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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a perspective through which we can explore the processes of joint 
development and security interventions in conflict-prone regions.  In employing the 
experiences of the Northern Region of Ghana as my case study, this thesis examines the ways 
that the rationales of both development and security interventions are articulated in the field of 
practice.  The central argument of the thesis is that most analyses of aid interventions, 
particularly those stemming from mainstream development literature, rarely interrogate the 
underlying rationales and assumptions behind the ideas, strategies and discourses employed in 
aid intervention.  Notably, these rationales and assumptions tend to reduce the complexity of 
development and security challenges, and, as an end result, facilitate the implementation of 
technical solutions.  The translation of development and security discourses and strategies into 
programmable practices as they encounter a local population is characterized by complex 
processes.   Following the central argument of the thesis, the key research question interrogates 
the way that the rationales behind development aid and security interventions have been 
articulated in conflict- prone Northern Region and how they have been received by the local 
population.  With the overarching aim of understanding the complexities associated with the 
joint articulation of development and security programmes, this study provides a unique and 
critical analysis of international development and security practices.   The study also provides 
deeper understanding of the broad socio-economic and political contexts for the delivery of aid 
interventions.  I scrutinise the rationales behind these interventions through the critical 
examination of colonial practices and three contemporary interventions: 1) Region-wide 
interventions, 2) the UN Human Security Programme, and 3) Post-liberal interventions used as 
a panacea to prevailing implementation challenges.  Based on the analysis of archival 
documents, alongside policy, program, and interview documents, my study reveals the ways 
that the development-security nexus perpetrates liberal practices in the declared conflict-prone 
Northern Region of Ghana.  I also evaluate the way that the development-security nexus 
reconstitutes individuals as resilient subjects through practices of empowerment and 
entrepreneurialism, and demonstrates the contestations, contradictions, and colonial features 
that characterise interventions in the field of articulation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
This dissertation focuses on the Northern Region of Ghana in order to critically examine the 
joint articulation of development and security interventions by development aid actors in a 
post-conflict region. Critical focal areas of examination are the rationales and assumptions that 
underpin the strategies and discourses of aid and security interventions.  The central argument 
of the thesis is that most analyses of aid interventions, particularly those stemming from 
mainstream development literature, rarely interrogate the underlying rationales and 
assumptions behind the ideas, strategies and discourses of interventions.  Notably, these 
rationales and assumptions tend to reduce the complexity of development and security 
challenges, and thereby facilitate the institutionalization of technical solutions.  Furthermore, 
the translation of development and security discourses and strategies into programmable 
practices as they encounter a local population are characterized by complex processes.  
Following the central argument of the thesis, the key research question examines the ways that 
the rationales behind development aid and security interventions are articulated in the conflict-
prone Northern Region and received by the local population.  The study draws and expands on 
Duffield’s critical perspective on the development-security nexus as a theoretical framework to 
examine joint interventions.  Furthermore, in relation to the independent concepts of 
development and security, I again draw on work of scholars, including Ferguson, Mosse, and 
Chandler.  
The empirical analysis is based on case studies of aid programmes articulated 
predominantly in communities of Tamale, the regional capital, as well as Yendi.  The analysis 
also benefits from discourse analysis, namely in terms of the documents aid agencies have 
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published relating to the Northern Region.  This chapter takes the following format: first, I 
situate my research, and then examine the scope and significance of my study.  A section that 
recounts my research methodology follows, and finally I summarize the chapters that constitute 
this thesis.   
 
Situating My Research   
The international development policy directions and priorities have taken a new path from one 
that calls for humanitarian assistance through relief aid in conflict-ridden societies toward 
attempting to secure post-conflict societies.  The move to secure post-conflict societies has 
been configured through the articulation of complementary and coordinated development and 
security interventions (Heathershaw, 2008).  Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah (2010) posit 
that the need for stabilization has necessitated the integration of both development and security 
interventions in post-conflict, recovery societies.  Following the need to secure post-conflict 
societies is the shift in the meaning of security that has placed the human being in a central, 
pivotal role.  Mahub-ul Haq redefines human security to reflect a new notion of security and 
argues that: “the world is entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change-
and change dramatically.  Security will be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory.  
Security of individuals, not just nations.  Security through development, not through arms. 
Security of all the people everywhere - in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their 
communities, in their environment” (Haq, 1995, p. 115).  The attempted fusion of security and 
development interventions is evident in the UNDP’s broad notion of security.  Thus, the 
UNDP’s framing of security encapsulates human development components, specifically in 
reference to needs.  A call for a joint articulation of security and development interventions 
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within the UN aid system and other bilateral/multilateral institutions led Duffield (2001) to 
frame the development-security nexus (DSN) as a new intervention lexicon in conflict and 
post-conflict societies.  Conceptually, the DSN is an integrative framework for the articulation 
of joint development and security interventions, with a goal of securing a conflict-prone region.  
In my view, it is imperative to examine the underlying logic that translates the DSN into 
concrete programs and strategies intended to secure conflict-ridden regions.  Another issue 
worthy of consideration is whether or not this reciprocal relationship between development and 
security exists at the operational and institutional levels.  Evidence from this study indicates an 
overwhelming absence of congruent working interactions between development and security 
actors. An important conclusion drawn from this study is that the alleged nexus between 
diverse aid actors in a conflict-prone region is a fiction, and that, in actual practice, this absence 
perpetrates autonomous ‘business as usual’ practices.   
The World Bank, in its World Development Report entitled Conflict, Security and 
Development and published in 2011, describes the reciprocal relationship between security and 
development, but more importantly, it foregrounds a ‘new’ area of intervention as its core.  The 
central message for the prevention of conflict and the enhancement of security exhibits a desire 
to begin: “strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, 
justice and jobs [as a] crucial to break cycles of violence” (p. 2).  From my perspective, such 
predetermined remedial measures to end violence and insecurity in various forms pose 
legitimate concerns in regards to the ways in which problems have been framed in the first 
place.  A problematic notion embedded in these kinds of calculated declaratory statements is 
the presupposition that aid agencies can know the precise causes of security and development 
problems.  The framing of existing international aid interventions as new universal blueprints 
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for homogenized conflict prone regions tends to foreclose alternative options. This continuous 
interventionist interest is reflected in the report’s first declared track of international action, 
that is “preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, jobs and justice” 
(p. 270).  The other declared intervention area relates to administrative reforms that will aid in 
expediting the pace of delivery.  From my perspective, the omission of the rationale and 
assumptions behind proposed interventions signifies a research gap that must be filled. The 
report gives the impression that external interventions are objectively neutral, trans-ideological, 
necessary and desirable for security and development improvements within developing 
countries.  
The 2011 World Development Report (hereafter designated as the ‘2011 Report’), 
however, did not provide any critical, introspective analysis of the past program failures apart 
from a reference to administrative reforms and the need for the proper sequencing of 
interventions.  I suggest that the importance given to administrative reforms will serve to 
simplify the complex security and development problems in order to foist a universally-
imagined technical, timeless solution on the region.  Further scrutiny suggests that a liberal 
ideological and positivistic epistemological and ontological perspective heavily influenced the 
2011 Report. The dominance of a liberal orientation in the 2011 Report necessitates the 
interrogation of rationales and assumptions about interventions undertaken in the name of the 
DSN.  Furthermore, these liberal interventions that were prioritized by the 2011 Report are 
essentially the recycling of old practices that precede conception of the DSN.  In this vein, the 
UNJHSP is an embodiment of the DSN, and, as will be discussed in Chapter five, this DSN is a 
replication of existing international development frameworks.  An analysis, therefore, must be 
conducted at all levels of the process, from the source of the ideas to the labeling and framing 
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practices put in use.  More importantly, the exploration of the rationales and assumptions that 
underlie interventions and their reception by the target population in the localities needs to be 
examined.   
The coming into vogue of a conflict prevention notion as a precondition for poverty 
reduction tends to forge reciprocal linkages between security and development issues by the 
aid industry.  Picciotto claims that “development has always been viewed as dependent on 
adequate security conditions, but a causal two-way causal connection has not been established” 
(2006, p.114).  The interventionist policy implications are that, notwithstanding the absence of 
empirical evidential causal relations between security and development, the fusion of the two 
concepts is deemed to have instrumental relevance.  The study’s findings suggest that an 
attempt to draw causal connections between security and development interventions is a 
restrictive exercise. Furthermore, the bounded notion of the DSN suggests that it can only be 
used as an attempt to regulate society.  The DSN, however, does not constitute a dependable 
theoretical and empirical framework to initiate transformational strategies to secure a post-
colonial region like the Northern Region.    
An acclaimed interest in tackling global poverty and conflicts has led to the adoption of 
the DSN as an interventionist lexicon within the donor community.  The UN Report (2004) 
from the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, notes that:  
Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is 
only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop.  Extreme 
poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also 
provide a fertile breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conflict.  
Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their governments help 
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poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals. (p. 9)  
This UN report aims to attach a reciprocal relationship between security and development, 
which raises a vital question about the authenticity of the ‘newness’ of these twin phenomena.  
Significantly, the framing of the ‘newness’ problem has become the established interventionist 
orthodoxy of the aid industry.  The questionable authenticity of the ‘newness’ tag stems from 
the fact that the dual challenges endemic to security and development are hardly evidenced by 
their colonial antecedents.  
A crucial note here is that the disappointing outcomes of the past development aid 
interventions continue to re-occur under the rubric of the current DSN.  Bain (2007), Richmond 
(2011), and Denney (2011) attest to the failures associated to the DSN interventions that have 
been blamed on the instrumental liberal orientation of the joint articulation of the proposed 
interventions.  Denney (2011, p. 290), in her work related to the DFID post-conflict 
interventions in Sierra Leone, posits that the poverty reduction expected to follow the intensive 
Security Sector Reforms did not materialize because the country’s PRSP strategies were too 
broad and not deep enough to address the structural bottlenecks.  Particularly, this study 
suggests that by limiting focus to the outcomes of PRSPs, for instance, and without questioning 
the technical solutions proffered, the complex relational dynamics that undergird the problems 
will be obscured.   The findings of the study suggest that interventionist rationales and 
assumptions are factors that ensure the silencing of relational factors used to perpetuate a 
technocratic orientation of programs.   As indicated above, there have been significant 
instrumental critiques dealing with the DSN, but an area that remains under-researched relates 
directly to the ideas, rationales and assumptions of security and development interventions as 
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well as the relational factors the DSN has to contend with.  Also under researched is the way 
interventions play out empirically on the field of practice.  
The main task of this study, therefore, is to examine the intervention rationales, 
assumptions and relational factors that are dearth in the DSN literature.  My study is grounded 
on the position that the site of intervention is not merely an object amenable for perpetual 
manipulation.  International development aid interventions constitute the interplay of an 
intervener over an intervened population.   The term ‘intervened population’ is used to denote 
the aid agencies prioritization of individuals as the focal point of development and security.   
The implication of this ‘human’ dimension of interventions is that an examination of external 
aid interventions must not be limited to the viewpoint of the intervener, a viewpoint that has 
been the most frequent area of research conducted particularly by international relations 
scholars such as Bain (2007) and MacGinty (2010).  MacGinty (2010, p. 398) argues for aid 
agencies to move away from ‘best practices,’ and take into consideration the urgent necessity 
for aid agencies working in conflict regions to embrace hybridization.  Further, MacGinty 
deems hybridization a precondition for the successful implementation of aid interventions.  The 
study findings, however, suggest that the mere recognition of a need for hybridization does not 
necessarily provide a framework to understanding the complexities inherent in the articulation 
of aid interventions.  A vital discovery elucidated in my research is that the diverse ethnic 
groups and disparate polities do not lend themselves to smooth instrumental hybridity.  The 
competing, diverse polities of ethnic groups are situated within the broader complex and 
adverse colonial and post-colonial relational (social and political) context in which the 
Northern Region is placed.   
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An important issue to note is that the Northern Region constitutes the epicenter of 
conflict and insecurity in Ghana.  This observation is attested to by the UN FTHS (2009) which 
states that, for the period 1980-2002, the Northern Region alone accounted for 19 out of 26 of 
the major conflicts that occurred in the entire three regions in Northern Ghana.  Furthermore, 
Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) note that, since the inception of the 1992 4
th
 republican constitution of 
Ghana, the Northern Region has remained a security and governance challenge not only to the 
rest of the nation but also to the entire West African sub-region.  Major conflicts in the 
Northern Region have been predominantly chieftaincy-related, and have involved boundary 
disputes among different ethnic groups.  Since 1994, the year that recorded the highest number 
of casualties in the history of the region and the country, the thorniest conflict has been the 
Dagbon crisis.   
The Dagbon crisis is an inter-dynasty/intra-ethnic chieftaincy succession dispute 
between the only two eligible gates, the Abudus and Andanis. The Dagbon conflict also 
resulted in a regicide in 2002, when the Ya-Na, Yakubu Andani, was murdered alongside many 
of his supporters by the Abudu faction, as has been reported by the Wuaku Commission 
(Government of Ghana, 2003).  The three day conflict (March 22-25, 2002) occurred in Yendi, 
which is the traditional capital of the Dagombas, and the location of the Gbewaa Palace. The 
conflict later extended to Tamale, which is inhabited mainly by the Andani faction, and all in 
all several villages were destroyed as noted by Seini and Tsikata (2004).  The government 
imposed a state of emergency on Tamale and Yendi in order to mitigate the violence, a 
situation that finally ended in August 2004.  My contention is that the state of emergency 
fundamentally served as a crisis management option because the state did not pursue long-term 
structural and institutional measures in order to engage the underlying factors of the conflict.  
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Moreover, the seriousness of the Dagbon crisis relates to three critical factors.  First, the 
Dagombas, based on the 2010 national census, comprise at least 40% of the entire population 
of Northern Region.  With this high population of Dagombas divided along the two main gates, 
the security of the nation was compromised. Tamale, the administrative, commercial and 
financial capital of the study region, and Yendi constitute the region’s development hub.  The 
conflicts, according to McGaffey (2006), have left the two areas at a developmental standstill, 
resulting in negative implications for the entire region.  Thirdly, the Dagbon crisis, more than 
any other conflict in the country, has captured the national political consciousness.  To be more 
specific, the Andani are perceived to be sympathetic towards the ruling government, the 
National Democratic Congress.  On the other hand, the Abudus are perceived to be aligned 
with the New Patriotic Party the most dominant opposition political party (Tonah, 2012).  The 
infiltration of national partisan politics has contributed significantly to the unending nature of 
the Dagbon crisis.  The absence of serious security enforcement by the various governments is 
made worse by their failure to fully and comprehensively implement the various 
recommendations proposed by the commissions of inquiries as a road-map to find lasting 
solutions. 
Succession disputes are rooted in both pre-colonial and post-colonial history of the 
various ethnic groups involved.  The 2002 regicide, according to the Wuaku Commission, is 
traced to 1967, following the death of Ya-Na Abdulai.  An essential trigger in the conflict is the 
reinterpretation of succession rules.  The 1930 succession format which, according to Ferguson 
and Wilks (1970), was an integral part of the Dagomba constitution, limited eligibility for the 
position of Ya-Na to three main dukedoms: Mion, Savelugu and Karaga.  With the pursuit of a 
new colonial policy of election of officers to administer the local councils, however, the Abudu 
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gate petitioned the Dagbon Council in May 1948 and advocated for an election to the position 
of Ya-Na by a small committee of elders (MacGaffey, 2006, p. 82).  The Andanis, however, 
rejected this Abudu proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with their traditions.  
Furthermore, the Andanis viewed this election proposal as a way for the Abudus to dominate 
the Na-ship, because the majority of chiefs that would elect the Ya-Na were aligned with the 
Abudus.  The election proposal bid by the Abudus did not take effect until 1954 following the 
death of the Ya-Na, Mahama (Abudu).  Staniland (1975) notes that, contrary to the procedure 
in place that required the eligible successor to be a chief of one of the three dukedoms, this 
time around, this strict rule was side stepped when the regent, Gbonlana Abdulai, was elected 
as the new Ya-Na. The Andanis felt short-changed by the enskinnment of Abdulai, and this 
instigated a series of violent conflicts and petitioned the Dagon State Council to reverse the 
enskinnment.  In search of a solution, the Andani leadership, alleged to have close ties with the 
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government, appealed to the government to de-skin Ya-Na 
Abdulai.  The CPP government did not approve to this request for de-skinnment, but rather 
constituted a commission of inquiry chaired by Justice Opoku-Afari to investigate the Andani 
petition and recommend measures to restore the rotational system between the two gates. The 
committee established that the Andanis had been denied their turn to occupy the Na-Ship, and 
therefore recommended that, upon the death of the then Ya-Na Abdulai, the next two Ya-Nas 
must be enskinned from the Andani gate to atone for the previous anomaly.  The government 
passed Legislative Instrument 59 in 1960 to restore the rotational system between the two 
gates.  
Upon the death of the Ya-Na Abdulai in 1967, the enforcement of Legislative 
Instrument 59 was met with fierce contestation between the regent, Gbonlana Muhammed, and 
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the Mion-Lana Andani.  In 1968, the Mion-Lana Andani was enskinned as the new Ya-Na, but, 
as noted by Ferguson and Wilks (1970) and Staniland (1975), the Abudus consistently 
challenged the legitimacy and authority of Ya-Na Andani.  The Abudus ultimately laid their 
grievances before the new government, the United Progress Party, as a last option to depose 
Ya-Na Andani.  In response to the Abudus’s petition, the government of the United Progress 
Party instituted an investigative committee, chaired by Mate-Kole, to inquire into their 
grievances.  This Mate-Kole Committee faulted Legislative Instrument 59, and therefore 
nullified the Na-ship of Andani.  In 1974, however, the new military government, the National 
Redemption Council (NRC), based on series of petitions from the Andanis, established a 
committee headed by Justice Ollenu to inquire into the issues between the two groups.  The 
Ollenu Committee overturned the findings of the Mate-Kole committee and restored 
Legislative Instrument 59. With the new ruling, Ya-Na Mahamadu Abdulai was de-skinned 
and Yakubu Andani was enskinned as the new Ya-Na. But the contestations from the Abudu 
end continued (MacGaffey, 2006).  In 1986, the contestations between the two gates were 
referred to the Supreme Court, and by a 6-1 decision, judgment was made in favor of the 
Andanis.  The Supreme Court ruling, however, was rejected by the Abudus who felt that the 
government had influenced the ruling.  Abudu dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling 
rather intensified the tension and violence between the two gates.  In the end, the military 
intervened to quell the hostilities, but the underlying grievances and motivations behind the 
hostilities were left unaddressed.   
The death of the deskinned Ya-Na Mahamadu Abdulai in 1988 exacerbated the tension 
due to the entrenched positions taken by both gates in the interpretation of their traditions.  The 
Andanis objected to Abdulai’s burial in the Gbewaa palace on the grounds that he died outside 
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the palace, and his burial was thus against the Dagbon tradition.  On the other hand, the 
Abudus insisted that he died as a Ya-Na, and was hence entitled to a royal burial.  As of today, 
this burial conundrum has yet to be resolved and thus remains a possible source of conflict as 
suggested by the Wuaku Commission.  Furthermore, the challenge to Ya-Na Yakubu Andani’s 
kingship continued and, by 2002, these contestations had become intense.  It has been alleged 
that the Abudus were energized when the New Patriotic Party government assumed office, 
because they had made an electoral promise to de-skin Ya-Na Yakubu Andani.  In one 
instance, MacGaffey (2006) notes how the Abudus organized their version of the Bugum 
festival under the protection of state security in order to undermine the authority of Ya-Na 
Yakubu Andani.  A curfew was imposed in Yendi, but the regional minister, in a unilateral 
decision, lifted the curfew and violent conflict that ensued for three days began.   During the 
conflict, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani was killed.  
The political opportunism of the various governments and the northern political elites 
has played a significant role in perpetuating the unending conflicts of the Dagbon Crisis. The 
Wuaku Commission, which was mandated to investigate the regicide, blamed past 
governments and individuals from both gates who had ties to the government for their 
complicity in the Dagbon crisis.  The Wuaku Commission also identified pervasive poverty 
and the structural underdevelopment of the Northern Region as major factors that predisposed 
the Dagbon to.  In search for a road map to restore peace, the two gates in Dagbon and the New 
Patriotic Party government, with technical support from the UNDP, formed a Committee of 
Eminent Chiefs to work on modalities to achieve peace.  This Committee of Eminent Chiefs 
worked through dialogue and negotiation processes and, in 2006, arrived at five benchmarks 
for peace and security.  These benchmarks are as follows: i) the burial of the late Ya Na Andani 
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II; ii) the installation of the regent of the late king; iii) the performance of the funeral of the 
deposed Ya Na Mahamadu Abdulai IV; iv) the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Yakubu 
Andani II; and v) the selection and enskinnment of a new Ya Na for Dagbon (Tonah, 2012, p. 
10).  In terms of implementation of these benchmarks, only the first two had been implemented 
as of September 2013. 
 Because the Committee of Eminent chiefs did not provide an acceptable framework 
that dealt with the root cause(s) of the Dagbon crisis, implementing the other three benchmarks 
will be difficult.  Mutual mistrust between the two gates has significantly contributed to sustain 
the tension.  In 2011, the Abudu leadership suspected the Andani faction to be stock-piling 
arms in preparation to appoint new chiefs for the skins, and wrote a petition to the President of 
Ghana.  In that letter, the Abudu leadership states: “This is a recipe for conflict in Dagbon. 
Neither the Kug-Na nor the Kampakuya-Na has power to authorize any regent to perform his 
deceased father’s funeral. Any attempt by the Kampakuya-Na or his agents to appoint a chief 
to skins currently occupied by regents from the Abudu Gate, will be fiercely resisted” 
(Ghanaian Chronicle, October 21, 2011).  The cumulative effect of this situation is that the 
Dagbon crisis is still raging, notwithstanding numerous interventions.  
In the wake of the failure to resolve the Dagbon crisis, and against the backdrop of 
numerous inter-ethnic conflicts and the endemic poverty in the Northern Region, the UN JHSP 
has adopted the human security framework as a remedial measure.  The human security 
framework constitutes one of the frameworks of the DSN.  The UN JHSP has adopted Tamale 
and Yendi as sites of intervention, with the expectation that the programs will be extended to 
other conflict districts in the coming years.  The UN JHSP comprises six UN agencies: the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
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the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Food Program 
(WFP), United Nations University (UNU) and the United Nations Children Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF).  It is worthwhile to note that security interventions by these aid agencies have been 
on-going in the region since the Konkomba-Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja War in 1994. An 
important finding of my study is that the UNJHSP security interventions, as with those 
development interventions, are very much akin to the 1994 conflict resolution interventions as 
discussed in chapter four.   
The apparent unending insecurity related tensions and poverty conditions, in my 
judgment, raise questions about how aid interventions were, and are, dispensed.  These 
questions are further buoyed by mainstream literature, such as work by Sachs (2005) and Paris 
(2010) who view development and security challenges as technical problems that can be solved 
by silencing the historical, and social-relational dimensions at work in the study region.  The 
likely effect of these liberal-oriented mainstream beliefs is that  short-term technical solutions 
are prescribed and conceptualized, instead of long-term approaches being considered to address 
the to address a complex set of interlocking problems. It is necessary, therefore, to undertake a 
critical discourse analysis (which includes relational aspects) of security and development 
interventions that incorporates the region’s development history.  A critical discourse analysis 
will entail an examination of the pertinent social-relational processes that underpin nascent 
poverty reduction strategies.  The choice of region for the focus of my study is to provide 
historical context/background and social relations dynamics that are deficient in a joint 
articulation of development and security interventions.  It is my contention that insights into 
the social relations of the DSN will bridge the ahistorism and depoliticization that have 
characterized the mainstream development and security literature.  
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The choice of the Northern Region as the study region provides both conceptual and 
empirical bases to assess whether the normative DSN functions an appropriate framework to 
secure the conflict-prone region.  A major finding of my study reveals the inability of 
international aid interventions to transform poverty, conflict and insecurity conditions in the 
region.  This inability on the part of the aid industry to secure the region gives ample 
justification to seriously engage the rationales and assumptions that underpin international aid 
practices.   
There is a paucity of literature on the region that fully examines the fusion of 
development and security interventions in the Northern Region.  Oelbaum (2010) attempts to 
draw a reciprocal linkage between spatial poverty and ethnic conflict traps in the region, 
occasioned by the implementation of SAP.  His work provides useful insight about the need for 
aid agencies to avoid the fallacy of unit universalization in conflict risk assessment.  He (2010) 
further proposes that serious considerations be accorded to politico-institutional issues as well 
as to prioritizing the political center before embarking on economic reforms.  Oelbaum’s 
(2010) work, however, remains an analytical piece. The absence of empirical research denies 
us an understanding of the unavoidable complicated processes, contradictions and critical 
interrogations of programme rationales and assumptions.  On methodological grounds, his 
analytical work relies extensively on policy documents and official data that do not capture the 
intricate process of intervention.   Oelbaum’s (2010, p. 6) suggestion that political reforms are 
inevitable preconditions for successful economic reforms is suggestive of highly unfounded 
faith placed in the formal institutionalist logic by instrumentally driven development scholars 
such as Fukuyama.  This institutionalist logic finds expression in the good governance policy 
prescriptions for SSA countries.  But Kelsall et.al (2010), and Grindle (2010) note that the high 
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expectations on the part of the aid industry for good governance have not translated into 
projected outcomes in most SSA countries.  Grindle (2010) displays a limited theoretical 
understanding on the part of the aid agencies of the diverse political systems in SSA countries 
as one of the factors responsible for the failures.  I will add that the aid industry’s belief in ‘best 
practices,’ that are undergirded by the simplistic assumption of the easy transferability of such 
best practices could also explain program failures.   
A questionable inference derived from Oelbaum’s institutionalist logic is the 
assumption that successful economic reforms are guaranteed by sound institutions, and 
translate into effective politics.  The issue of political settlement has become a crucial area for 
serious consideration in view of Northern Region’s adverse reaction to incorporation as part of 
Ghana’s state formation.  Political settlements refer to continuous formal and informal 
institutional processes to create responsive and representative state-society relations.  
Based on my research findings, the failure of aid interventions to achieve their stated 
goals lies with the driving rationales and the assumptions of liberal institutionalism.  This 
liberal institutionalism points to the need for research that will instigate a new kind of thinking 
that recognizes the complex nature of multiple polities in the region.  
 In order for my study to critically interrogate numerous aid interventions, it will be 
necessary to move away from a one-sided analysis of the aid agencies perspectives, and move 
towards a much more complex view which examines relational practices and reflects upon 
interactions between an intervener and the intervened in a differentiated population.  The 
people of the Northern Region differ in terms of their ancestral origins, and social and political 
traditions for rule-making, meaning making and relations building, and also along linguistic 
and historical lines.  From my perspective, the extent to which the differences between the 
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people of the Northern Region play out as they encounter the aid interventions will provide 
insights into the shortcomings in the intervention programmes.  Studying the way aid 
interventions are encountered in the social and political systems of the localities is a way to 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of aid processes involved.  More particularly, this kind of 
interactional study will illuminate the inadequacy of positivistic-oriented liberal logics as they 
function in a post-colonial Northern Region.  Pursuit of this relational-oriented study, in effect, 
problematizes the calcified apolitical technical solutions that reduce the complexity of the 
intervention.  
To facilitate a critical social relational study, I conceive of the aid industry as a 
generator of protectorates.  A protectorate as defined by Mayall and de Oliveria is a “form of 
governance shaping the lives, at least in the medium term, of those under their aegis” (2011, p. 
3). In my view, this definition of a protectorate as proffered by Mayall and de Oliveria appears 
neutral and unproblematic.  If we consider the historical formation of the Northern Region, I 
view protectorates as deliberate and contradictory processes of governing communities in line 
with the priorities of the interveners and against the will of a significant number of the 
intervened population.  The most likely outcome of pursuing these kinds of programs is that 
interventions will be writ large with irreconcilable contestations with positive outcomes.   
It is important to recognize that, for successful creation of protectorates, problems must 
be framed as new to warrant reformatted forms of intervention.  The renewed intervention 
strategically delinks the historical past from the present.  Against the backdrop of the conflict 
and poverty conditions dating from the colonial era, my study therefore challenges aid 
industry’s framing of security and development problems in developing countries as new post-
cold war problems.  The elimination of the historical development policies and practices, in my 
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thinking, is a credibility enhancement strategy to waive the complicity of the interveners in the 
production and perpetuation of the problems in the conflict-ridden region.  Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation highlights the long historical processes of the conflict, insecurity and 
developmental challenges in the region.  An attempt to frame these challenges as new and 
urgent problems ends up simplifying the complex issues involved, with the objective of 
institutionalizing quick-fix solutions.   
In order to create new protectorates, the aid industry deploys spin control mechanisms 
to justify its practices.  As noted by Easterly (2005), the aid industry ignores their own past 
failed interventions with the likely tendency to replicate old approaches to solve an acclaimed 
new problem.  A confirmation of these recycled interventions is evidenced in the discussions in 
chapters five and six.  Chapter five reveals that the human security strategy of the UN JHSP, 
touted as a transformational framework, is actually driven primarily by the existing dominant 
frameworks.  These dominant frameworks are the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs), 
the frameworks of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and those put forward by the 
New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD).  Not only is the human security driven by 
existing dominant international development frameworks, its practices are articulated through 
capacity building, and community oriented approaches of empowerment and participation.   
Moreover, the aid industry, as a creator and regulator of new protectorates, thrives on 
the imposition of external ideas that are framed as universal blueprints.  This marks aid 
practices as intentional external interventionist activities.  Noticeable on the international aid 
landscape is the prescription of wide-ranging universal solutions anchored around 
empowerment, participation, good governance, capacity building and microfinance.  Through 
such predetermined solutions, the aid industry poses as a benign enterprise with a genuine 
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intention to secure the lives of the disparate poor and vulnerable.  I strongly suggest, however, 
that the aid industry is not a neutral entity, and this fact suggests that any intervention on their 
part must be scrutinized thoroughly in order to tease out the real interventionist logics.  
 As an external interventionist practice, my study reveals that the aid industry is imbued 
with its unique ontological, epistemological and ideological viewpoints which  underwrite the 
policies, programmes and projects that are imposed on framed ‘objects’.   My research also 
demonstrates that the intervened-upon society has its unique and diverse spatio-temporal 
features.  The intervened-upon society and population are far from being mere objects with no 
history, cultural worldview, meaning making, rule-making or social relational systems.  The 
vitality of the intervened population makes it a legitimate area of investigation regarding its 
encounter with the international aid interveners.  
An interrogation of the mainstream development aid practitioners and development 
scholars such as Collier (2007) continues to conceive of the aid industry interventions as 
development assistance or development cooperation.  In this respect, I deem that an 
interrogation of the rationales and assumptions that inform the policies and programmes of the 
aid industry as critical research pillars of my thesis.  In classifying the aid industry as an 
interventionist enterprise, this thesis adopts a critical development-security nexus perspective 
to provide insight into the empirical manifestations of aid interventions.  Benevolent 
assumptions about interventionist practices must be subjected to critical scrutiny in order to 
expose their congenital contradictions.  Notable among these ‘benign’ assumptions are the 
right to intervene, the necessity for intervention and desirability of the region to intervention. 
Following the above discussions that underpin the central research argument, the main 
research question for my study has been formulated.  I ask; How are the rationales of 
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development aid and security interventions articulated by the aid agencies and received by the 
local population in conflict prone Northern Region? This key research question is vital to 
expose the actors, processes, imaginations and complex natures of the local setting, which 
makes direct interventions problematic.  Through my key research question, the inevitable 
imbalances in power relations rife in interventions and the neglected social relational factors 
that defy interventionist rationales will be laid bare.  Power relations and contestations are 
inevitable between aid institutions and actors, government agencies, and the heterogeneous 
local population.  Secondary to the central research question, another important question is 
formulated as: How and in what ways are security and poverty framed by development aid 
practitioners and local actors in Ghana?  In policy-oriented literature, interventions are treated 
as neutral or scientific practices that provide universal solutions as evidenced in the 
prescriptions embodied in the SAP and the MDGs.  My study suggests that framing processes 
are vital to the understanding of aid interventions.  It is necessary to interrogate the framing 
vectors and avoid the fiction that interventions are neutral or objective practices.  
Another set secondary questions examined in this study asks to what extent are the 
poverty reduction programs addressing the security challenges in the Northern Region of 
Ghana? And what are the specific operational and institutional challenges associated with the 
joint implementation of poverty reduction and security programs in Northern Region of 
Ghana?   The essence of the first question is to problematize the interdependent relationship 
between poverty and security as conceived of by the DSN and thereby illuminate the broader 
relational factors at play. The second question provides insight into whether the DSN works 
empirically or just as an idealized imagination.  Finally, an examination of the implementation 
challenges will provide information about the likely policy ramifications.  
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The ultimate objective of this study is to deepen our understanding of the complexities 
of development aid that has been geared toward poverty reduction in the conflict-sensitive area 
of the Northern Region. Notably, the study region has been engulfed in intractable ethnic 
conflict for at least four centuries and constitutes one of the top three poor regions in the 
country.  The Northern Region is also a hub of international development aid and security 
interventions in Ghana.  It is of the highest importance to conduct this research considering the 
pertinent contextual factors and my quest for a deeper understanding of the complexities in aid 
delivery practices in the region. 
 
Scope and Significance of study 
Development and security interventions that have been undertaken by the networked aid 
industry entail diverse practices of conceptualization, imagination and ideologies that are 
further underpinned by rationales and assumptions.  These practices frame the programmes and 
projects that come face-to-face with post-colonial sites of intervention.  Various historical and 
social relations influence and continue to shape interactions between the interveners and the 
intervened-upon population.   
This study contributes to the critical development and security literature of the aid 
industry.  Stewart (2009) and Kliengebiel (2006), from a progressive standpoint, advocate for 
the adoption of DSN as an interventionist model for the recovery and transformation of post-
conflict regions.  Such prescriptive assertions do not provide grounded conceptual and 
empirical insights into how and what programmes and projects are articulated in the name of 
development and security on the ground.  My study contributes to providing empirical insights 
into the actual practices and processes of aid interventions.  My study also brings the 
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problematic instrumental mobilization of development and security as a panacea to secure post-
conflict and postcolonial society to the forefront of aid discussions.  A major finding of my 
research exposes the contestable processes of the articulation of the interventions under the 
guise of the constructed DSN.  A very important finding of my study is the gross inadequacy of 
the DSN as model/framework to address the intractable development and security challenges in 
the Northern Region. The failure of the UN JHSP in particular to secure the localities of 
intervention and the region as a whole suggests the need to examine the liberal logics that drive 
the programme.   
The significance of my study is the way it exposes the conceptual and empirical 
weaknesses of interventionist tropes such as capacity building, empowerment and participation 
approaches that form the core activities of UNJHSP as well as the other aid agencies discussed 
in chapter four.  Another revelation my study highlights is that the employment of the DSN 
framework to transform a conflict prone region maintains the short-term and narrow 
interventions in the region, thereby institutionalizing a status quo policy regime.  My study is 
significant because it provides a lens through which to interrogate on-going security 
considerations, conflicts and development strategies as the underlying framework for post-
2015 development agendas by the UN and its aid industry acolytes.  
This study’s significance is in the revelation that the pursuit of the DSN is a strategy to 
promote crisis management practices through the neoliberal-oriented interventions.  On the 
basis of information received during my fieldwork, I posit that the prevailing interventions 
deliberately seek to produce self-reliant individuals against inevitable threats, rather than 
focusing on the transformation of people and the society at large.  Because this study is 
informed by critical political economy considerations and historical background, it highlights a 
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way to move beyond the narrow DSN framework toward an exploration of the social-relational 
approach and its role in the in the quest for long-term transformational or emancipatory goals.  
In addition, my research brings a critical relational perspective that is missing in the DSN 
literature, and provides a more complex formula for solutions than that reinvented by 
interventionist rationales and assumptions.  Significantly, the study provides legitimate 
groundwork to move away from stylized understandings of the imagined nexus to interrogate 
the actual discourses and practices of development aid actors.  
Another significant intervention in my study is its contribution to the bourgeoning 
literature on resilience as an integral part of the interventionist rationality of practices in post-
conflict societies.  Following Lentzos and Rose (2009), resilience is defined as “….a 
systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and 
material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex 
worlds without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary” (p. 243).  From the 
context of the development and security literature, Chandler (2012), based on an analytical 
study of the “Responsibility to Protect’ orientation of human security, suggests that resilience 
functions as a new DSN framework.  However, my empirical findings suggest that resilience is 
driven by the same failed rationales and assumptions that ground aid interventions.  From my 
perspective, resilience is a tactic to perpetuate the interventionist assumptions and rationales, a 
fact that certainly calls for critical examination of new aid frameworks. Thus, resilience has 
become a tactic to re-enact human agency as the main instrument for social change, 
independent of prevailing structural and institutional conditions.  Essentially, the recourse to 
resilience effectively consolidates the problematization of the local as the source of conflict, 
thus normalizing the failed assumptions and rationales that ground aid and security 
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interventions.  A vital implication of adoption of a resilience approach is to further add to the 
complexity reduction mission of the aid industry.  This complexity reduction initiative, based 
on the study’s findings, is precipitated by a negation of historical context, the global political 
economy, and the structural and domestic factors that shape development and security 
problems.  Furthermore, renewed faith in a resilience framework, based on the findings, 
indicates that long-term transformational development of post-conflict societies is not a 
consideration for international development actors.  Hence, securing a region through the DSN 
is highly impossible, and this impossibility has the tendency to institutionalize failure that 
results in the instigation of a formulation of ‘new’ or recycled approaches. My study confirms 
that if there is an incipient shift in the meaning of security, individual empowerment will result 
in a decrease in risks and threats.  The new understanding of security is markedly different 
from the UNDP’s concept of security as ‘freedom from fear and want’.   The adoption of this 
resilience approach is situated within the context of an overwhelming emphasis on the 
adaptability and flexibility of individuals as precondition for security.  My study concludes that 
the adoption of resilience framework in the wake of colossal failures in securing the region is 
an attempt to normalize problems and maintain the prevailing unequal and contentious social 
relational order. 
A significant element of this study involves the addition of a regional dimension to the 
critical development and security literature.  The literature on conflict and development 
indicates that there is an overwhelming emphasis placed on broad conflicts at the state/national 
level with less emphasis on local and regional or non-state conflicts.  This overriding focus on 
state-level crises, according to Fukudar-Parr, Ashwill, Chiappa and Messineo (2008), might 
result in a conflagration of existing regional-based conflicts. The lack of attention given to the 
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framed non-state conflicts can be attributed to the narrow conventional definitions of war, 
which is primarily centered on contested combat against the state (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2008, p. 
2).  My study aims to fill this regional gap in both the mainstream and critical literature, 
especially analyzed from the perspective of a postcolonial region.  From my perspective, this 
study will provide a solid nuanced understanding of conflict at the micro and local levels in 
terms of how everyday struggles are generated and sustained.  This will provide a better prism 
for interpreting the wider processes of development and security relations toward poverty 
reduction.  
 
Methodological Approach- Qualitative Case Study and Field Methods 
In order to capture the inherently complex and contested processes of aid interventions, I adopt 
a qualitative case study approach.  Peck and Theodore (2011, 2012) note that in the mutations 
of mobile policies in practical economies, “beliefs and behaviours of policy actors are 
constitutively embedded within networks of knowledge expertise (many of which are trans-
local and trans-scalar), as well as within localized socio-institutional milieu.  Policy designs, 
technologies, and frames are likewise regarded as complex and evolving social constructions 
rather than as concretely fixed objects” (2012, p. 23).  The crux of this statement is that 
international development practices involve policy formulation and programming processes 
that are reflective of the standpoints of the actors involved, who represent institutional interests 
and worldviews.  It was necessary, therefore, to interview the core actors in the aid industry in 
order to have a better understanding discourses, ideas and frameworks that drive interventions.  
My methodological perspective is guided by my belief that a focus on development outcomes 
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without any sort of corresponding engagement with aid actors to seek clarification of the 
processes is not productive research.    
From my methodological perspective, the intervention site of the Northern Region is an 
unpredictable, unstable and chaotic region that generates various kinds of negotiated orders, 
accommodations, oppositions, separations and contradictions.  In addition, the field is non-
linear, wherein an assumption of discretely interconnected sectors is far from reality.  The 
plausible implication of this factor is that unexpected outcomes are common, rather than rare.  
The discrepancy in outcomes, in my view, requires the interrogation of the content and sources 
of the ideas that undergird aid intervention plans, particularly the unstated assumptions or 
rationales behind these interventions.  
In considering the position enunciated above, the empirical methodological approach 
adopted for this study is a critical interpretivist method, and challenges the pure scientific 
tradition currently used, because the field of intervention is complex and in constant 
reconstruction.  The scientific tradition, as I understand it, is a methodological and 
philosophical tradition that postulates that social phenomena can be studied independent of 
human senses, and makes objectivity one of its vital canons.  Furthermore, the scientific 
tradition is underpinned by a positivistic ethos, which means that it seeks to generate universal 
rules that can be generalized to different contexts.   In this scientific tradition, then, peculiar 
societal differences (history, political systems, colonialism, etc.) do not matter.  The neglect of 
societal differences in the scientific tradition is attributable to its underlying assumptions of 
uniformity and regularity in even the most diverse societies.  A further objection to a positivist 
methodological approach is that it dwells on the notion that there exist observable regularities 
in nature that can be described, and linear patterns that can be established (Moses and Knutsen, 
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2007; Searle, 1995).  The interpretivist approach recognizes the important roles of the observer 
and social relations in creating the patterns we study as social scientists.  This approach implies 
that all knowledge is produced and constructed (Stake, 2005, p. 452; Flyvberg, 2011, p. 303).  
In supporting the interpretive research methodology, Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 204) and 
Mabry (2008, p. 216) argue for an ontology of truth and a subjectivist epistemology in which 
meaning is socially constructed.  This ontology of truth that underpins interpretive 
methodology does not subscribe to foundational truths, because it presupposes that reality is 
not just out there as foundational reference point.  Thus I adopted a different interpretive 
method for my thesis to enable me examine broader and more core aspects of human life.  Vital 
core issues of human life include institutional power, social relations, insecurity, poverty, 
conflict and nature of global political economy.  
The core issues that my study examines are not given variables that can be abstracted 
apriori.  In following Lash (2009), who suggests that an essential way of knowing is predicated 
upon the relevance of the experiences of people who live in unpredictable social systems where 
chaos and uncertainty characterize daily challenges to survival.  Chaos, uncertainty and 
messiness are relevant features of my study region, a fact that makes it prudent for me to adopt 
a qualitative approach to facilitate a better understanding of the nature of relations among 
diverse polities.  Such a methodological orientation has deepened my understanding of the 
complexities of development aid and poverty reduction in the conflict prone Northern Region. 
The uniqueness of my study region and the pertinent issues examined in my study 
essentially required me to use this kind of context-specific approach.  Berg (2007, p. 285) 
describes a case study as in-depth qualitative study of one or a few illustrative cases.  The 
outstanding advantage of utilizing the case study method is akin to what Geertz (1973) calls 
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‘thick description.’  These descriptions are strong motivators to gain a detailed and distinct 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. This method has also influenced my decision to 
undertake a qualitative case study research approach.   
Qualitative case studies entail investigating particular phenomenon as a complete whole 
as much as possible, particularly in real-life contexts.  Case studies are suitable for research 
work that has no definite boundary between the context and the phenomenon, which is 
essential to provide insightful information.  A qualitative case study is equally suitable for 
researching complex phenomena such as conflict, security and development issues that 
demonstrate the irreducibility of the uncertainty of real life conditions into statistically 
predictable and generalizable variables.  One of the reasons that influenced my decision to 
adopt a qualitative case study is the complex nature of the phenomena of my research study.  
This complexity lies in the disparate ethnic groups structured by colonial practices that have 
endured postcolonial political engagements as well as chronic poverty and insecurity 
conditions.   
Furthermore, Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2011) utilized a qualitative case study 
approach extensively in their work Contesting Development: Participatory Projects and Local 
Conflict Dynamics in Indonesia.  This work has been situated around the conflict-development 
nexus used as the framework to examine the World Bank’s Kecamaten Development Program 
undertaken in selected districts that were badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis in 
Indonesia.   Barron, Diprose and Woolcock justify their use of the qualitative case study 
because of the process undertaken to trace the orientation of their research.  They were 
interested in the identification of the mechanisms and processes that trigger, sustain or resolve 
conflict (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock, 2011, p. 272).  Through the adoption of a case study 
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approach, their work brought to the fore symbolic contestations that characterized aid 
interventions.  My study examines the processes of these kinds of interventions.  A research 
endeavor like mine therefore requires the examination of the interplay of institutional power 
relations and their encounters with local power structures and systems of disparate groups of 
people.  In order to realize this objective, I utilized qualitative data collection methods: in-
depth interviews and documentary analysis.  
Certainly, my adoption of the qualitative case study approach has brought to the fore 
the diverse contestations and contradictions associated with the different programmes.  
Furthermore, Lewis, Bebbington, Batterbury, Shah, Olson, Siddiqi, and Duvall (2003) suggest 
the need for the use of qualitative case studies in research into development interventions, 
particularly when the focus is to understand the ways in which aid interventions are constructed 
and negotiated.  They recommend the use of in-depth interviews and documentary analyses as 
the chosen data collection tools for critical case study work.   
 My research aversion towards a quantitative approach stems from the static policy 
recommendations that came from quantitative studies such as Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, 
Reynal-Querol and Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap.  Collier et al (2003), with the 
utilization of econometric models, conclude that resource curses, youth population bulges and 
low income are the main causes of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment in difficult 
regions.  The policy effect is the promotion of entrepreneurship based on the assumption that 
entrepreneurship provides the requisite incentive to avoid conflict by reducing poverty.  In fact, 
the empirical record of conflict-afflicted states such as Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia suggest 
that this income/market driven pro-poor prescription was a flawed option from the onset.  The 
remedial prescription, however, cannot be delinked from the methodological foundation that 
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homogenized different contexts with common explanatory variables.  In essence, a 
decontextualized quantitative approach ignores the historical-political processes of conflict and 
underdevelopment in conflict regions.  There is a compelling need to depart from such 
decontextualized approaches, hence my decision to utilize a qualitative case study approach 
that will generate highly context-dependent knowledge and provide insightful information 
about a set of phenomena that can be applied to other contexts.  
Another reason for my application of this qualitative case study approach is to 
challenge the veracity of the DSN framework from a post-colonial regional context.  Honke 
and Müller (2012, p. 395) suggest that a suitable approach to interrogate the failures inherent in 
the DSN is a qualitative case study that reflects an encounter between the fields and practices 
of interveners and the intervened-upon local residents.  Through such an interface encounter, 
they suggest that the contradictions inherent in aid interventions can be exposed to contest the 
positivistic methodological persuasion of international relations that tend to give hegemonic 
status to external interventions.  Honke and Müller further suggest that such a practice-oriented 
methodological approach, that utilizes in-depth interviews and participant observation, 
provides useful generalizations that are empirically grounded.  Thus, they deem qualitative 
methods to be better tools for critical-oriented studies than quantitative-driven security studies 
based on abstracted formal models and statistical surveys.   Although I did not formally utilize 
a participant observation method, I made sure that critical observations did not escape me in 
the course of conducting my in-depth interviews and informal conversations with residents.  
These critical observations enabled me to extract the kinds of meaning that research 
participants assign to their socio-economic and political circumstances.  In adopting a 
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qualitative case study approach, it enabled me to challenge the hegemonic development and 
security studies which positivistic methods rarely reveal. 
The choice of a qualitative case study has given me insights into the historical processes 
of aid interventions, and has allowed me to develop certain sensitivities to the context of my 
study and well as some knowledge and understanding of the processes on interventions.  As 
suggested by Guba and Lincoln (1985, 2005), qualitative research is predicated on the view 
that social phenomena, human dilemmas, and the natures of each case is situational and reveal 
real happenings of diverse types.  According to Mabry (2008, p. 217) and Stake (2005, p.449 ), 
the term ‘contextuality’ constitutes an aspect of the dynamism and complexity of a case, which 
implies that cases are shaped by many contexts, including historical, social, political, 
ideological, and cultural contexts.  My use of ‘contextuality’, here, is not employed from a 
static deterministic sense.  Contextuality is deployed in the sense of having multiple 
manifestations and diverse influences that make a context fluid and is intended to foster a 
socially emergent constellation of contingent factors that are worked up and confronted, rather 
than being ignored in daily interactions.   
It is from this definition of contextuality that my study was undertaken in the Northern 
Region. Like any other region in Ghana, the Northern Region is shaped by many relationships 
between different groups.  By situating my study within the two specific sites in the Northern 
Region, my research has generated valuable research data.   My research has been enriched by 
revelations that are rarely found in statistically-driven national surveys that increasingly blur 
pertinent inter- and intra-regional differences.  A notable revelation emerging from this work is 
the deeper historical foundation of development and security challenges in the Northern 
Region. 
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The use of case studies help scholars investigate indeterminate real life situations and 
provide a reliable platform to study processes, events, human agency and struggles.  Yin 
(2009) posits that qualitative case studies are appropriate research methods that are anchored 
around “how” and “why” questions, which fit well with my study.  In addition, a qualitative 
case study is not bounded by linear and deterministic assumptions and therefore provides open-
ended ways to examine multiple interventions by different aid organizations.  Furthermore, 
qualitative case studies enable a researcher to identify relevant patterns outside of the case 
itself, which help to convey deeper insights into the phenomenon.  In as much as statistical 
generalization is not the aim of a qualitative case study, I suggest that a purposeful, deep 
examination of real life phenomena is bound to illuminate vital information that will have 
serious implications on how aid programs are developed, The possible generalization of case 
study findings explains why Gerring defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit 
for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (2004, p. 342).  More 
importantly, using case studies to generalize a position on a theory or framework like the DSN 
is an effective research method when we adopt Popper’s falsification principle against 
positivist conclusions.  Given that the DSN did not achieve its aid expectations, it should be 
possible to generalize the ineffectiveness of the DSN when applied to other conflict-prone 
regions that have similar contexts with that of the Northern Region.  
Case selection is always fundamentally critical when employing the case study method.  
Yin (2009) posits that achieving the greatest understanding of a phenomenon under study 
depends, to a large extent, on the selection of cases.  My study took place in the cities Tamale 
and Yendi, with more interviews conducted in the former than the latter due to strategic and 
practical reasons.  My own studies and other consultations suggest that these two places have, 
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over the years, attracted a great number of international development aid and security 
interventions.  Moreover, Tamale, for instance, has remained the pivotal region of both 
colonial and postcolonial administrative practices and policies.  Significantly, the two sites 
constitute the largest multi-ethnic population in the region and are homes to the largest ethnic 
group, that is, the Dagbon.  Given the majority political status conferred on these areas by the 
colonial government and maintained by postcolonial governments, they constitute one of the 
significant development and security hubs of the Northern Region.  Currently, they function as 
the development anchor of the region, which explains why it has become so attractive to 
development aid interventions.  In addition, these two case sites have experienced diverse 
conflicts and insecurity problems, both intra and inter-ethnic, which have threatened the 
stability of the region.   
The selected study sites in the Northern Region were chosen in order to provide an 
appropriate litmus test for the application of the DSN, and are helpful in seeking to understand 
aid interventions.  The presence of vital social relational features associated with the selected 
sites have provided me with insightful information that can be used to address the central and 
secondary research questions, as well as the overall aim of the study.  
With the quest to obtain insightful information on the main focus of my qualitative case 
study, I ensured that my key participants were officials with sound knowledge and an 
understanding of their practices.  The key participants’ roles in the agencies addressed here 
include: policy design/formulation, operational programming, project implementation, 
project/program planning, facilitators of training programs, program/project managers, fund 
management and performance assessment.  In order to interview the right or appropriate 
research participants, I went through a formal approach and booked book appointments for 
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each interview.  Some of the donor and government institutions were hesitant to negotiate for 
an interview appointment.  
In-depth interviews were utilized for this study and conducted through an interactive 
process to elicit detailed information.  Following the structure of feminist methods, I employed 
in-depth interviews not only to gather data, but to probe into the construction and meaning-
making of the data.  Given the highly contestable discursive nature of development and 
security concepts from both the interveners and intervened-upon populations, it became 
prudent for me to conduct in-depth interviews in order to obtain a nuanced understanding of 
the issues at hand.  I did not utilize quantitative methods such as longitudinal studies and 
closed-ended questionnaires or surveys, because I concluded that they would hinder a deeper 
understanding of how the rationales and assumptions were articulated in aid interventions.  
More particularly, if the research objective is to understand differential power relations along 
with contradictions and exclusionary processes of intervention then it was clearly more 
appropriate to utilize in-depth interviews.  
I conducted in-depth interviews across a diverse spectrum of key participants, including 
officials representing development agencies, such as: DfID, CIDA, JICA, ActionAid, UNDP, 
FAO, WFP, CARE International, Danish International Development Agency, Netherland 
Development Organization and Catholic Relief Services that operate in the study area.  As part 
of my interview process, I prepared an appropriate interview guide that highlighted the 
essential questions relative to the central research question and the subsidiary questions. The 
questions posed to the key informants of the various development aid agencies included 
questions about their understanding of aid interventions, how the interventions are determined, 
and what processes were used to define poverty and security problems. 
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Conducting fieldwork research has generated this ‘inside-outside’ debate in terms of 
what the ideal position a researcher should take in order to gain insightful information.  I can 
confirm that being an insider does not necessarily guarantee access to insightful information.  
In fact, the interactive nature of the research process does not lend itself to such binary or 
dichotomous designations.  Furthermore, as an interactive process, the position occupied by the 
researcher and participant changes, and an interview may be influenced by the age, marital 
status, and occupation of the interview subject.  When conducting a qualitative case study, 
therefore, it is important for the researcher to develop an attitude of empathy or caring as 
suggested by Collins (1991).  In fact, my 12 hour journey to the study site gave me a prima 
facie appreciation of the development challenges manifested in the region, particularly during 
my journey from Salaga to Tamale.  The scenes of disparate women (including those who were 
pregnant and lactating) enduring the long miles, on foot, required to find firewood and water to 
meet their daily energy and consumption needs was played out against the backdrop of 
numerous aid interventions in the area and brought the aid paradox I discuss in this work into 
sharp focus. This interventionist discrepancy affirmed my zeal to seek out an understanding of 
the paradoxical conditions under which the locals lived. In addition, this dismal spectacle 
buoyed me to examine the adverse social-relational processes that have conditioned abject 
poverty, in addition to the extra-local and supranational policies and programmes.  
The adverse relationship between numerous aid interventions and the dire living 
conditions actually experienced by those on the ground reconsolidated my initial drive to 
examine how interventionist rationales have been articulated.  I therefore concur with Merriam 
et al (2001) that, in conducting qualitative research, it behooves the researcher to be empathetic 
to the causes and problems of the research participant.  Fine and Weiss (1996) also suggest 
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that, in undertaking field research, it is incumbent on the researcher to work on the hyphen that 
exists with the researched.  My research certainly prioritized the poor and marginalized people 
because they constitute research participants whose perspectives, perceptions and ways of 
interpreting their lived experiences were crucial for my study.  I interviewed selected groups of 
the diverse ‘poor’ people in different localities. While it is essential to develop solidarity with 
the locals, it is equally necessary for a researcher to be mindful of his or her preconceived ideas 
and perceptions.  It is also imperative for a researcher to constantly question his or her 
assumptions and values during data analysis. 
In dialogical interviews, the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is 
critical to the success of the interview process.  Naples (2003) asserts that it is imperative for a 
researcher to exercise negotiated flexibility during the course of research as a vital tactic to 
gain access to relevant participants for useful information.  To gain a better understanding of an 
interviewee’s perspectives when pursuing a qualitative case study research, the researcher must 
strive to combine involvement and observation.  More essential is the need to create a 
reasonable distance in order to enable the effective observation, analysis and description to the 
outsider.  I remained ‘outsider’ on most occasions during the fieldwork.  I regularly interacted 
with my research participants and other community members in order to forge a sense of 
personal involvement and understanding of their perspectives and perceptions.   
 I did establish cordial working rapport with the local residents, who initially were 
suspicious of my presence to the extent that believed me to be an undercover agent for the 
government.   After multiple encounters, however, an effective relationship was fostered 
between us, particularly with the small-scale farmers.  As a cautionary reminder, I was alert to 
the non-unidirectional power relations inherent in the research interview process, as in the 
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moment when key participants from the aid and government agencies tried to assert themselves 
in response to certain questions.  I was able, however, to moderate the interview in order to 
gather adequate and vital data I could use to enhance the study.   
An analysis of a qualitative case study has to be detailed enough to reflect the wide 
gamut of issues that emerged during research.  Analyzing a qualitative case study’s research 
finding obliges the researcher to exercise immense reflexive subjectivity, given that the 
analysis is filtered through a researcher’s worldviews and interpretations.  It is important to 
note that the analysis of testimony is based on the themes embedded in the responses given by 
the research participants.  According to Gubrium and Holstein (1997), many concerns have 
been raised about the possibility of silencing the narrator’s voice when conducting such 
dialogical interviews.  My research ensured a balanced representation of the diverse views of 
respondents as evident in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
As stated earlier, this research also relied extensively on document analysis through the 
utilization of both policy documents and colonial archival records.  Document analysis as a 
technique used to categorize, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of physical 
sources has a long history is sociological studies, and has been used by classical sociologists 
like Durkheim, Marx, and Weber.  A notable example is Durkheim’s use of official 
government statistics to develop his classic work on suicide.  Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 163) 
posit that sociological research must regard documents as a source of data or as sociological 
interviewee or anthropological informant.  Anthropologist Jack Goody (1977) also believes 
that written documents are an insightful yet neglected field for research studies and declares 
that, without documents, salient information would remain invisible.  Latour (1987) also sees 
documents as forms of action from a distance, whereby decisions written in one context can 
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carry implications for action in future settings.  Documents also have the capacity to construct 
human identity and characteristics, because they are not objective data sources but actively 
manipulated sources of information.  The relevance of documents in sociological studies 
spurred my decision to use them in order to gather meaning and define relations between the 
interveners and local residents. 
Documented records, in my view, are not objective or neutral materials, but are social 
materials that aim to convey a viewpoint or position of the party involved.  According to Prior 
(2008), documents are situated records that take many forms and enter into episodes of social 
interaction in two pertinent ways.  First they enter as receptacles of content and second, they 
serve as a functioning agent in networks (p. 485; 489).  The key consideration, then, is to view 
documents as objects and actors in a web of social relations.  Scott (2006) further identifies two 
important uses of documents as a research strategy.  The first relates to content that focuses on 
the material lodged within the document, while the second suggests the ways in which 
documents are used and exchanged in communities.  Alternatively, documents can also be used 
both as resources for data and as topics in their own right (Prior, 2003; Zimmerman and 
Pollner, 1971).  My study employs both uses of documents suggested by Scott, because they 
offer relevant information to facilitate a critical examination of rationales behind aid 
interventions as well as provide ways to understand institutional power relations between the 
aid agencies and local actors.  
A cursory assessment of the development landscape shows a consistent trend of 
discrepancies between aid industry intentions and outcomes, yet little research work has been 
conducted to question the processes that ferry such rationales and assumptions within the 
context of Northern Region.  My study, therefore, examines the conceptual structure and 
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fundamental assumptions that led to the production of aid reports and uses these reports as 
topics in themselves, beyond the material contents that they contain.  Additionally, the material 
contents were thoroughly scrutinized in order to address the core and related research questions 
helpful in unearthing the rhetorical nature of aid interventions.  Archival sources provide 
significant insight into the historical context of the insecurity, poverty and conflict issues that 
arise in the study region.  The use of archival sources also provides reliable information used to 
gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of aid and security problems that are not 
reducible to simplistic assumptions.  
The relevance of archival documents to this project involves their use as a resource on 
which to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the programs.  The operational reality is that 
the external aid institutions work largely through institutional reports, written policies, 
programmes and operational guidelines that shape the form and content of aid interventions.  
The intentions, assumptions, and goals of aid interventions are, on most occasions, stated in 
written terms, which makes the sourcing of relevant documents vital to this study.   
I adopted document methods because it provides my study with the accurate and critical 
background information necessary to complement the in-depth interview and ultimately 
strengthen the analysis.  Given the critical orientation of my study, exploiting documents 
methods, in my view, is a reasonable tool to obtain information and knowledge germane to 
colonial and postcolonial development and security interventionist practices.  It is for this 
reason that I gained relevant insightful information from the archival sources about the 
atrocious colonial practices at the national and regional archival offices’ in both Accra and 
Tamale.  Policy documents from pertinent institutions such as the African Union, World Bank, 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Government of Ghana (GoG) and Department 
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for International Development (DfID) were sourced.  Without any shred of hesitation, I assert 
that the use of document sources boosted my understanding of institutional power relations and 
rationales within the aid interventions.  Above all, the document method did provide the vital 
complement to the in-depth interview in addressing both the research questions and aims.   
In respect to the sampling techniques used to facilitate my research, I settled on two 
non-probability sampling techniques.  These are purposive and semi-snowball sampling 
methods used with the goal of obtaining insightful and deep information to guide this study.  
With regard to the relevance of purposive sampling, Berg (2007) and Stake (2005) (who calls it 
judgmental sampling), view it as a technique ideal for a case study research, whereby the 
researcher uses his judgment regarding which samples would serve his best research interest.  
An important factor in selecting cases is the requirement on the part of the researcher to have 
sound knowledge of the actors involved, as suggested by Yin (2009).  In preparing for this 
study, my prior engagement with a number of aid agencies and my familiarity with policy 
documents gave me reasonable experiential insights about the various organizations that work 
on development and security issues in the region.  Further, the relevance of the agencies in 
relation to the research area was a key criterion utilized to select agencies whose officials I 
interviewed.  The semi-snowball sampling technique was adopted for some community 
members who were willing and able to be interviewed.  I interacted with the same community 
residents on a number of occasions in order to establish consistency, variation, and the 
authenticity of the diverse responses. 
My fieldwork was undertaken from July 1 to October 31 2011, and took me to various 
communities in Tamale and Yendi.  From the government sector, seven ministries and agencies 
were selected for interviews, as well as ten donor agencies (both multilateral and bilateral), 5 
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International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), 10 Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) (including 5 Community-Based Organizations) and 2 research institutions. In all, a 
total number of 65 participants were involved in this study.    
It is vital to stress at this juncture that this thesis is largely informed by field research, 
as well as by an evaluation of both relevant primary and secondary literature.  Furthermore, 
this study also benefited from a relevant literature of critical orientation that theorizes the 
complex relations between the aid industry and the intervened-upon population.   
The study was undertaken in full consideration of its ethical implications, particularly 
when it came to issues related to confidentiality, anonymity, informed consent and harm/risk to 
participants.  Before I embarked on the fieldwork, I applied for ethical clearance to the 
Research and Ethics Board of the University of Windsor.  This ethical clearance was approved 
and issued REB # 29087, which expired on August 31, 2012.   My research was accomplished 
prior to my transfer to the University of Waterloo.  This ethical approval imposed a burden of 
responsibility on me to ensure that my research followed the highest possible ethical 
requirements in order to establish and maintain its credibility within the academic community.   
In full compliance with ethical requirements, I can vouch that no participant was 
coerced and/or enticed with monetary incentive to participate in the research interview.  Before 
the interview was conducted, I devoted considerable time to explaining the details of the 
research outlined on the information letter.  I had to thoroughly explain the content of the 
information letter to make sure that respondents fully understood the details so that they could 
make an informed judgment as to whether or not to participate in the interview.  I devoted 
ample time to comprehensively explaining their rights as participants (such as voluntary 
participation and its associating correlates), the potential benefits and inherent risks associated 
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with the research to respondents who were curious about the study.  At the end of each 
interview, we both signed the consent form.  I retained copies of the consent forms while 
research participants were given the signed copies of the information letter. In observing strict 
practices of confidentiality, hard copies of information from the research participants as found 
on tapes, along with transcribed materials are currently under safe lock. The issue of 
confidentiality in my study has invariably prevented me from divulging some critical 
information.  I am of the view that this emphasis on confidentiality promotes secrecy, 
especially when it comes to issues related to the public interest.  Absolute confidentiality 
cannot be guaranteed because it is incumbent on researchers to report and analyze their 
findings.  In this case, I confirm van den Hoonard’s thesis, which notes that “promises of 
confidentiality are easier to make than to keep” (2002, p. 8).  In addition, I suggest that to 
guarantee anonymity in face-to face interviews was impossible.  In fact, to ensure anonymity in 
a research study that is geared towards social change is counter-productive because the ‘poor’ 
cannot be studied in detail through deductive methods.  Therefore, an attempt to hide the 
identities of my research participants, especially the poor, beyond hiding their identity with a 
pseudonym, has the possible effect of introducing a substantial amount of unconfirmed 
information into the data.   
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Figure 1: Map of Ghana 
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 Figure 2: Map of Northern Region 
 
 
Source: Centre for Remote Sensing and geographic Images, University of Ghana. 
 
Summary of the Chapters 
The remainder of this study proceeds with one conceptual chapter, one chapter that provides 
the necessary historical background to the study, three empirical related chapters, and a 
concluding chapter.   Specifically, chapter two deals with the conceptual framework of the 
thesis.  As I discussed earlier in relation to the critical dispositions of the central research 
question and the sequel research questions, this thesis adopts a critical development-security 
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nexus framework.  Development and security are viewed as social constructs that entail 
processes of labeling and framing underpinned by a particular set of imaginations, ideas, 
institutional power and knowledge.  This chapter argues that the created space of interventions 
is active, characterized by its peculiar historical power relations and constituted by diverse 
identities, political structures and multiple identities.  Therefore, an articulation of mainstream 
interventions driven by high modernist rationales and assumptions in such an active polity, is 
characterized by chaotic implementation.  
Chapter Three relates to the colonial foundations and post-colonial continuities of the 
development and security challenges in the Northern Region.  The core argument of this 
chapter is that the current development and security crises did not emerge recently, but is 
largely rooted in it is adversarial historical formation, which makes the current aid challenges 
undeniably complex.  To substantiate the central argument, this chapter discusses the various 
colonial policies and practices that led to the under-development in Northern Ghana through 
the uneven development with Southern Ghana.  Also to be discussed is the political 
reconfiguration of Northern Ghana through the indirect rule policy and its ramifications.  
Furthermore, the continuities of colonial practices as well as the state formation processes will 
be discussed.  The overall outcome is the contradictory institutionalization of conflict, poverty, 
insecurity and underdevelopment in the region. 
The fourth chapter posits that that the development and security challenges in the 
Northern Region, due to their historical relational antecedents, constitute an inevitably complex 
problem.  From my perspective, the current challenges cannot be reduced to simplistic 
problem-solving interventions because the contentious issues are rooted in the adverse social 
relational practices.  The driving argument behind this chapter is that the aid industry, through 
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its interventionist rationales, has reduced the complexity of the region through simplistic 
problem solving or technical solutions.  The driving approaches through which the poverty 
related interventions were articulated include: empowerment, capacity building, and 
participation.  To validate this driving argument, the perspectives of the aid agencies for 
development and security have been analyzed.  In addition, notable programmes related to 
agriculture and water services as vital sectors for development focused poverty reduction 
interventions and various conflict resolution practices have been expatiated within the ambit of 
their rationales and processes.  The neglect of vital past and current global policies and its 
ramifications on the Northern Region have been given considerable examination.  
Chapter Five is devoted to the United Nations Joint Human Security Project (UN JHSP) 
as it constitutes the most recent intervention of the DSN.  The aim of this chapter is to 
challenge the transformational credentials accorded to this is human security driven 
programme.  In addition, the human security framework is deemed to be an improvement of 
the existing and past development and security interventions in the region (Newman, 2011; 
Mack, 2005).  My rejection of this transformational notion, however, is informed by its driving 
rationales and assumptions that are overly liberal.  Therefore, the central argument of this 
chapter is that this alleged transformational capability of the UN JHSP is elusive and rather 
tends to perpetuate existing practices.  In supporting this central argument, the various 
foundational frameworks of the programme have been examined.  Also, the core community 
and individualistic oriented practices driven by responsibility and autonomy rationales have 
been analyzed to provide insights into the contradictions, marginalization and exclusionary 
manifestations.  Again the driving activities of the human security programs include 
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empowerment, capacity building, participation and community based conflict prevention 
programs. 
Chapter Six responds to the third secondary research question, which is not independent 
of the central research question.  This chapter discusses the implementation challenges of 
intervention under the rubric of the DSN.  The central argument is the orthodox imputation of 
implementation failures to technical and administrative constraints is a strategy first to 
exonerate the interventionist rationales in order to reconstitute post-liberal interventions as a 
necessary ameliorative measure.  Further, this chapter interrogates the veracity of the DSN at 
the institutional level.  The concluding chapter deals with summary of the major findings of the 
study and its policy ramifications.  In addition, complexity of regional interventions, from my 
perspective, calls for a re-conceptualization of development and security in terms that will 
accommodate the historical formation and lived socio-economic realities of specific societies.  
This chapter also discusses the inevitable limitations of the study and suggests plausible areas 
for future research.    
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Perspectives of Development and Security 
 
Introduction 
In spite of the absence of explicit development and security consideration in the UN’s officially 
declared MDGs, I suggest that security has been an overarching consideration for development 
aid practices since the 1945, if not an integral part of colonial interventions.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that there currently appears to be a prevailing notion within the development aid 
industry when it comes to the securitization of development.  The securitization of 
development essentially provides conceptual space to endorse a reciprocal relation between 
development and security.  A DfID strategy document for Security and Development states: 
“security and development are linked. Insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are 
the biggest obstacles to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals; they also 
destroy development.  Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions 
for conflict and the emergence of new security threats” (2005, p. 5).  The 2004 UN High level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change supports a similar ideology.  From my perspective, 
however, the DfID’s suggestion for a linear reciprocal relationship between development and 
security requires critical interrogation that examines the rationales that guide the programmes 
deployed under the rubric of development and security.  
The international aid industry’s declared interest in security and developments have 
spawned a plethora of diverse imaginations and representations used to identify spaces for 
intervention.  Most SSA countries have been constituted as security threats, as noted by Smith, 
who attributes Africa’s categorization as a global security threat to discourses that posit them 
as  chaotic and volatile political and socio-economic states (2005, p. 1).  The potential problem 
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in abiding by this discourse is that such a negative designation of Africa invariably delimits 
ways of perceiving countries in the SSA, a fact significantly informs the technical and 
simplistic diagnostic interventions.  I must add that such delimitation is most likely to elicit a 
counter-hegemonic response from locales of intervention. The inevitability of counter-
hegemonic responses is due to the complex daily struggles and overall practical political 
economy of localities that defy programmable delimitations.  
This security-driven interventionist position has piqued the research attention of critical 
development and international relations scholars such as Duffield, Pupavac and Willett.  
Willett (2005), posits that the association of the SSA with conflict and underdevelopment have 
presented opportunity for donor communities to articulate their development and security 
interventions (p. 570).  The crucial issue is to examine the lens through which the security and 
development challenges are framed, understood, represented and, most importantly, the 
rationales and assumptions that underwrite the multiple interventions.  Beyond these issues, the 
interests that underlie aid and security interventions also require examination. 
Conceptually, a critical development-security nexus (DSN) has been applied to large-
scale conflict-prone regions and countries.  My study shows the applicability of this critical 
DSN in examining interventions in low intense conflict regions and further expands our 
conceptual understanding of the DSN model.  Furthermore, my framework conceives of 
development and security issues as the embodiment of constructed, complex relational 
processes and practices that are imposed on a locality.  Underlying these relational dynamics 
are rationales and assumptions that influence the operational content, procedures and form of 
the interventions imposed on a local setting.  Conceptually, the imposition of such rationales 
and assumptions onto a local setting generates indeterminable complex interactions that result 
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in contradictory, exclusionary and contestable outcomes.  These contradictory, exclusionary 
and contestable outcomes provide the conceptual basis to challenge the veracity of the nexus as 
well as the necessity and desirability of development and security as espoused by orthodox 
development scholars like Collier (2011).  My conceptual framework, then, provides grounds 
to consider alternative options beyond the stylized, ineffectual, orthodox development and 
security nexus.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section provides an in-depth discussion of the 
conceptual imperatives of independent development and security measures.  This is followed 
by a discussion of the DSN, which constitutes the thrust of the conceptual framework to guide 
this study. Conceptually, both development and security are viewed as discursive practices 
rather than normative or instrumental ideals.   
The second section discusses the complex conceptual challenges in the articulation of 
trusteeship-oriented international aid interventions.   A key argument of the this section is that 
international development aid entails different practices and processes that are underpinned by 
rationales that are inconsistent with the complex conditions of the locales of these 
interventions.  This section also examines the inevitability of complex processes of aid 
interventions, which is vital to explain how rationales are deployed. 
The third section briefly deals with the research context of this dissertation with the 
intention of providing the analytical scope within which the research will be studied.  The 
concluding aspect of this section sums up the adoption of the development security nexus from 
a critical perspective as the conceptual framework based on a conceptual overview.  In 
addition, plausible approaches used to examine the rationales of the interventions will be 
highlighted.  A brief introduction of the next chapter will be provided. 
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 Conceptualizing the Development and Security Nexus 
The conceptual intervention impetus of the aid industry is based on an inheritance of their 
colonizers policies that framed particular societies in a specific spatial context in negative 
terms to validate an urgent intervention.  Based on their studies, Rist (2008) and Crush (1995) 
confirms that the current aid practice is a direct successor to colonial practice, an idea that leads 
to a replication of colonial practices in current aid operations.  Crush (1995) notes that 
decolonization was essentially a shift from settled colonialism to international development 
that continued the civilizing mission role.  Crush’s argument implies that important colonial 
traits cannot be divorced from the present-day aid industry.  More importantly, the perpetuation 
of the rationales behind colonial practice, including necessity, desirability, and moral duty to 
intervene, ensures that human progress and security lie behind the ‘developmentalist’ aid 
industry.  This moral duty to intervene is the foundation of the development trusteeship on 
which aid agencies justify their interventions.   
By understanding this structure, I conclude that aid interventions are not neutral 
schemes, but rather ones guided by a manifold of stated and unstated rationales.  These 
rationales are akin to what Scott (1998) calls ‘high modernist interventions.’  The rationales 
and assumptions that will form the pivot of my analysis of development and security 
interventions include the necessity of interventions, societal change as replicable and makeable, 
reliance on expert knowledge divorced from local contexts, the need to create visibility from 
the outside, the application of standard models and experimentation on local contexts, and the 
right to intervene.  It is critical, as a result, to examine how these rationales play out in the 
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development and security interventions put in place by the aid industry given that their current 
practices are underpinned by colonial ideas, interests and institutional power dynamics.  
Development as an interventionist practice is endowed with ideological and cognitive 
inclinations that foster external interventions in economies framed as ‘poor’.  A cardinal 
feature of development as an interventionist practice is its social engineering orientation, which 
shapes economies to idealized ends.  This kind of social engineering orientation reflects 
development’s underlying rationale of the possibility of change, which facilitates the 
trusteeship practices.  For analytical purposes, I deem ‘trusteeship’ to be a paternalistic process 
that aims to manage a population deliberately perceived to be lacking the competence and 
capability to manage itself unless there is an imposition of external ideas and practices on the 
intervened population.  Escobar (1997, p. 44) and Rist (2008, p. 31) link the formal coordinated 
international development assistance drive in poor economies to the US Government’s 1949 
‘Point Four’ program outlined in President Truman’s inaugural speech.  Truman, working 
under the rationale of ‘Western’ responsibility for helping ‘poor’ economies, privileged the use 
of scientific and technological knowledge used in developed ‘Western’ countries to help the 
‘poor’ Southern hemisphere countries.  This reliance on scientific and technological resources 
brackets off contentious politics and reduces development challenges to simplistic and 
transplantable technical solutions.  Development practice by aid agencies could be referred to 
as a deliberate complexity reduction exercise that suits ideological and power interests.  
My viewpoint is that ‘development’ as a concept practiced by the aid industry entails 
complex representational processes.  Most critical, here, is that development practice 
encapsulates problematic rationales and assumptions that serve as its driving software.  Nustad 
(2001) makes the point that an analysis of development in the field exposes the problematic 
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premises that drive aid interventions.  Riddell (2007) and Duffield (2003) allude to the point 
that, notwithstanding the numerous interventions undertaken by aid agencies ranging from 
stable economies to conflict ridden countries, the underlying rationale remains the same.  It is 
my quest to understand how these rationales play out in the field that forms the central research 
question for this thesis.  Development is characteristically buoyed by enormous discursive 
attempts to frame external interventions that address the poverty and other developmental 
challenges of developing countries (Escobar, 1995, p. 44-47).  Beyond this, it is crucial to 
investigate the processes in which discursive practices take place in order to understand the 
underlying rationales of these aid interventions. 
The discursive power associated with the development practices used by the aid 
industry foregrounds reliance on institutional power and expertise that appear to replicate 
colonial ‘development’ practices, though in diverse forms.  Kothari’s (2006) critical 
postcolonial work alludes to the apparent continuity in the expert-driven framing and labeling 
practices used by colonial administrators akin to contemporary development practitioners and 
institutions.  The aid industry portrays itself as having the requisite knowledge and capacity to 
help the ‘poor’ in developing countries.  An instructive note in Kothari’s work is that the 
expertise required for contemporary development practice is sophisticated in its quest to 
provide complex models to enable the prescription of standardized policies in the name of best 
practices and blueprints.  Specifically, the colonial development practice was underpinned by a 
brute paternalistic orientation to govern the ‘natives,’ who were deemed to be lacking the 
capacity to govern themselves (Mamdani, 1996).   An essential issue, however, is to question 
the assumptions and rationales that informed the colonial interventions and the ‘targeted’ 
people under it. 
54 
 
A critical observation of contemporary development practices show that similar 
paternalistic orientations have characterized the development aid industry over the past 60 
years.  This paternalistic orientation provides the basis for the imposition of external solutions. 
Cooke (2004) and Chhotray and Hulme (2009) explain that this paternalism is perpetrated by 
the consistent faulting of the internal deficiencies endemic in developing countries.  Chhotray 
and Hulme (2009, p.35) expose how the US government’s Millennium Challenge Account and 
DFID’s Driver of Change development blueprints have attributed causes of poverty and 
underdevelopment challenges to weak governance systems in poor countries.  The quest to 
reform the framed neo-patrimonial political systems in SSA countries has become one of the 
urgent priorities of DfID, as evidenced by interventions in Sierra Leone in particular (Denney, 
2011; DfID, 2005).  In the meantime, there is no empirical proof that this neo-patrimonialism is 
the main cause of the underdevelopment, insecurity and poverty crises in SSA countries.  Neo-
patrimonialism in the international aid domain has many variants.  The normative 
understanding of neo-patrimonialism is of a political system built on personal and networked 
ties that aim to privilege private interests over the general good through corruption, lack of 
transparency and patron-client relations.   
The ‘neo’ aspect of patrimonialism presupposes that pre-colonial African societies were 
politically controlled through patrimonial relations in the context of their subsistence 
economies.  This normative view of neo-patrimonialism lacks both a historical and 
ethnographic understanding of the diverse African political systems.   Prescribing good 
governance, therefore, as the remedy to this alleged neo-patrimonialism has yielded dismal 
outcomes (Kelsall, 2010).  These outcomes suggest a simplistic diagnosis of SSA development 
malaise was used in order to formulate universal solutions.   
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Historical reviews of development interventions suggest that development is not an 
objective or neutral endeavor but rather constitutes a deliberate set of processes used to achieve 
a particular purpose.  From a critical angle, it can be argued that the purpose of development is 
to regulate the affairs of an intervened society.  Cowen and Shenton (1996), in their path-
breaking historical study of development practices spanning various British colonial 
administrations, view development as an exercise used to forge a ‘trusteeship’ relationship.  An 
integral aspect of trusteeship is that development is an intentional practice in which ‘trustees’ 
have positioned themselves as capable of solving the problems of developing economies. The 
three main factors that underpin trusteeship as noted by Easterly (2008) and Chambers (2006) 
are; 1) the availability of technical skills, 2) knowledge, and 3) financial resources.  Alongside 
these three factors, I suggest that political legitimacy and moral authority are crucial factors 
that play a significant role in the consolidation of a ‘trusteeship’ hegemonic practice.  Thus, the 
enacting of ‘trusteeship’ must also be seen as a political act in which institutional power 
politics determine the choice of discourses, strategies, policies and actors that underpin aid 
interventions.  Furthermore, these five factors of ‘trusteeship,’ are crucial in configuring the 
international development aid apparatus as a problem-solving entity.  This problem-solving 
ethos fundamentally privileges technocratic knowledge and skills in the conceptualization and 
implementation of these interventions.  The crucial issue is to interrogate the conditions that 
facilitated the creation of trusteeship and the processes through which this ‘trusteeship’ is 
deployed at particular sites.  Examining the empirical manifestations of trusteeship will 
enhance our understanding of the struggles, negotiations and compromises therein.  The next 
section of this chapter will provide theoretical insights into the complex processes of 
articulating international aid trusteeship oriented interventions in the real world.  
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Development as an action-oriented or performance-bias concept in mainstream aid 
thinking is riddled with a constructed, intentional will to improve the lives of human beings.  
The means through which development agencies achieve their goals of human progress involve 
the identification of workable policies, programs and plans irrespective of the social context in 
which they appear.  Further processes of articulating development needs involve the 
classification and categorization of human beings into calculable objects that would facilitate 
simple problem-solution analyses.  It needs to be recognized that a reliance on such 
programmatic plans and policies on the part of aid agencies elicit a need for a particular kind of 
expertise that can quantify and render problems visible and have the ability to homogenize 
disparate societies.  Other specific kinds of expertise needed are in the areas of goal and 
priority setting, and the prescription of time-bound solutions tied strictly to strict budget cycles.  
These kinds of diverse fields of expertise provide standardized methods and benchmarks to 
facilitate performance appraisals, categorizations and the comparability of distinct people.  
The results-driven nature of development from the mainstream perspective cannot be 
dissociated from the interventionist rationales that are averse to complex and complicated 
thinking.  In response to this often-ignored interrogation of rationales by the aid industry, the 
central research question of this dissertation seeks to examine how the rationales of 
development aid and security interventions have been articulated in the Northern Region.  
Cornwall (2007) and Rist (2007), in their studies relating to the history of development aid 
practice, posit that the word ‘development’ has become a modern shibboleth, with fulsome 
promises of the possible and connoting a futuristic myth that promises hope even in the wake 
of incontrovertible failures.  These fulsome promises can be seen in the reassurance of human 
development in the wake of past failures by the evocation of ‘new’ priorities, goals and 
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programmes.  Development practices articulated by the aid industry thrive on making 
unattainable promises, whereby the failure to realize or achieve a set of promises serves as a 
window of opportunity for experimentation of new ideas and practices.  From an empirical 
perspective, development must comprise broad and diverse historical processes of economic, 
political and social sub-systems of a particular society.   
Given this background, I conceive of development as consisting of local, regional, 
national, and international processes of change that involve economic, social and political 
policies, practices, and programmes to regulate human conduct.  Development also entails 
practices of security that aim to secure human lives and reduce poverty in particular locales, 
times, and spatial contexts. Development as an interventionist practice involves an 
indeterminate set of tasks and goals that are enmeshed with constant struggles and negotiating 
processes.  These constant struggles and indeterminate tasks can be attributed to the fluid 
nature of the field that cannot be pre-determined in any accurate sense, including Long and 
Ploeg’s (2002, p.245) ideas of the practical political economy.  Therefore, privileging 
technocratic and universal solutions for context-specific solutions is most likely to generate 
resistance and failure. 
The difficulty in controlling spatial and temporal contexts because of their fluidity 
demonstrates the avowed inadequacy of calcified blueprint interventions.  Typically, 
interventions that are mediated through plans, programmes, policies and techniques hardly 
reflect the complex, unfolding, nature of the field.  Based on the information received during 
my fieldwork for this study, I suggest that the Northern Region is characterized by 
unpredictable social, political and economic contestations and is embodied by non-linear, 
diverse interactions at the local, national and international levels.  The presence of 
58 
 
unpredictable contestations raises fundamental questions regarding the articulation of linear 
and managerial development interventions.  One of this study’s core positions is that these 
interventions are not neutral processes, but reflect the significant interests and ideas of a 
diverse set of actors with varying asymmetric power relations.  It is critical, therefore, for me to 
examine the rationales behind development and security interventions that have been 
articulated and employed in the region.   
Development as a positivistic practice, in reality, cannot be divorced from the social 
context in which it operates.  Mosse (2005) explains that programs and projects for poverty 
reduction shape, and are in turn shaped by social, political and economic relations operating in 
specific areas.  The deployment of new resources and the imposition of operational rules 
associated with interventions are often thought to provide incentives to help shape the 
structural and relational contexts that make conflict less likely to escalate, or arise in the first 
place. It is critical, however, to note that development processes with their unavoidable 
embedded uncertainties are shaped through multiple, uneven, and contested social structures, 
rules and power relations.  As such, these processes are necessarily political and, indeed, can 
often result in violent conflict (Barron et al, 2007, p. 29-30).  It is important to recognize that 
the nature of these processes and conflicts are predicated upon unique contextual factors.  Any 
attempt, then, to incorporate conflict sensitivity into development programmes must be tailored 
to meet the political, social and economic realities of particular contexts.  In the wake of the 
uncertainty of development, I deem it appropriate to interrogate the rationales that guide 
interventions at specific sites, as in the case in the Northern Region.  
The constructed nature of development and security has been well noted by scholars of 
critical development studies.  Abrahamsen views development as an intentional constructive 
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practice that sets out to map the content and boundary of its interventions.  According to 
Abrahamsen, there are three interrelated factors that form the interventionist basis of 
development: ‘fear,’ ‘absences,’ and ‘hierarchies’ (2000, p. 17).  These three factors 
collectively aim to frame dire conditions in order to justify the necessity of external 
interventions. The factors identified by Abrahamsen provide room for external actors to justify 
interventions on the grounds that they have a moral duty to intervene.  As I indicated earlier, 
this moral duty to intervene is intertwined with other rationales like desirability and the 
necessity for development.  Consideration of these three factors leads Abrahamsen to conclude 
that development is a disciplinary mechanism used to regulate poor societies to conform to the 
practices, ideas and programmes foisted on them by their ‘benevolent’ interveners.   
Using development as a disciplinary mechanism points to the discrepancy between the 
‘good intentions’ of aid agencies seeking development and the dismal outcomes of their 
attempts.  It is vital to interrogate how the triple interventionist triggers identified by 
Abrahamsen play out in the field in order to understand how the failures in established models 
can be attributed to technical and administrative factors.  It is crucial to expose the relational 
foundation of these triggers because, in my view, they are highly subjective elements 
undergirded by the unique ontology and ideological orientation of aid strategies.  
Security, like many concepts in the social sciences, is difficult to define because it is a 
social construct with a changing definition.   Therefore the UNDP’s position on security as 
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ denudes the real motivation of regulating a 
particular group.  The disciplinary devices are articulated through the imposition of 
predetermined decontextualized policies and programmes aimed at addressing an a priori fixed 
problem.  The UNDP’s definition of security seems innocuous because it obscures the entity 
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that actually defines what constitutes ‘fear’ and ‘want.’  The UNDP definition of security, 
based on my conceptual understanding, marginalizes the historical-relational dynamics in favor 
of best practice programmes driven by a liberal ideological persuasion.  As will be discussed in 
chapter five, a similarly limited definition of security was espoused by one of the UN JHSP 
program managers.  Following this narrow definition of security, the deployment of liberal 
interventions through individualist and community oriented practices as strategies for conflict 
prevention comes into effect.  
I view the discourse of security a power-laden with the capability to imagine 
naturalized threats with the usually-silenced intention of regulating and disciplining human 
conduct.  The regulatory and disciplinary orientations of security interventions do not, 
however, translate smoothly to targeted recipients in specific localities.  Chapters four and five 
will demonstrate that a security impasse was more a norm than an exception to the rule of 
external security- related interventions.  Governmental orientation is pursued through the 
deployment of liberal programmes and projects that consistently fail to address complex 
dynamics underlying imagined security threats.   
An important issue to acknowledge is that the identification of problematized threats 
depends on the interplay of asymmetric power relations between the intervener and intervened 
society. This power differential as a determinant of security risks and threats could be found in 
the way the UNDP and DfID -sponsored expert designed the Early Warning System. The early 
warning system predetermined what issues or events constituted a security risk, an evaluation 
that the local collaborator, the Ghana Network for Peacebuilding (GHANEP) was forced to 
follow independent of their own views and the views of the larger populace.   
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The concept of security within the field of international development practice has 
assumed an expansive notion, a fact that necessitates the engagement of a myriad of 
professionals in problem-solving actions.  Bigo (2006) identifies the need for professionals in 
the areas of risk management, human security and other risk analysis fields to undertake risk 
assessments of the economic, political, social and environmental costs of conflict in order to 
determine the overall security and development implications in each region.  It is important to 
note that these expert assessments tend to dwell on broad, disembodied aggregates, such as 
Collier’s economic costing (which postulates that violent conflicts cost SSA countries 25% of 
their GDP per annum (Cramer, 2006).  This economic costing provides significant support to 
his greed-based thesis of conflict that continuously informs the liberal pro-poor interventions in 
many SSA countries.  The on-going, numerous, international aid interventions in the Northern 
Region necessarily emphasize the need for the central research question of this study to 
interrogate the rationales that drive programmes and projects of development and security in 
the region.  
There have been attempts from both policy and academic perspectives to draw a 
working linkage between security and development.  In fact, Stern and Ojendal (2010, p. 6) use 
the concept DSN to map a relationship between these two concepts.  This mapping exercise, 
however, creates the impression that the development and security challenges can be mapped 
onto distinct connections to establish congruent linkages between these two concepts.  From 
my perspective, the attempt to establish a linear relationship between security and development 
aid issues risks naturalizing the relational dynamics, whereby standardized packages become 
the preferred solution.  My research seeks to transcend this analytical mapping to interrogate 
62 
 
real interventionist practices in order to expose the constructed processes and instrumental 
logics at play.   
The shift towards human-centered development and security plans appear to dominate 
the mainstream development literature.  Alkire (2010, p.47) notes that both security and 
development are now human-centered in their focus and both complement each other.  Alkire 
states that both security and development practices share common paradigm shifts, with 
security changing from territorial/national focus towards human.  On the other hand, the unit of 
analysis for development changed from economy and territory to person or human.  Implicit in 
Alkire’s position is an attempt to naturalize the shifts; but my position is that the alleged shifts 
are reflective of unequal balances of power in knowledge generation patterns that favor the 
dominant global development governance institutions.  These shifts towards human and 
individual categories do not necessarily mean that the assumptions and the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of these interventions have been transformed.  This ‘new’ focus 
on individuals tends to foreground ‘freedom’ and ‘capabilities’ as the main means and ends of 
development and security.  In sum, Alkire’s (2010, p. 47) postulation mirrors the Commission 
for Human Security 2005 Report, which views security as the way to protect the vital core of 
human development (freedom, dignity and livelihood).  From my perspective, the ‘innocent’ 
instrumental linkage between security and development ignores the asymmetrical power 
relations that drive the processes of these interventions.  The assumed linkage between security 
and development has been formulated with a gross disregard for the effects of the unequal and 
exploitative nature of capitalism and the wider global political economy. 
Alkire’s conceptualization of the reciprocal linkage between development and security 
is, in my view, a vain attempt to endorse the universal blueprint of liberal interventionist 
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practices that endlessly problematize poor economies.  Thus, the predetermination of the final 
outcomes of these two contestable discursive and autonomous concepts through this kind of an 
ex ante conceptualization negates critical questions about the rationales and assumptions 
behind such interventions.  In drawing such instrumental linkages, I contend that the DSN 
justifies technical solutions to complex indeterminate structural and relational problems. In 
fact, these pursuits of technocratic solutions are rife in UN-driven conflict resolution 
programmes in the Northern Region since 1994.     
The mainstream instrumental framing of development and security plans has attracted 
critiques from critical scholarship.  Jolly and Ray (2007) argue that human security 
programmes privileged by the Commission for Human Security, and scholars such as Alkire 
lack conceptual rigor because they bundle all vulnerabilities into a single concept, thereby 
blunting their analytical edge and policy impact.   From my perspective, the broad framework 
of human security could lead to a gross homogenization of internal socio-economic challenges 
in poor economies, with the possible consequence of prescribing ‘one-size fits all’ solutions.  
The human security, with its focus on internalizing the development and security of local sites, 
tends to ignore the lopsided, inequitable international political economy that undermines many 
developing economies.  The critical point within the context of my study is to interrogate how 
the rationales of the UN JHSP unfold in the field of intervention in order to understand the 
intricate processes that are important to aid development. 
As a discursive practice, security within the context of the aid industry has stimulated a 
plethora of measurement techniques and classifications used to categorize particular countries 
as fragile, failed, and weak states.  The outcome of these categorizations is the 
institutionalization of liberal economic and political plans, reforms, and programmes as 
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remedial options for such countries (Richmond, 2011, p. 15).  In particular, the study of 
development and security interventions by Willett (2005, p. 1-3) suggests that the notion of a 
‘conflict trap’ that exists in most SSA countries has created an enabling condition to foist 
liberal peace and development initiatives upon such countries.  Notable among these are the 
elite-oriented democratization processes, rule of law and social protection schemes that 
disadvantage the poor and render them unable to address the ‘drivers’ and ‘triggers’ of security 
and development challenges.  Denney (2011, p. 285-288) attests to the failure of DfID Security 
Sector Reforms in Sierra Leone.  Additionally, the liberal interventions with simplistic 
universalistic assumptions lack the epistemological rigor necessary to interrogate the historical 
foundation the constructed development and security challenges. In the wake of the historical 
basis of conflict and underdevelopment issues in the study region, it is vital to examine the 
rationales behind the interventions rolled out to address developmental problems.  
Security as a discursive practice with a debatable shift from territorial and regime foci 
towards people, as conceived by the global development establishment, invariably becomes a 
bio-political project used to regulate and discipline human life.  It is from within this context 
that bio-politics, according to Miller and Rose (2008), refers to “the deliberations, strategies, 
tactics and devices deployed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its 
constituents to ensure good or avoid evil” (p.195).  The critical point here is to interrogate how 
conditions arose to make it possible for specific actors to create security images and translate 
those images into programmes that are then used to regulate others.  
This notion of bio-politics, which frames the work of Duffield (2006, 2007, 2010), is 
being adopted for this study because it foregrounds the governing of contingent risks in conflict 
prone regions. Governance of risk, therefore, involves the use of expertise to provide 
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programmable information about the people, policies, and plans devised based on this 
information.  In view of a preference for expert knowledge, information relative to causal 
determinants of an imagined problem prescribed solutions and implementations under the 
guidance of universally ‘acclaimed’ performance indicators would be most preferred.  The 
reliance on best practices is an integral component of the articulation of the development and 
security programmes that are based on universally homogenized problems.  
The alteration in the referent object of security from a state to human or people-
centered perspective has led to the constitution of the individual as a site of liberal intervention.  
The other effect of this approach is the securitization of development.  Securitization of 
development entails an attachment of the security connotations of risk and threats to vital 
socio-economic conditions like poverty, underdevelopment, and local conflict as dangerous 
phenomena that warrant interventions in order to secure lives.  Poverty and conflict are 
demonized as threats because of the narrow, liberal-inspired view that criminalizes the poor by 
asserting that violence is the main survival tactic for homogenized populations of poor people.   
A cardinal effect of the securitization of development is the reconstitution of poor 
regions as threats to national and global stability.  This liberal viewpoint is reinforced by the 
position of the World Bank, when Zoelick (2009) posits that “when states are breaking down or 
overcome by conflict, the consequences can be severe: death and disease, economic stagnation, 
and environmental degradation…fragile state’s neighbors are also at risk, often suffering 
hardships caused by refugee flows, warring groups, contagious diseases and transnational 
criminal networks that traffic arms, drugs and people” (p. 1-2).  Duffield (2010, p. 56) affirms 
that the thrust of the liberal development and security interventions are geared towards the 
building of individual self-reliance in order to withstand potential risks based upon adaptive 
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patterns of household and communal individual initiatives.  Given the international aid 
community’s belief in the liberal political economic worldview, pro-market entrepreneurship 
primacy and depoliticized community driven practices would be the prescribed antidote.  
Notable approaches of capacity building, empowerment and participation that have been the 
main instruments of liberal DSN interventions will be given in-depth assessments in chapters 
four and five.  
The overall goal of interventions under the DSN is to contain the mobility of the 
population.  This containment measure is articulated under the guise of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ 
through the pursuit of the forging of egalitarian and cohesive communities.  Containment of the 
‘third world’ population, according to Duffield (2010, p. 57), is fostered through individual 
agency-oriented sustainable development.  A likely consequential effect of this individual 
focus on sustainable development is to confine millions of people to barbarous situations of 
inhuman existence.  Confinement to this barbarous life is due to sustainable development’s 
lack of prospects for transformational change.  The individualistic focus of development aid 
interventions mimics deliberate colonial policies and practices meant to foreclose social 
transformation in the Northern Region, and maintain dependence on piecemeal external 
assistance.  Within the framework articulated by Duffield (2008, 2010), risk becomes 
normalized on one hand, while on the other hand, this normalized risk prevents the search for 
the fundamental, broad, and complex aetiologies of the insecurities aid actors seek to solve.  
The logical implications of this aid strategy is that prioritization of risk will instigate 
exceptional short-term interventions, which is likely to provide only ephemeral relief.  
Substituting core grievances and risk factors of other situations is most likely to endure or 
aggravate pre-existing tension. 
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Remarkably, the regulatory nature of human circulation can be found in the colonial 
interventions and are prosaic with the Indirect Rule of the Northern Territories, out which the 
Northern Region was created.  Duffield (2010, p. 56) further argues that the DSN has fostered 
an assemblage of actors who include development actors, security actors, aid agencies and 
professional networks.  These actors generate fatalistic discourses aimed at formulating 
grotesque conditions that will justify urgent interventions, for which the aid industry remains 
the sole incubator of redeemable solutions.  The critical issue to examine is how the rationales 
for security and development actors feed into interventions that have been articulated in a 
conflict prone region, and this endeavor drives this thesis.  
Moreover, securitization of development is, in my view, an institutional process used 
create a reciprocal linkage between security and development.  The converse also holds true in 
relation to the developmentalization of security.  The securitization of development through the 
coercive creation of mutuality between human development and human security in mainstream 
aid- industry thinking would require investigation into the processes and practices they 
engender.  Securitization, from Waever’s (1995) perspective relates to speech acts that define 
what an officially-declared issue constitutes an existential threat.  Weaver (1995) posits that, 
“with the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act.  In this usage, 
security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something real; the utterance itself is the 
act…By uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific 
area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it” (p. 55).  
The determination of an existential threat is influenced by a realist orientation that gives 
authority to political leaders.  This realist notion of securitization is problematic in the sense 
that it tends to silence vital voices, particularly within diverse populations, and only reflects 
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dominant voices.  It also gives a monolithic representation of insecurity as constitutive of 
danger and threat.  An important problem in the equation of insecurity challenges to danger and 
threat is that this equation stalls the consideration of possible opportunities that insecurity, and 
that might initiate new grounds for societal transformation.  Insecurity and conflict challenges 
point to the need for long-term measures to correct a defective socio-economic and political 
system.    
In the wake of the high number of donor-agencies in Ghana’s political and economic 
administrative systems, I suggest that Waever’s absolute sovereignty securitization thesis must 
be moderated in order to recognize the active role that diverse non-state actors play in security.  
The heavy influence of the donor community in the economic and political governance of poor 
regions invalidates Waever’s absolute sovereignty thesis.  It is appropriate to examine the aid 
agencies at the forefront of the security and development interventions in the Northern Region.   
An observation of post-Cold War international development areas of interest indicates 
that the numerous conflicts and insecurity issues in SSA countries has opened up several 
avenues of political domination by international actors.   Diverse international actors are 
currently actively involved in complex emergency interventions in conflict prone regions in the 
developing world.  Young, in his study of the late postcolonial African State, suggests that “the 
webs of conflict, violent social patterns and governmental dysfunctionalities in many parts 
make the state a far less dominating, agenda setting actor than in the first post-independence 
decades” (2004, p. 24).  The implication of Young’s remarks is that the classical Weberian 
notion of the state as wielding an absolute monopoly on the use of force is not consistent with 
the political realities in most SSA economies. This can clearly be seen in the evolving history 
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of the Northern Region, where supra-national actors and domestic non-state actors are 
particularly involved in the complex web of the conflict and security.  
I submit that the existential threat thesis is a static proposition, and it would be more 
helpful if consideration is given to the processes through which an issue becomes securitized as 
dangerous for human society in the first place. A vital process for consideration will be a 
transition from normalcy to existential threats.  In support of the critical risk notion of security, 
Abrahamsen (2005) suggests that security issues vacillate in an indeterminate continuum from 
normalcy, to worrisome, to troublesome, to risk and to existential threats.  Abrahamsen (2005, 
p.59), in her study of the security policies of the Blair administration that are germane to 
Africa, affirms the possibility of pursuing dichotomous policy interventions for post-conflict 
countries as well as those in  active conflict.  Taking a cue from Abrahamsen’s position on the 
possibility of dichotomous interventions, my view is that it is not only at the state-centric level 
that those external security interventions are undertaken.  Such interventions are also 
perpetrated at the regional level, as we can see in the Northern Region.  
It is these externally formulated security interventions that inspired me to investigate 
the rationales that underpin aid practices alongside the poverty-oriented aid program of the UN 
JHSP in particular.  From an instrumental perspective, the UN JHSP is framed as a 
revolutionary programme that can be used to emancipate the region.  A close examination of 
the foundational underpinnings of the UN JHSP, however, suggests that the program is 
modeled on normative frameworks.  These frameworks seek to privilege individual awareness 
creation, consensual and formal dialogue and negotiation, and the capacity building of local 
trainees.  The unavoidable discrepancy in the UN JHSP’s expectations and correlating 
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practices make it imperative for me to examine the way rationales behind similar interventions 
were articulated in the region. 
Security has constituted a vital strategic consideration in aid interventions since the 
1940s.  Security primacy could be found in the Marshall Plan, Truman’s doctrine, and the 1951 
US Congress development policy called the “Mutual Security Program” (Bueger and 
Vennesson, 2009; Beall et al. 2006).  In 1968, the World Bank sought to elevate the saliency of 
‘security’ as a vital, but neglected issue related to development’s conceptualization and its 
wider utility.   This possible development–security linkage led McNamara to declare that: 
“security is development and without development there can be no security […] development 
means economic, social and political progress.  It means a reasonable standard of living, which 
in this context requires continual redefinition; what is reasonable in an earlier stage of 
development will become unreasonable at a later stage” (1968, p. 149-150).  Given 
McNamara’s acclaimed goal of ending poverty via the basic needs approach, I suggest that he 
endeavored to draw a reciprocal linkage between security and poverty reduction.  McNamara 
sought to frame both security and development as preconditions for social and political 
progress. These positivistic linkages and ideas, however, constitute pillars of the current anti-
political liberal interventions. The ultimate effect of localizing development and security 
problems in SSA economies, as McNamara does, is to gloss over the adverse effects of the 
global economy and history of the locales of intervention.  
The imputation of the deleterious effects of violent conflicts and war on poverty and 
overall development has been prominent in stimulating the interventionist interests of aid 
agencies operating in conflict-prone regions.  I hold the view that this renewed interest in 
international aid in difficult regions has contributed immensely to the shift from the state-
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centric focus of security towards a human centered notion.  Security as a possible 
governmental tool has developed expansive aspects that have perceived to be essential for 
human wellbeing.  Specifically, the broad dimensions of security span from military threats 
towards non-military threats that include economic, health, environmental and hunger.  
Rothschild (1995) characterizes shifts in security targets as “from national states, including 
upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional to local communities or local 
governments and sideways to non-governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, 
and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market” (p. 55).  The vital question that needs to 
be raised and examined in detail, however, is the underlying rationales and assumptions behind 
the current expansive notion of security, and how they manifest on the field of practice. 
The 9/11terror attack on New York has brought on increased global security attention.  
Beall et al. (2006) suggest that security has become a dominant aid priority for donor countries, 
including perceived munificent donors like Canada and Denmark.  In addition, the Global War 
on Terror has provided the necessary conceptual support for the imagined linkage between 
development and security.  The US terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 that were allegedly 
organized in Afghanistan (which is considered a weak state because of its dire development 
and security challenges) tends to support the notion that there is a causal relation between 
underdevelopment and terrorism (Buzan & Waever, 2007).  The logical policy implication is 
that simultaneously addressing security and development challenges in Afghanistan must be an 
urgent priority, an idea that is perpetrated under the notion of state reconstruction.  
Nevertheless, the critical issue to probe here is whether the merging of security and 
development priorities and resources fully address the fundamental problems of the poor in 
their particular spatial location.  It is important to note also that there is a legitimate concern in 
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terms of how problems are conceived and whether development gets subordinated to security 
priorities.   
The possibility of subsuming developmental priorities to security objectives might 
undermine the poverty-reduction goal of the aid industry.  Beall et al. (2006) establish that the 
overwhelming dominance of security considerations over development priorities has seriously 
ruined the developmental prospects of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Chandler (2010) attributes the 
contradictory development outcomes in the two countries to the disproportionate resource 
allocation in favor of the security sector against the social, cultural, political and economic 
sectors.  Above all, the misleading rationales behind these aid interventions offer a very 
minuscule hope of societal transformation.  Given the possibility of contradictory relations 
between development and security interventions in Afghanistan, significant questions arise 
around the veracity of the shift from state-centric perspectives to human centered normative 
practices. 
The DSN theoretically postulates broader notions beyond the traditional state-centric 
conceptions. Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 11-17), however, point out the Security 
Sector Reform’s flagrant restoration of the state monopoly of the security apparatus.  It must be 
noted that insignificant attention is accorded to private security in many SSA countries by aid 
agencies, with the state security apparatus constituting the largest sector of donor interventions 
as seen in countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone and Kenya.  This disproportionate aid practice is 
very intriguing given the phenomenal growth in private security industries in these countries.  I 
argue that the state-centered focus of the Security Sector Reforms gives us cause to rethink the 
influence of state security actors in a new global security regime.   Abrahamsen and Williams 
(2011) suggest consequences for overall security due to the marginalization of private security 
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in the security sector network.  It is necessary to transcend officially-recognized private 
security actors and direct serious attention towards informal security actors that are popular in 
rural communities.  These informal security networks are, in most cases, framed as security 
threats or risks as is the prevailing situation in the Northern Region.  It is prudent, then, in the 
context of my study, to examine the implementation of security and development programmes 
in the Northern Region. 
From my perspective, the official conceptual understanding of the DSN is that the two 
concepts are interdependent and employ joint simultaneous implementation.  Given the 
significant adversarial social relations and historical forces that have conditioned development 
and security challenges in acclaimed conflict prone regions, however, these situations might 
render this conceptual DSN empirically indeterminate.   
 
Complex Processes in the Production of Development Trusteeship  
The crucial point to appreciate is that development and security interventions are conceived of 
as practices and processes that are not trans-ideological.  Integral parts of the aid articulation 
are the practices of labeling and framing the subjects of intervention.  Labeling is defined as 
interplay of asymmetric power and knowledge processes of classifying and naming people with 
the aim of identifying targets and scope of interventions.  Wood (2007) suggests that labeling is 
an interactional encounter in which policies and designated labels have an impact on resource 
allocation.  A critical issue according to Wood (2007) is: “not whether we label, but which 
labels are created, and whose labels prevail to define a whole situation or a policy area, under 
what conditions and with what effects” (p. 20).  Relevant points in these processes of labeling 
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are the predetermined solutions earmarked for specific localities or societies based upon very 
limited contact.   
Labels like ‘primitive’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘savage’ played crucial roles in colonial 
development and security interventions as related to the Northern Region.  Similarly, current 
problematic labels such as ‘post-conflict’, ‘conflict trap’, ‘conflict-prone’ and ‘difficult 
regions’ have been generated for countries and regions with history of conflict, violence and 
insecurity.  Accompanying these labels are the illiberal consensus-oriented community driven 
interventions that will be discussed in great length in Chapters four and five of this thesis.  It is 
crucial, however, to note that such labels equally become the resources for contestation, 
thereby setting in motion indeterminate struggles in the field of intervention.   
The uncertainty of the sites and localities for interventions has also necessitated 
labeling practices to sanitize the chaotic nature of the field of interventions to establish 
certainty.  It should be noted that the aid industry is a complexity-reducing entity, hence 
labeling becomes a catalytic resource to simplify complex problems in declared conflict prone 
regions.  Labeling is vital in designing abstracted solutions to imagined sites.  To a large 
extent, I propose that the replication of consensual good governance solutions in conflict 
plagued regions and or countries must be attributed to this deliberate avoidance of non-
quantifiable contextual social relational realities.   Pugh’s work on critical approaches to 
peacebuilding suggests that market competitiveness and liberal peace logic have become the 
operational orthodoxy for the aid industry in conflict-ridden regions (2005, p. 23-24, 31).  The 
crucial question is to examine how the assumptions behind such interventions are manifest in 
the study region. Such an insight into the processes of articulation will provide a nuanced 
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understanding of interventions away from the hegemonic power assigned to liberal policies and 
practices.  
The likely silencing of the social-relational factors in the labeling processes suggests 
that the derived programmes, plans and projects are unlikely to reverse the poverty and conflict 
challenges.  Goloobo-Mutebi and Hickey (2009, p. 25) demonstrate that the neglect of the 
historical power relations within conflict plagued Northern Uganda and the mainland has 
significantly undermined the implementation of the social funds programme.  In addition, the 
rendering of such deep-seated micro, meso, and macro historical socio-economic and political 
problems as technical issues amendable to calculative rationality, or the resorting to a ‘lack ‘ or 
‘deficit’ mantra is counter-productive.   
The essence of this framing is also to provide the necessary visibility to problems 
before rendering technical, prescribed, and managerialistic solutions.  I contend that poverty 
and security challenges defy technical solutions because of the complex forces that created and 
still create conditions for their emergence and reproduction from colonial and postcolonial 
regimes.  Another crucial factor to note is that the cause(s) of underdevelopment, poverty and 
insecurity cannot be limited to internally constrained conditions, but are forcefully determined 
by the confluence of unfettered, misguided, global capitalist and governance practices.   
My framework resolutely affirms the contradictory nature of the development aid 
industry because of the chasm between abstracted knowledge and the lived realities of the 
communities within which these interventions are deployed.  This contradiction, according to 
Rist (2008), is due to an excessive reliance on beliefs not grounded in the complex and realistic 
feasibility of its manifestation.  I will further attribute these discrepancies to the individualistic 
and abstracted methodological tools that inform the policy, programme and the projects of the 
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bureaucratized aid agencies.  It is instructive to note that the acclaimed experts that provide the 
technical and operational guidance to aid industries cannot be absolved from such a failure.  It 
is from the above-noted drawback that, Kumar and Corbridge’s (2002,p. 93-96) study of the 
Eastern India Rainfed Farming project conceives that most expert-oriented participatory 
projects as programmed to fail due to the uncritical faith put into unrealistic, weak and untested 
assumptions.  Inherent in such weak assumptions is a reductive diagnosis and neglect of 
contentious structural, socio-economic and political imbalanced power relation issues at critical 
multiple nodal points.  
The epistemological lens through which interventions are framed by the international 
development agencies are not objective or neutral in their nature but are decidedly social 
constructs.  Part of this social construction is ideational power, and an important area of 
concern is the source of the idea and not what is actually proffered.  Ideas espoused by aid 
agencies or through the epistemic communities and other networks have played vital roles in 
operational functions, particularly in labeling, framing, classifications, categorizations, 
diagnosis and evaluative standards.  The ideas churned out by the dominant aid agencies tend 
to be technical and depoliticized (Ferguson, 1990, p. xv; 2006).  Depoliticization occurs 
through the neglect of broad causal historical relational factors from diagnostic considerations, 
and rather privilege technically-derived uniform factors that can be standardized for universal 
application.  This technical rendering of problems as suggested by Ferguson (2006) is used to 
fulfill the institutional interests of the aid industry.  Technical rendering is a way for the aid 
agencies to maintain ideologically hegemonic control of solutions to identified problems in the 
SSA and other developing countries.   
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These technical and apolitical interventions cannot be delinked from colonial 
interventions.  Mitchell (2002), Kothari (2006), and Kothari and Wilkinson (2010) also 
attribute this framing of the ‘other’ as emergent from the colonial administration practices in 
the former colonies.  Kothari (2006, p. 238) explains that the assumption of the possession of 
cultural capital on the part of the colonial officers was a critical factor in framing.  This cultural 
capital reflects in the deployment of scientific knowledge to describe and represent the ‘other’ 
perceived as inept, lazy and barbaric finds similar thought in contemporary aid industry.   
The cumulative effect of such derogatory classifications of the ‘other’ becomes the 
pretext to colonize the ‘other’ in the name of a “moral or humanitarian assistance” or civilizing 
mission.  This labeling, as Greisler (2012, p. 17-20) notes, is superficial because it relates more 
to the characteristics of people rather than the history and polities of the people.  In my view, 
such an artificial representation feeds into the thin-veneer interventions that tend to exteriorize 
problems instead of engaging with their actual complex relational drivers.  
Contrary to the orthodox aid industry frameworks that espouse linear and positivistic 
development and security policy and programmes, the reality is that articulation entails 
contestations. Various studies undertaken by Long (2004), Jessop (2012) and Peck and 
Theodore (2012) demonstrate that the process of generating and diffusing the programs, 
policies and projects entail diverse negotiating processes and compromises.  Long (2007, p.15-
16), using interface analysis for his study of Peruvian Land reform, frames the intervention 
arena as a battlefield not of knowledge alone.  The site of intervention is active with a 
consistent struggle over social meanings and practices that have the possibility of altering 
predefined or pre-programmed plans, intentions and policies.  It is necessary to recognize the 
importance of power, ideational, socio-cultural and historical differences that influence the 
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direction of articulation processes.  Such complex processes should moderate elevated promise 
of securing regions.  
By conceiving of development agencies as transnational networks, I will provide the 
basis needed to transcend binary classifications of ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ and macro 
versus micro.  This demonstrates a need to direct attention to the entire gamut of actors in aid 
situations in order to improve our understanding of the messy nature of interventions.  From 
my analytical prism, this transnational perspective would provide a better understanding of 
what kind of knowledge is privileged and the sources of expertise that influence development 
and security interventions.  The indeterminate nature of these processes of intervention, 
according to Peck and Theodore (2012) and Hall (1993) are symptomatic of their social and 
institutionalized contexts.  Within the purview of the Northern Region, I reiterate that 
international development interventions, inclusive of security, are not objective practices.  
Instead, they are actively driven by socially constructed rationales and assumptions that are 
discursively constituted in line with institutional priorities at multiple sites.  
 
Research Context 
I posit that the former and current development and security related interventions prioritized by 
diverse aid agencies in a framed fragile or difficult region like the study region are undertaken 
in an uncertain structured atmosphere of multiple conditions, constraints, actors and 
institutions.  Most research undertaken from policy perspectives in acclaimed conflict-prone 
regions have focused more on the effects on potential beneficiaries, which does not fully 
capture the rationale behind these interventions.  In order to better grasp the rationales and 
assumptions in the processes of interventions, my study places a prime focus on diverse 
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encounters with multiple actors, including local residents, government officials and 
consultants.   
The study is being placed within the purview of the historical relational formation of 
the region in order to understand the complex nature of the field and its location within the 
international political economy.  In addition, the nature and pattern of the relationship between 
actors and institutions and agencies is a critical area that my study will consider.  
This research context is being utilized to enable a critical interrogation of the growing 
literature and aid agency interest in the dual concepts of development and security as witnessed 
during fieldwork.  There is a compelling need to examine the rationales and assumptions 
underlying the current interventions, especially in a postcolonial region, in order to expose 
actual practices perpetrated under the guise of the DSN.   The overall research context fully 
recognizes the saliency of broader historical power relational and international political factors 
and their impact on development and security interventions. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In summary, I have explained the constructed nature of development and security concepts, 
and analyzed the intricacies of the DSN.  Furthermore, the articulation of development and 
security interventions is underpinned by rationales and assumptions that privilege technocratic 
solutions.  The development and aid organizations (bilateral, multilateral and INGOs) are 
driven by an expertise bias in order to invent a problem and devise interventionist measures.  I 
suggest that, far from the perceived seamless articulation of interventions, the field of 
development practice is messy, non-linear and complex.  Given the analyses undertaken for 
development and security relationships, I will utilize the DSN to form the critical orientation of 
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my conceptual framework.  The focus of this nexus leads to the main research question:  how 
are the rationales of international development aid and security interventions articulated in 
conflict prone Northern Region of Ghana, and received by the local population?  
The key interventionist approaches in facilitating critical analyses of these rationales 
include: community, participation, empowerment, and capacity building.  The next chapter 
addresses the colonial development practices and political initiatives that show the historicity 
of the development and security challenges.  The contradictory and exclusionary outcomes will 
be addressed extensively and will ultimately demonstrate the complexity of the current 
development and security challenges. 
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Chapter Three 
Historical Development Interventions in the Northern Region 
 
Introduction 
The Northern Territories out of which the current Northern Region emerged at the turn of 
national independence was a colonial creation.  For the remainder of this dissertation, I will use 
Northern Ghana and Northern Territories interchangeably.  Northern Ghana was created by an 
Order-in –Council in 1902, which was preceded by the Anglo- Franco and Anglo-German 
conventions 1898 and 1899 respectively (Metcalfe, 1964, p.523-524; Gold Coast Annual 
Report, 1903, p. 59).  In addition to these agreements,  protection treaties were brokered with 
the chiefs of Dagomba, Gonja and Mamprusi by George E. Ferguson during his exploratory 
mission to the North in 1894 (Gold Coast Annual Report, 1897, p.24).  For administrative 
reasons, the NT was divided into three provinces: North Western, North Eastern, and Southern 
(now Northern Region).   
Currently, the Northern Region has innumerable unresolved conflicts, which have 
created an interventionist opportunity for international development aid organizations.  
Certainly, efforts to address the unresolved conflicts, contestations and grievances are a 
laudable effort.  The most critical issue in my view, however, is the way in which the conflicts 
are understood and imagined.  In an interview with Dr. Albert Awedoba, of the Institute of 
African Studies, University of Ghana, he outlined existing salient conflict hotspots in the 
Northern Region.  He asserts that:  
The inability to search for long-term solution to the numerous conflicts in 
the region, due both to institutional weakness and superficial approaches 
by the development partners puts the relative stability of the region in 
82 
 
jeopardy. Unresolved issues and demands such as; the Mpaha-Kpabuso 
religious conflict; rumours of impending Gonja-Tampulma conflict; 
recurrence of the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict; the Buipe Chieftaincy 
dispute, the Nalogni Chieftaincy turmoil; Dagbon crisis and the Gbintiri 
quest to be part of the Bunkprugu-Yonyoo District make the region 
insecure. (A. Awedoba. Interviewed on July 30, 2011). 
My scrutiny of the literature and documents in relation to the ethnic conflicts in 
Northern Region suggests that unresolved conflicts became much intense after the 
introduction of the Indirect Rule policy.  The Indirect Rule was a territorial 
governance system aimed at governing the colony through its native political and 
informal institutional structures, beliefs, laws and customs.  I will defer further 
explanation of the Indirect Rule later in this chapter.  
Remarkably, most orthodox literature on development and security interventions in 
acclaimed conflict prone postcolonial regions seems to de-historicize the site of intervention.  
This de-historicization of the factors that precipitates insecure regions creates the impression 
that poverty, conflict and insecurity are recent phenomena.  In particular, the ‘new war’ thesis 
by Mary Kaldor (1999, 2007) deems poverty, underdevelopment and conflict in developing 
countries as post-cold war problems.  The policy conclusion of this new war thesis is the 
unrestrained urgency for international aid interventions with the ultimate goal to prevent global 
instability and insecurity.  Duffield (2007, 2010) makes an attempt to link the liberal peace 
interventions in fragile states to the colonial native administration practice.  The key conclusion 
that he draws between the two distinct but organically linked interventionist epochs is the 
unending governing from a distance practice.  I do agree with this governing at a distance 
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thesis, but, within the context of the Northern Region, colonialism cannot be exonerated from 
charges that it caused insecurity and poverty challenges.   
In light of the issues discussed above the key argument of this chapter is that the current 
security and development challenges of poverty and conflict in the Northern Region are 
organically linked to the discriminatory colonial development practices. The colonial 
development policies put into effect were used in order to maintain pre-colonial peasantry in 
Northern Ghana.   Additionally, the labour resources of Northern Ghana were used to promote 
the capitalists interest in the southern colonies.  This anti-developmental objective was to be 
achieved through strategic articulation of various practices and policies to prevent expansion of 
the subsistent economic base of Northern Ghana.  
In consideration of the key arguments of this chapter, I interrogate the core colonial 
policies that were deployed to undermine the developmental prospects and institutionalized 
ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana. To fully address the key argument, I will rely on colonial 
documents and secondary literature as my core sources of information  
The first section of this chapter discusses in detail the uneven development policies 
between Northern Ghana and its Southern counterparts.  Specific uneven core policies to be 
discussed are related to education, land and agriculture, infrastructure investment and labour 
recruitment.   The second section interrogates the reconfiguration of the polity through the 
Indirect Rule policy.  The processes leading to this political configuration will be discussed as 
well as the contestations and struggles that it ignited will be discussed.  The third section deals 
with the processes for the incorporation of the Northern Region into independent Ghana.  This 
section discusses the adverse incorporation of the Northern Region into the state formation of 
Ghana.   
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Colonial Development Policies in Northern Ghana  
The development of Northern Ghana from the outset was an afterthought because the territory 
was politically disconnected from the Gold Coast Colony.  There was no pressing political or 
economic interest to develop Northern Ghana.  Grischow (2006) suggests that the potential 
commercial and trade benefits of the Northern Ghana (by virtue of its proximity to the 
Sahelian) might have explained its annexation.  A careful consideration of the colonial 
government’s policies suggests that the occupation of Northern Ghana was to serve complex as 
well as contradictory and complex capitalist/imperialist and mercantilist interest.  The 
contradiction lies in the fact that Ferguson’s economic report about the promising agricultural 
potential of the Northern Territories did not result in meaningful investment to develop the 
agrarian resources.  Ferguson reports that:    
The resources of the country under notice consist of gold in the western 
districts of Gaman, Lobi and branches of the Kong Mountains; ivory, 
horses, cattle and slaves brought down by caravans from the Mossi and the 
region of the Middle Niger; shea butter the producing tree growing 
abundantly in the plains; gum Arabic, produced in enormous quantity in 
the plains, but which at present does not form an article of export to any 
extent. …..Rice, guinea corn, millet and other cereals as well as ground-
nut, sweet potato and cassava grow luxuriously in the rich plains…the 
people cultivate indigo, tobacco and cotton. (Ferguson, 1892, No. 35 in 
448.  In Arhin, 1974, p.67-68) 
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This statement suggests the role that mercantilist interests played in the hinterland, providing 
an added economic impetus to the colonial administration’s political interest in the annexation 
of the territory. Considering this information, justification for territorial, political and 
administrative control as a way to protect the inhabitants of Northern Ghana is a blatant farce.  
The real intent appears to be an enforcement of order and the exploitation of labour resources 
to support a capitalist export economy in Southern Ghana.  For the rest of this chapter, the 
terms ‘Northern Territories,’ ‘Northern Ghana’ and ‘the North’ will be used interchangeably, 
likewise with the terms ‘Southern Ghana’, ‘Southern Colonies’ and ‘the South.’ 
The keen capitalist interest in developing the Southern colonies certainly was the 
overriding objective, and the NT was used to attain this goal.  Thus, Governor Hodgson 
justified the low budgetary allocation for the NT states by arguing:  
The country as far as is known is destitute of mineral wealth, it is destitute 
of valuable timbers, and does not produce rubber or kola nuts or indeed 
any product of trade value…….. I therefore cannot too strongly urge the 
employment of all available resources of the government upon the 
development of the country to the South of Kintampo leaving the Northern 
Territories to be dealt with in future years……. I would not at any present 
spend upon the northern territories ….. A single penny more than is 
absolutely necessary for their suitable administration and the 
encouragement of the transit trade (Gold Coast Confidential Dispatch, 
From Governor Hogdson to Chamberlain, December 20, 1899, Cited in 
Kimble, 1961, p. 533-4.)  
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The above admission underlines the official development policy for Northern Ghana.  
Essentially, the material development of the North was not a priority for the colonial 
administration.  This implies that the South, richly endowed with exportable products would 
benefit from immense infrastructural and other productive investments.  Considering this, it is 
critical at this point to interrogate the colonial development policies that institutionalized 
stagnant agrarian development in Northern Ghana. 
The anti-developmental objective of Governor Hodgson against the North stood in 
sharp contrast to the Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain’s developmental objective for the 
colonies.  Chamberlain decreed, in what would become the industrial back-up for the empire, 
that Britain develop its colonies.  The decree states: 
 It is not enough to occupy great spaces of the world’s surface unless you 
can make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them.  We are 
the landlords of a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to develop the 
estate.... In my opinion, it would be the wisest course for the Government 
of this country to use British capital and British credit to create an 
instrument of trade (i.e. Railways) in all....... new important countries.  I 
firmly believe that not only would they, in so doing, give an immediate 
impetus to British trade and industry in the manufacture of machinery that 
is necessary for the purpose, but also in the long run.... they would sooner 
or later earn a large reward either directly or indirectly.  (Cowen and 
Shenton, 1996, p. 248)  
The dictates of this decree are certainly at variance with the peasantry promotion rationale that 
was the underlying framework for the development of Northern Ghana.  The implication is that 
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the moral responsibility goal of the colonial ‘development’ practices in the North was certainly 
a ruse to serve other interests.  My view is that the moral duty and responsibility to develop the 
Northern Territories was side-stepped to develop the export economy in the Southern colonies 
instead.   
 
Colonial Labour Recruitment Policy 
The youth and able-bodied, while considered an essential element in the material development 
of any society, was actually used to retard the advancement of the Northern Territories.  
Recruitment of manpower from the North started from a security angle.  In 1897, the 
government proposed the recruitment of Gonja, Dagomba, Gurunsi and Mossi people for the 
Gold Coast Regiment of the West Africa Frontier Force (Metcalfe, 1964, p. 494).  In 
subsequent years, and by 1917, close to 90% of the men and officers of the Gold Coast 
Regiment were from the North.  A police escort division was established in 1908 to provide 
internal security in the colony.  Indeed the 1926/27 Annual Gold Coast Report outlines the 
duties of the escort police and its ethnic composition:  
The Escort Police are illiterate and are mainly natives of the Northern 
Territories. Among their number are many old soldiers of the Gold Coast 
Regiment and they are generally of a more military type than the educated 
class. They are available for all duties not requiring reading and writing 
and are specifically useful on escort duties, guards, patrols and the like. In 
the event of any unusual disturbance escort police are employed to cope 
with it (p.32).  
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This statement attests to the low level jobs reserved for the natives of NT, especially in jobs 
that Southerners were unwilling to undertake. In sum, this escort police division was 
established to serve two cardinal security and economic objectives.  The massive recruitment 
of men from the North served the purpose of reducing the conflict propensity in the territory to 
ensure security in the region.  Secondly, the escort division served to provide the necessary 
security that was vital for capitalist exploitation in the southern colonies. The same report 
indicates that the general police, who serve as the mainstream police service, are dominated by 
recruits from the Coastal colony.  
Beyond the security-oriented recruitment, the central force behind this labour 
recruitment drive from the NT was to build capitalist relations and commercial 
interests in the southern colonies.  The capitalist interest in gold, diamond, bauxite 
manganese, cocoa, palm oil and rubber attracted high capital investment in such 
resources.  Investment in these natural resources was accompanied by capital 
investment in infrastructure.  The growth in gold, for instance, was seen in 
incremental scale of export value.  The period 1898-1902 recorded the value of gold to 
be £55,000 in export revenue, which rose to £597,000, and, by 1907, to £1,130,000 
(Kay, 1971, p.334).  The cocoa sector total exports grew exponentially from zero tons 
in1891 to 5000 tons by 1900, then to 23,000 by 1910 and to more than 51,300 tons by 
1913 (Kay,1972, p. 336).  The phenomenal growth in both gold and cocoa production, 
amidst other conditions, created high demand for labour beginning in 1905.   
One of the pertinent conditions that facilitated the labour shortage that 
warranted the implementation of this labour policy on Northern Territories was the 
refusal on the part of southern workers to work in the underground mines.  The 
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Annual Mines Department report of 1916-20 suggests that a daily average of 7900 
men worked in the underground at that time.  The refusal of southern workers to work 
in the mines can be attributed to the availability of less tedious jobs in the cocoa, 
palm-oil and rubber plantations.  It is instructive to note that the out-migration of the 
Nigerian and Liberian workers in the mines following the buoyant rubber industry 
also accounted for the labour shortage.   
Given the possible dire consequences of this labour shortage, the management 
of the Tarkwa Mines made a request to Chief Commissioner Watherston for a supply 
of labourers from the Northern Territories.  After subsequent negotiations in regard to 
the terms around working conditions, the deployment of the first batch of labourers 
commenced in 1906 (Thomas, 1973). 1907 saw an organized recruitment for the 
mines following the deployment of the first batch with the District Commissioners and 
chiefs serving as recruitment facilitators.  The District Commissioners were paid 5s 
for every gang they recruited (Thomas, 1973).  In the meanwhile, no opportunity was 
created for the Northern Ghana recruits to develop their innate skills. 
The tedious nature of the underground work was enough reason for many of 
the recruits to return home in 1909, whilst other refused to work and some ran away.  
Reports suggest that a second batch of recruits made up of 163 Dagomba and 
Mamprusi men were dispatched on July 1909; five of these men died en route, and 
several others contracted smallpox.  By July 13, 1909, virtually all of the remaining 
men had vacated their jobs.  With this necessary boycott of mine work, an acute 
labour shortage was declared in mid-1909.   Giles Hunt, an attorney for ten mining 
companies wrote a letter to Governor Rodger, in which he proposed the establishment 
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of a Native Labour Association for recruitment from the Northern Territories as the 
solution to the labour shortage in the mines (Thomas, 1973).  Hunt further proposed 
an amendment to the Master and Servant Ordinance in order to tighten the penalties 
for violation of contracts by the recruits.  For example, the rules of the of the contract 
were varied to ensure that recruits work for a minimum of a year before they are 
allowed to return home and must be medically and physically examined (Chamber of 
Mines to CO. 1912 in Illiasu Papers).   Governor Rodger, however, rejected this 
proposal and, in consultation with the Secretary for Mines and Chief Commissioner, 
decided that recruitment should be carried out by the Chiefs.  They believed that this 
recruitment would create the impression that men were volunteering for service 
(Thomas, 1973). 
The recruitment from the Northern Territories reached its highest level 
following the institution of Guggisberg’s 10 year development plan, which ran during 
his time in office from 1919-1927.  A key aspect of Guggisberg’s development plan 
was massive infrastructural investment in the southern colonies, including road 
construction, government buildings, the Achimota School, hospitals and railways. 
Thus by the early part of the 1920s, an average of 3000-4000 men were recruited from 
the Northern Territories to work in the railway and mining sectors (Mines 
Departmental Annual Report 1921-23).   
The recruitment of men from the North must be placed in the larger context of 
the retarded educational system in the Northern Territories, which created great 
number of unskilled graduates.  In addition, the confinement of Northern Ghana 
labour to low-paying jobs in the Southern colonies was part of the strategy to limit the 
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quantity of remittances available to their kinsfolk.  It is interesting to note that the 
majority of the Northern indigenes that served in the security services occupied lower 
ranks.     
Whilst labour from the Northern Territories was being used to develop the 
southern colonies, there was no corresponding developmental intervention in the 
North.  The chiefs further complained about the lack of reciprocal investment in the 
Northern Territories, which did nothing to change the neglect.  In order to deepen their 
protest against exploitation, the chiefs selected weak men to work in the plantations.  
This led to rejection of the recruits by the mining companies.  In fact, Guggisberg, in 
solidarity with the chiefs of Northern Ghana, suggested that labour should be recruited 
in localities of the infrastructure, since they are the direct beneficiaries.  During a 
meeting with the selected chiefs of Northern Ghana in Salaga, in 1921, Guggisberg 
reiterated his promise to extend the railway network to the North.  This was a gesture 
to compensate for the exploitation of Northern Ghana manpower resources. 
My contention is that claiming that the ‘natives’ of Northern Ghana were 
unruly was a diversionary act to cover the dangerous nature of the work in the 
underground mines.  The net effect of subjecting these recruits from the Northern 
Territories to this kind of work had a debilitating effect on their personal 
advancement.  This led to the streamlining of the recruitment process to ensure that 
the recruits were committed to the work.  The recruits were not expected to return 
home with skills and knowledge to improve their communities, but rather to stay in 
the mines long-term.   
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The experience of working in the mine was characterized by low wages, 
endless diseases and infections, as well as psychological and cultural alienation.  In 
particular, there were a great number of deaths from tuberculosis and pulmonary 
diseases among the NT recruits who worked in the Tarkwa mines beginning in 1918.  
This phenomenon was noted by Sir William Simpson, a surgeon whose job it was to 
inspect the mines (Simpson to the CO. 1924).  The mining companies, however, 
blamed the deaths on the poor health conditions of the recruits.  Coercive means of 
ensuring the return of recruits led to staggered payment systems being introduced.  
Payouts of meager wages of 1s 6d per day were delayed in order to keep the recruits 
committed to work (Giles Hunt to Colonial Secretary, 1909. Illiasu Papers).  A 
striking negative effect of this labour recruitment has been the inferior status accorded 
to these migrants by Southerners.  This unequal relationship between the 
comparatively richer southerners and poorer northerners unfortunately did not alter the 
disproportionate political representation of needs and priorities from the post-
independence era.  The ensuing social inequality gap between the two sets of people 
translated into poor state formation, which accounts for the perpetual poverty 
conditions of the northern region.   In the last section of this chapter, I will explain 
further, the adverse incorporation of the Northern Region into the immediate post-
independence state of Ghana.   
 Labour recruitment practices officially ended in 1927.  The unofficial 
movement to the South did not end.  As of the twenty-first century, downward 
migration remains one of the few livelihood options for residents of the Northern 
Region.  The crucial issue remains the terms of incorporation into the few sprawling 
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urban centers.  Based on my personal observation in the national capital, I can attest to 
the dire conditions in which the Northern migrants, particularly young women and 
girls endure in Accra.    
 
Colonial Government Land Policy in the Northern Ghana 
The precursor to the appropriation of the land resources in NG was the enactment of 
the Mineral Rights Ordinance in 1904, after the initial gold prospecting by British 
mining companies.  With the passing of the mineral rights ordinance, regulatory 
power was given to the colonial administration to regulate mineral prospecting in the 
Northern Territories.  In effect, the colonial administration, in its quest to raise 
significant money, raised the concession fees, leading to a disincentive for mine 
prospecting in the territory.  Further, no tax incentives were provided to attract 
prospective mining companies.  Subsequent to the passing of the Mineral Rights 
Ordinance, the enactment of the Northern Territories Land Ordinance began in 1923 
(Bening, 1995).  The Northern Territories Land Ordinance effectively nationalized the 
land in the Northern Territories, stripping the chiefs of their power and the Tendana, 
their traditional and spiritual control and ownership of the land.  Because of the 
absolute control of the land by the colonial government, a pittance was paid to the 
chiefs by mining companies in their concession fees.  The colonial government 
received £40 per sq. km of land and the chiefs were paid £10 (Der, 1975).  
Furthermore, considering the high concession fees charged by the government, there 
was no pay consideration given to the chiefs.  The consideration fees actually 
preceded the concession, in which case the southern colony chiefs were paid £50,000.  
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With the avowed aim of keeping capitalist penetration out of the Northern 
Territories, and without consultation with the chiefs of the North, the state passed the 
Land and Native Right Ordinance in 1927.  The Land and Native Right Ordinance 
vested all lands, mineral resources and water bodies to the crown and made them 
subject to the discretionary of the Governor.  Significantly, the passing of the Land 
and Native Right Ordinance was contested by local legislators in the South, who were 
members of the Aboriginal Rights Protected Society.  The core of their argument - 
which was upheld - was that the lands of Northern Ghana belong to the natives and are 
not for the crown to appropriate (Kimble, 1963).  The rejection of the 1927 Land and 
Native Right Ordinance by the Legislative Assembly led to its revision in 1931.  The 
revised 1931 Land and Native Right Ordinance had the following objectives: a) to 
prevent the natives from disposing of their lands outright, without regard for the 
requirements of their descendants, for totally inadequate payments; b) to ensure that 
such profits as are derived from the land are used for the benefit of the community as a 
whole and not of any particular section or individual member of it; and c) to minimize 
the possibility of ruinous litigation (Slater Speech, In Metcalfe, p. 634).   
These stated objectives denied the chiefs and people of the North their 
autonomy in the management and utilization of their lands.  Secondly, the Land and 
Native Rights Ordinance deprived the traditional leaders of the right to demand 
royalties that were necessary to develop their communities.  Further, the revised 
ordinance perpetuated the paternalistic relations between the colonial administration 
and the people of Northern Ghana.  Clearly, this paternalistic relation was a way to 
manipulate people against any possible revolt against the colonial government.  This 
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revised ordinance reflects contemporary sustainable development discourse that is 
aimed at containing a particular group of people with no long-term transformational 
objective. 
The effect of the rigid land use was agrarian expansion by both the chiefs and 
the people.  Technically, this Land and Native Rights Ordinance dispossessed the 
indigenes of the North of their productive asset and rendered them stagnated peasants.  
The consequential effect was that the institutionalization of peasantry became a further 
disincentive to investors to develop crops like shea butter, rice and ground-nut in NG.  
This land use ordinance contributed to the stagnation of peasantry by limiting any 
expansion potential.   In the end, labour recruitment became a major source of 
employment to support their livelihoods   On the other hand, their southern 
counterparts exercised a high degree of autonomy over their lands in order to further 
their economic and social interests.   
The minuscule fees paid to the chiefs as concession fees undermined revenue 
mobilization which Northern Ghana needed for its development.  In one instance the 
Wa Syndicate, a gold prospecting company, was charged £22,000 per annum to mine 
an area of 450 sq. miles.  According to Der (1975, p. 28), the colonial government 
appropriated £18,000, whilst the Chiefs, Tendanas and Elders were collectively given 
£4,000. The southern colony chiefs, however, were paid much higher rents and 
expanded their cocoa, rubber and palm-oil plantations (Kimble, 1963).  These 
plantations contributed to the diverse job opportunities in the Southern Colonies.  
Land nationalization policies used in the North denied traditional rulers and Tendanas 
the autonomy necessary to negotiate effectively to extract better rents they could use 
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to address their developmental needs.  A more serious effect of the land use ordinance 
is that the ultimate power vested in the Governor for allocation of any land for public 
use was, on some occasions, used to undermine agrarian development.  A typical 
example is the confiscation of cultivated fertile lands for public buildings such as 
veterinary station in Tamale in the mid-1920s (Der, 1975, p. 29-30).  
Before the enactment of the Land and Native Rights Ordinance, earlier 
attempts to nationalize the lands and mineral resources in the Southern Ghana had 
been made on three separate occasions in 1894, 1897 and 1911.  The Bills on Land 
and Forestry were proposed by the colonial administration, and the main thrust of the 
1897 Bill focused on land use rights and customary ownership.  The merchants, 
chiefs, clergymen, intellectuals and lawyers from the South, however, fiercely 
defended their own land use rights (Berry, 1992, p. 341).  The lead counsel of the 
southern business class and chiefs, John Mensah-Sarbah, a Coastal lawyer, argued 
there was no vacant land to be vested in the colonial government, because all land was 
fully owned by the community (Kimble, 1963, p. 338). The rejection of these 
proposed bills enabled the southern merchants to expand their plantations for wealth 
accumulation.  
 
Colonial Infrastructural Investment Policy  
One of the most important areas in which the fusion of political and economic interests of the 
southern colonies worked against the Northern territories was the investment decisions of 
capital expenditure. In an address to the Legislative Assembly, Governor Hugh justified the 
decision not to construct any railway infrastructure in the North.  The statement reads:  
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In this matter (railway), however, the Northern Territories must be content 
to await its turn.  At the present time … Many of the richest and most 
developed districts of the colony and of Ashanti are still without any 
efficient means of transporting their produce to the coast; and it is not until 
these districts have been opened up by the railway extensions that the 
provision of similar facilities for the Northern Territories can be regarded 
as a question of practical politics.  The Government of the Colony must be 
content for years- it may be for decades- to recognize the Northern 
Territories as a direct and unremunerative expenditure. (Metcalfe, p. 544-
548). 
This statement underlines the colonial central policy that dictated the use of the Northern 
Territories to support the capitalist venture in the Southern colonies.   Considering that 
investment decisions tend to be driven by expected returns from colony, this demonstrates a 
clear lack of lack of appreciation for the labour resources from Northern Ghana that provided 
manpower needs to the mines and security of the colony.  The declaration by the governor 
about the failure to create a rail infrastructure attests to the lack of interest in the established 
agricultural resources in Northern Ghana.  Therefore, Northern Ghana needed to be confined to 
stagnant agrarian economy in order to ensure primitive accumulation.  The absence of the 
functional political representation of the Northern Territories in the Legislative Assembly 
essentially ceded all important decisions to the caprices and whims of the southern-dominated 
legislators.  Furthermore, the mercantilist and imperialist interests in the gold, cocoa, palm-oil 
and rubber resources available in the south fiercely resisted any attempt to extend productive 
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infrastructure to the Northern Territories.  I will use the railway for explanatory reasons to 
explain the complex political nature of resource allocation for infrastructural development.   
Recommendations for the extension of railway to the Northern Territories were made 
by Ferguson during his economic feasibility tour in 1896.  He remarked that “the contour of the 
interior offer facilities for animal transport and railway” (cited in Arhin, 1974, p. 99).  This 
recommendation, however, was not considered when the territory was annexed in 1902. 
Furthermore, the vast mineral resources available in the southern colonies significantly 
galvanized capitalist interest to convince His Majesty (HM) to invest in railways in the south.  
A memo sent to His Majesty by a group of London Merchants reads, “the Gold Coast being 
entirely without beasts of burden or means of water transport, there can be no real or important 
development of its resources or trade without the formation of a railway”. (Metcalfe, p. 413-
415).  This memo, along with sustained pressure on the colonial administration led to the 
commitment of resources to a construct rail network in the southern colonies.  By 1901, there 
was railway connection between Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Tarkwa.  This productive 
infrastructure benefited a wide array of business actors, ranging from the local merchants to 
mining companies and to the local administration and the chiefs.  
Upon Guggisberg taking office, there was a shift in the colonial administration’s 
infrastructure investment policy.  Guggisberg’s major concern was the inequities in regional 
development that was to the detriment to NG.  In order to correct this inequitable regional 
development, he proposed an extension of the rail network from Kumasi to the North.  
Guggisberg categorically stated that “the career of the Northern Territories as the Cinderella of 
the Gold Coast is nearing its end. As Cinderella she has done good and unobstructive work 
that.  Her reward for that and the gallantry of her soldiers …is in sight.” (Government Gazette, 
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1919, p.1006).  It is vital to note that Guggisberg’s interest in the Northern Ghana was to more 
easily enact the strategic realization of colonial policy.  This policy was guided by the need to 
diversify the economic base of the colonies, so that the products of the Northern Territories 
could counter falls in the commodity prices of gold and cocoa.  Grischow notes that “the 
Northern Territories provided Guggisberg with a clean slate for his experiment in development 
without denationalization” (2006, p.62).  This commitment by Guggisberg to develop and 
diversify the economic potential of the Northern Territories in a broader sense was to fulfill the 
Chamberlain decree. The vast untapped agricultural resources in the North, to a large degree, 
influenced Guggisberg’s proposal to extend the railway to the region. He stated unequivocally:  
 I have absolute evidence that the country is extremely rich ground for the 
development of huge trade in both groundnut and shea butter. It is also a 
fine country for rice in the Volta flats, a commodity badly needed here and 
of which, with a railway, we could export large quantities. I am doubtful if 
the agricultural poverty of the country was a reason for the desire to 
postpone the railway. Rather was it due to the policy which has openly 
obtained... of starving the Northern territories of the means of 
development. The time is now past”. (ADM. 12/2/32, 1919; p. 15-16). 
Guggisberg’s promise of a railway never materialized, however, because political opponents of 
railway construction in the North rejected the plan on three grounds.  Led by Governor Slater, 
their objections articulated that; a) the railway was estimated to cost 50% more than the most 
expensive of any previous railway build in the colony; b) the railway was due to pass through 
areas where the population was only about a third as dense as in the colony and round Kumasi; 
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and c) the railway would serve an area where cacao could never be grown (Metcalfe, 1963, p. 
624-626).   
Studies conducted by the United Africa Company, show financial and economic 
promise for crops such as shea butter and ground-nut.  On the basis of the bright prospects of 
the two products, the Chairman of United Africa Company urged the Colonial Office to extend 
the railway to the Northern Territories.  His proposal was turned down on the grounds that the 
scattered nature of the shea trees posed a problem for centralization, which even with good 
output and rail access would be an expensive investment that made the project unfeasible.   
These objections were raised in relation to ground-nut plantations, and the proposal was 
rejected after the United African Company lobbied for the rail extension. 
The absence of this railway system led to the collapse of the British Cotton Growers 
Association after nine years in business.  Cocoa merchants in the Southern colonies opposed a 
similarly request by the British Coffee Growers Association for an extension of rail service to 
the North.  Similar requests for railway construction in the Northern Territories was made by 
the British mining companies that started the gold prospecting, which led to the enactment of 
the Mineral Rights Ordinance.  A vital case in support of the railway was the discovery of the 
gold deposits in Nangodi in Northern Ghana in 1933.  The exploitation of these mines was 
halted because of the high cost of transporting the imported machinery to the north as well as 
sending the ore to the port in the south (Dickson, 1976, p. 103-104).  Resistance on the part of 
the mining conglomerates to the extension of the rail network to the north cannot be ignored.  
According to Brukum, (1998) the European mining companies, in tandem with the southern 
colonial administrators, succeeded in blocking any rail investment in the North.    
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Guggisberg’s quest to extend the rail service to the Northern Territories ended when his 
time in office ended in 1926.  Instead, three main road networks were promised the region 
because Governor Slater deemed to be just a fraction of the cost of building a railway.  The 
official death knell for railway construction in the North was sounded by Lord Passfield in 
1929, who emphasized explicitly: “I have read your full and clear view of the case with great 
interest and after careful consideration, I cannot but agree with you that circumstances at 
present do not justify the construction of such a railway, which must accordingly be postponed 
and need no longer be regarded as a project to be taken up in the near future” (Kay, 1972, p. 
166).  Lord Passfield’s statement reflects the opinion of the colonial government which had 
resolved never to expand the economic base of the Northern Territories.  Instead, they would 
focus on expanding export markets in the southern economies.  Notably, the high sunk cost for 
rail infrastructure, has been used by all postcolonial governments to deny requests to provide 
the region with a rail transport system. 
The essence of the railway construction project in the southern communities was to 
entice investment by outsiders in the resources of the territory and to reduce transaction costs.  
As of 1920, a head porterage system became the main means of transport for goods in the 
Northern Territories, and a report has suggested that, each porter walked close to 400 miles per 
annum transporting goods (Department of Road, 1908).  
 
Colonial Agricultural Development Policy 
The colonial administration policy practices for agriculture development in Northern Ghana 
reflects a combination of ambivalent opinions and neglected positions.  With the exception of 
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brief spells of experimentation with capital injections into the agricultural sector, subsistence 
production was the norm.   
The enormous agricultural endowments of the Northern Territories did not stimulate 
much investment interest in its development when compared to the exportable products in the 
Southern colonies.  From the onset of the annexation of the Northern Territories in 1897, Chief 
Commissioners assigned experts to study the commercial viability of identified crops such as 
tobacco, cotton and indigo.  Subsequently, Lt. Col. Morris, the Chief Commissioner in 1904, 
identified the commercial viability of cotton grown in large parts of the North that was already 
being traded in the Southern colonies.  Paradoxically, Morris refused to authorize investment in 
cotton plantations.  He argued that, given the failure of the experimental cotton growing 
projects in Anum and Labolabo, the administration would not commit to invest funds to 
develop cotton crops (Acting Governor Bryan, Government House, 26 June 1905 to Mr. 
Lyttelton. ADM. 56/1/113; NAG, Accra).  Again, the clear disinterest in developing these 
crops cannot be under-estimated: the two southern colonies that hosted the cotton-growing 
experiments were not successful because they were not known as hubs of cotton production in 
the south.  Traders from Northern Territories, however, had been growing and trading cotton 
grown in Salaga as far back as 1881 (Kimble, 1963).  This cotton was exchanged for cloth in 
the southern colonies.  
The first major attempt at capitalist penetration into the Northern Territories was geared 
toward the exploitation of the cotton crop and was started by the British Cotton Growers 
Association in 1906.  They conducted all the required commercial and technical feasibility 
studies that provided promising results leading to the initiation of production.  Reports indicate 
that from an initial bale of cotton purchased in 1909, production increased steadily to boost 
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exports of 27, 882 lbs. in 1916 (Annual Report of the Northern Territories for 1915. ADM. 
5/1/24).  It is intriguing that this existing commercial link between the north and south was not 
sustained by the colonial administration.  The colonial desire to use the Northern Territories to 
support their imperialist ventures in the southern colonies could explain this neglect.   
 In recognition of the steady progress of the British Cotton Growers Association, 
Watherston travelled to England to woo investors to invest in the crop.  He espoused the 
potential of cotton as follows:  
The Cotton is of distinctly promising quality and would be readily saleable 
in this country.  It is similar in character to Improved American Upland but 
some- what depreciated in value by the presence of stained fiber. If greater 
care were taken in cultivation and means adopted to combat the ravages of 
insect pests, the cotton would be much improved and probably equal in 
value to the better qualities of American cotton grown from selected seed. 
(Watherston, 1908, p. 365)   
A year after Watherston’s promising crusade for cotton’s potential, British Cotton Growers 
Association complained of severe challenges, especially when it came to labour shortages and 
high transportation costs.  These physical shortages are tied to colonial policies to deny 
Northern Territories the necessary productive infrastructure and labour recruitment for the 
mines.  Significantly, the cotton project was viewed as an economic distraction to the Southern 
colonies, as suggested in a letter directed to the Prime Minister of England about the need to 
discontinue the project.   
In an official communication with the Sir Arthur Hutton, the Chairman of British 
Coffee Growers Association, the Prime Minister relayed the Governor’s message for the 
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discontinuation of the project.  The Prime Minister argued that "having considered the 
unprofitability of cotton growing being developed on a large scale in the North…the presence 
of more lucrative agricultural industries, such as the production of cocoa and palm-oil" were to 
be supported.  Another issue highlighted by the Prime Minister was that cotton prospectors 
would have to compete with the mines for labour, which could lead to a labour shortage (10 
Downing Street, 11 May, 1909 to Chairman, B.C.G.A. ADM.56/1/78).   This official shift of 
interest in supporting the product explains the lukewarm reaction to the British Cotton Growers 
Association project that ended up being confined to its experimental stage.  Preferences for the 
resources found in the southern colonies did not favour the Northern Terrritories, and cotton 
was sacrificed for cocoa and palm oil.  The Prime Minister’s statement indicated that the 
government would support the economic interest of three main actors in the metropolitan 
center.  These three actors included local merchants from the southern colonies, the colonial 
administration and business magnates in the mining sector.  In fact, Mr. A. Balstone, the 
Acting Inspector of Customs, reaction to the Governor’s conclusion about a rail transportation 
system in the North included a statement in which he indicated that he did not-“think any form 
of commercial cultivation can be attempted with success, until a proper means of transportation 
of introduced” (A. Balstone, to the Governor, Accra. ADM 56/1/131).  This clarion call, 
however, was not enough to reverse the colonial administration’s policy directive of non-
infrastructural investment in Northern Ghana. 
This apathetic attitude towards cotton production prevented the appropriate socio-
political incentives from instituting the necessary infrastructure and services to enhance the 
socio-economic well-being of the indigenes in the North.  Unsurprisingly, later events point to 
the futile outcome of the project.  The Annual Gold Coast Report reflects the dismal fortunes 
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of cotton production.  It notes that, “There were no maritime exports during the year, but 
exports of seed-cotton over the eastern frontier amounted to 2.0 tons. Little interest is taken in 
the crop in the Northern Territories.  A small amount is grown for local use” (Gold Coast 
Annual Report 1938/39, p. 35).  These statements reinforce the deliberate will of the colonial 
government to under-develop trade in the Northern Territories.  In addition, the endowment of 
the North with valuable agricultural products suggests that the region’s under-development 
cannot be attributed to a lack of exportable products.  Instead, it was a calculated attempt on the 
part of the colonial government to suppress the territory in order to mitigate any possible anti-
colonial resistance and to facilitate the exploitation of labourers in the territory.  
There was some experimentation in the North to develop crops such as rice, shea nuts 
and cattle, despite the recommendation of colonial agricultural officers who believed all three 
would be of economic benefit.  None translated into full scale commercial investment.  Indeed, 
Mr. N.C. McLeod, a Colonial Conservator of Forests, was commissioned to investigate the 
economic potential for shea nuts.  He concluded that 250,000 tons of shea butter could be 
produced annually to generate the funds necessary to develop the Northern Territories (N. C. 
McLeod, Conservator of Forests on the shea nuts areas of the Northern Territories; ADM, 
56/1/158).  This potential to develop shea exports attracted British investors who supported the 
exportation of the nuts.  The lack of a cost-effective transportation system, however, was 
enough to discourage investors like John Walkden and Company, African Merchants, and W. 
Bartholomew and Company to invest in shea nuts (Annual Report of the Northern Territories, 
1926/1927 p. 7).  From the perspective of the colonial administration in the area, the market 
potential for shea nuts in Europe and America was unknown, and the price for shea nuts was 
lower than that for palm-oil, and overall yield per tree is low (Ag. Governor, Thomas to 
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Secretary of State, 1929. In Kay, 1972, p. 218).  Low economic interest in exportable crops 
grown in the North undermined any commitment on the part of colonial governments towards 
the development of the shea nut industry in Northern Ghana. 
A modest attempt on the part of the colonial government was made to introduce mixed 
farming in Northern Ghana as a way to increase productivity. This policy directive, however, 
was a response to an increased demand for products in the southern colonies. The policy was to 
focus on peasant farmer and in order to provide credence for the new practice.  This move, 
despite the lofty potential mixed farming had for peasants was not welcomed by them.  The 
crux of the matter was that the peasants, having being ignored for decades without introduction 
to mechanized farming,  were accustomed to reliance on available village and household labour 
to meet their manpower needs.  
The bullock ploughing system used to facilitate mixed farming could not be sustained, 
especially in the Dagomba area of the Northern Territories. In a letter to the Chief 
Commissioner, the District Commissioner of Dagomba wrote that:  
I agree with…remarks as to the difficulty in persuading the Dagomba 
farmer to change their system of farming.  The people are very 
conservative and view any change with disfavor.  Even the fact that the 
cultivation with bullocks is less laborious than their own methods of will 
hardly appeal to them as majority of them are now in a position to hire 
labour to make their farms” (Letter from the District Commissioner to the 
Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories.  Tamale: National 
Archives of Ghana, March 15, 1940).    
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The peasants had developed (low scale) coping mechanisms in the face of many 
decades of colonial neglect and were unwilling to change.  Furthermore, it must be 
understood that the peasants can equally determine the prospect of any new technique, 
before deciding whether to adopt it or not. Therefore, they have every right to view 
any external technique with doubtful suspicion. The bullock ploughing technique was 
alien to the peasant farmers, a fact that confirms the complexity of the change in 
farming practices that has been ignored and misunderstood by other agents.    
Another hindrance to the adoption of mixed farming innovation was the cost of 
doing so.  According to Benneh (1972, p. 101), non-adoption of new ploughing 
techniques was due to the vicious cycle of poverty that the farmers found themselves 
in.  They were unable to secure loan support from co-operative groups and banks, and 
had no way to increase their production in order to secure credit.  We must be careful 
not to naturalize the poverty of those in Northern Ghana, but rather to be sure to 
situate this poverty in the context of the neglect of the colonial administration.  As 
events turned out, it was only in the North-East section of the Northern Ghana that the 
bullock technique was embraced.  This move did increase rice and ground nut 
production but, the monopsony created by southern merchants deprived the farmers 
their due profit (For details see Plange, 1976).  
With the exception of the brief era of mixed farming that gave some peasants 
support, the rest of the colonial era involved the neglecting of the traditional staples of 
the Northern Ghana.  The traditional staples include; maize, yam, millet, ground-nuts, 
rice and beans.   The cumulative effect of this neglect of traditional staples was to 
limit the productive capacity and capabilities of the peasants.  
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The post-war era ushered in a new agricultural policy that I refer to as colonial 
development dirigisme (massive state development).  This dirigisme approach was 
very much influenced by the Fabian Socialism orientation towards heavily developing 
the colonies to serve the economic interest of Great Britain and to maintain and 
promote the African community.  In justifying the need for the extensive development 
of the African resources, Sir Stafford Cripps, at the Governor’s conference in 1947, 
stated: 
The further development of African resources is of crucial importance to 
the rehabilitation and strengthening of Western Europe as the restoration of 
European productive power is to the future progress and property of 
Africa. Each needs and is needed by the other…We must be prepared to 
change our outlook and our habits for colonial development and force the 
pace so that within the next two to five years we can get a really marked 
increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, raw materials of all kinds, 
foodstuffs and anything else that will save dollars or will sell in the dollar 
market (Cabinet Press Release, November 12, 1947). 
The policy outcome of this new colonial priority was the investment of £22, 500,000 into 
oilseed and ground-nut plantations to support the British economy in the East and West African 
colonies.  During the post-Second World War era, Unilever conducted prospective studies 
focused on the commercial viability of ground-nut cultivation in the North.  The encouraging 
findings of these studies largely informed the colonial administration’s decision to invest in the 
crop.     
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The Gonja Development Corporation was established by the colonial administration to 
embark on large-scale commercial cultivation of ground-nuts in 1948. The Gonja Development 
Corporation was set up after a period of political strife surrounding the selection of the site in 
Damongo (West Gonja), which was, at that time, an uninhabited area.  This was a heavily 
capitalist project that sought to instate massive mechanized farming, which would involve the 
peasants as wage-earners in the project.  Eighty thousand non-natives were expected to move 
from Zuarangu, at the time considered to be an over-populated area, to Damongo, where the 
farms were to be located.  The overall project objective of increased productivity was an abject 
failure, in which output was below the average international level.  Also there was no evidence 
that any produce was sold in commercial quantity, and the intended resettlement of the farmers 
did not take effect (Quansah, 1972).  In view of the noted failure of Gonja Development 
Corporation, it was officially liquidated in 1956.  From a technocratic standpoint, the colonial 
administrators attributed the failure to “inherent soil infertility, erratic rainfall, remoteness of 
the area, and the reluctance of people to move and settle permanently on the site” (Quansah, 
1972, p. 15-17).   Significantly, the failure of the project seemed imminent from the onset 
because, the sudden introduction of a highly capitalist-oriented agricultural project in a 
traditional peasant-farming setting is likely to fail because response to market incentives does 
not develop automatically.  The already-identified deliberate policies to ruin communities 
within the North could offer structural relational explanations for the failure.  My interview 
with an elder in the Tamale metropolis during the fieldwork suggests that deep-seated mistrust 
by the resettled indigenes regarding the ground-nut production also contributed to the failure. 
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Colonial Education Policy in Northern Ghana 
Education was one of the main areas that generated the developmental differences between the 
southern colonies and the northern territories.  The colonial administration ran diametrically 
opposed educational systems in Southern Ghana.  The southern colonies had a formal 
European type of education, whereas the Northern Territories had very restricted education.  
The reason for this differential will be discussed below.   
The colonial administration’s preferences to use manpower resources imported from the 
North hindered the early establishment of a formal educational system in the territory.  This 
policy practice arose in response to a rising educated class in the southern colonies who 
pursued diverse administrative and or clerical occupations within the colony.  The colonial 
administration devised strict regulations to prevent the White Fathers of the Catholic Church in 
1907 from providing European education to the people of Northern Ghana (Ladouceur, 1979, 
p. 50).  I conclude that the underlying colonial policy on education was primarily to produce 
people who were unwilling to supplant their local and traditional social structures.  
Guggisberg’s remarks in the next paragraph support my conclusion that education policies in 
Northern Ghana were intended to produce citizens loyal to their tradition who were unwilling 
to implement changes.  
Prior to Governor Guggisberg’s entering office, there existed a limited educational 
infrastructure in the North, which was diametrically opposed to that of the southern colonies.   
Guggisberg, notwithstanding his promise to reverse the developmental deficits in the North, 
however, envisaged an educational policy that would maintain the traditional social system in 
the Northern Territories.  Guggisberg was influenced by policies that guarded against the 
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premature westernization of the Northern Territories.  Governor Guggisberg (1921) remained 
influenced by this mantra of guarding against premature westernization for the Northern 
Territories and emphasized the need for the territory to start on a ‘clean slate’ in terms of 
educational development amidst the pervasive internal politics itself.  To support his policy 
goal, he asserted that:  
When we give a Dagomba man a European education we do not want him 
to forget the customs of his own country.  We do not want to make him a 
European.  We want to teach him to remain a good Dagomba.  If you want 
good trade and have a fine country, it is necessary that you should all be 
good Dagombas and stick together and not to try and break up.  That is 
why we are going to be very careful about the European education that we 
give you (N.A.G.A, ADM. 56/1/258. 1921).   
This statement attests to the limited educational opportunities that the colonial 
administration planned to provide the people of Northern Ghana.  Clearly, this 
educational motive was geared towards maintaining harmony between the educated 
and their traditional rulers, a move that would be convenient for the colonial 
administration. The attainment of order and territorial cohesion was prioritized over 
long-term pragmatic human capability building in Northern Ghana.   
 The need to prevent anti-colonial resistance was in actual fact stated by 
Guggisberg as a justification for his decision not to replicate western education in the 
Northern Ghana.  He declared that, “it is obvious that to do anything at the present 
moment that would extend education system in the Northern Territories would be 
extremely inadvisable.  In the Northern Territories we have a virgin ground on which 
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to work, as far as education is concerned, guided by the lessons brought to us by the 
failures in the colony and Ashanti” (File Number ADM/56/1/88, letter Number 
30/M.P.2189/24, 1925).  In fact, this practice of parallel educational systems within 
the same country, in the absence of vital political and economic interests that would 
support Northern Ghana, would hinder its long–term development.  
An ascriptive educational policy was instituted to limit the number of 
northerners who qualified to be trained at Achimota College (former Prince of Wales 
College).  Particularly, sons and relatives of the chiefs who passed the Standard Seven 
exams were allowed to enroll at Achimota College.  They were not, however, 
however, allowed to proceed to the secondary school programme (Ladouceur, 1979 p. 
52).  The reason for this was that the colonial government believed that when sons of 
the chiefs were educated, there would be no threat to the stability of the territory.  The 
quest for the maintenance of traditional order which was the colonial administration’s 
overriding objective, inhibited educational expansion in the Northern Territories.   
In order to satisfy the restrictive educational polices in the North, the 
curriculum was geared towards basic vocational training, where the curriculum in the 
southern colonies was geared more towards diverse skill training.  The 1934/35 Gold 
Coast Annual Report, indicates that the curriculum provided in the Northern 
Territories at the primary school level included: mat-making, raffia-making, rope 
making and rough carpentry.  At the primary level in the southern colonies, students 
were taught courses that included: speaking, reading, and writing in vernacular and 
English, arithmetic, duties and rights of citizens, drawing, nature study, hygiene, 
handwork and domestic science for girls.  Not only was there a significant difference 
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in the curriculum used in the different colonies, the southern colonies had secondary 
schools, technical schools, five teacher training colleges and a university college.  
Education flourished to the extent that the building of schools had to be halted in the 
early 1920’s so that resources could be devoted to the establishment of Prince of 
Wales College (Plange, 1976).  The Prince of Wales College provided primary to 
university education that was predominantly of benefit to southerners.  Prince of 
Wales College was affiliated with University of London and offered degrees in arts, 
science and engineering.   
The exposure of southerners to higher education gave them an advantage when 
it came to finding jobs that were rewarding.   For example, Ladouceur (1979) 
confirms that the southerners, who worked in Northern Ghana, occupied 
administrative positions that northerners would not be able to get.  Northerners were 
limited to menial jobs in the mines, plantations and to low ranked security positions.  
In short, the human capital formation differential between the Southern and Northern 
Ghana had a significant impact on the overall social inequalities that existed between 
the two distinct geographical spaces. 
In addition to limiting access to courses and schools, further measures were 
deployed to prevent progressive adjustment of the educational system to meet the 
future skill needs of the inhabitants of Northern Ghana. In particular, there was a strict 
limitation of qualified teachers assigned to teach in the northern schools, especially 
during the Guggisberg regime. In fact, this deliberate neglect of the educational 
system in the North was highlighted earlier by Capt. Wheeler, the Chief 
Commissioner:  
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To give these primitive children more advanced education would be a 
doubtful blessing at present. It might tend to make them discontented with 
their lot. Is our population so large at present that we can afford to educate 
natives for work on the coast? On the other hand if they, on leaving school, 
return to their families with advanced education, will this make for peace 
in the household? Will these educated youth go back to work on the farms? 
(ADM 56/1/33). 
These remarks by Capt. Wheeler reinforce that the colonial administration was using 
sub-standard education as a way to prevent resistance movements from forming in the 
North. The result of these educational restrictions hindered the ability of the indigenes 
of Northern Ghana to develop the skills necessary to rise out of poverty.  This 
deliberate provision of sub-standard education is in tune with the official development 
policy that restricted investment in Northern Ghana.  Such limited education would not 
provide the necessary incentives to diversify the economic base of the region.  From my 
perspective, the inevitable consequence of limited access to education undermined the 
political participation of Northerners, especially in the processes that culminated in 
national independence.  The implications of a weak educational system will be 
discussed in the post independent integration of Northern Ghana. 
The next section discusses the processes of exercising political control of the 
different ethnic groups in Northern Ghana.  Primarily, the Indirect Rule was the 
political strategy devised to ensure political and administrative control in the North.  
115 
 
 
Indirect Rule: Empowerment of ‘Native Kingdoms’ and Conflict Implications  
Indirect rule is a form of decentralized territorial governance practice in which the 
colonial administration used the chieftaincy institution as a permanent structure to 
enforce fixed rules over their subjects. Within the colonized West African sub-region, 
Lord Lugard was the first to introduce IR practices in Northern Nigeria in 1908.  
Lugard used his work on the Dual Mandate in The British Tropical Africa (1923) to 
justify Indirect Rule.  He charges that British colonial success could be sustained if they 
facilitated their rule through the incorporation of native institutions.   For effective 
implementation of Indirect Rule policies, Lugard suggests three functional institutional 
preconditions: native courts, a native administration, and native treasury. 
It is important, however, to suggest that the implementation of Indirect Rule practice in 
Northern Ghana was precipitated by three aspects of colonial self-interest.  The first reason 
relates to the need to grant fiscal autonomy to the natives.  This fiscal autonomy arose as a 
result of the mismatch between the government’s expenditures in the North and the revenues 
they collected there.  From a fiscal angle, the ensuing budgetary deficit in Northern Ghana 
imposed a financial burden on the government.  By granting fiscal autonomy to Northern 
Ghana through Indirect Rule, the government could absolve itself of responsibility for North’s 
growing national deficit.  According to Ladouceur (1970, p.45), the revenue that the 
government collected averaged £13,800 a year from 1904-1908.  Revenues then fell to an 
average of £2,525 during the years 1909-1913.   Expenditures in the North were much higher:  
the military campaign cost borne by the Gold Coast was £48,700 per annum during the years 
1904-1908.  This expenditure rose to £73, 600 per annum from 1909-1913.  The abolition of 
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the caravan tolls in 1908 explains this reduction in revenue.  It was not until 1925/26, after the 
introduction of the cattle tax, that revenue increased from £ 9201 to £19, 027 for the fiscal year 
1926/27 (Gold Coast Administrative Reports 1927/28).   
In line with Hodgson’s declaratory statement against increased expenditure in the 
North, the Indirect Rule became the alternative strategy used to mitigate the deficit.  In fact, 
Governor Clifford made a justification for limited expenditure in the Northern Territories.  He 
stated clearly that the “continued direct and unremunerative source of expenditure” (1918, p. 3) 
granted to the North defied any justification unless it was based on moral grounds. In essence, 
Clifford was pushing for continued increased expenditure in the southern colonies at the 
expense of the northern territories.   
The second reason for implementing Indirect Rule was related to a quest for 
administrative efficiency.  A vital stumbling block to smooth administrative control of 
Northern Ghana was the indomitable acephalous group.  The pre-colonial political systems 
could be classified into those with centralized, and those with and non-centralized, polities.  
More importantly, the pre-colonial contestations between the different polities endured through 
colonial rule.  Staniland (1975) explains that the Dagomba (cephalous) had been fighting the 
Konkomba (acephalous ethnic group) at least once every decade since the 15
th
 century.  The 
invasions of Konkombaland by the Dagomba occurred, on average, 10 years into the reign of 
every Dagomba paramount chief since the mid-16
th
 century, beginning with the regime of Na 
Sitobu (Staniland, 1975, p.4).  These periodic conflicts undermined the colonial 
administration’s conception of harmonious and egalitarian pre-colonial social relations among 
the diverse groups of people.  Apart from the inter-ethnic contestations between the 
Konkombas and Dagombas, there was intra-tribal fighting among the Konkombas.  These 
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intra-tribal fights among the Konkombas have been attributed to the corporate nature of their 
clans which thrive on partnership and kithship.  Thus, clans of the same tribe are bound by a 
moral obligation to support fellow clan members in inter-tribal conflicts.  Because of this moral 
obligation to support clan members, Tait suggests that there will be no end to inter-tribal feuds 
among Konkombas (Tait, 1961).  Tait (1961, p. 9) suggests that the threat of fighting also 
served as a social control mechanism to ensure good behaviour.  This propensity for fighting 
among the Konkombas needs to be given deeper consideration, especially in terms of their 
value systems ecological circumstances.   
The colonial administration’s lack of proper socio-cultural understanding of the 
constant fighting among the Konkombas underpinned the government’s simplistic containment 
measures.  To end the frequent feuds among the Konkombas, Chief Commissioner C.H. 
Armitage adopted several strategies.  First, the government instituted increased police patrols 
within Konkomba villages.  Secondly, the government banned the possession of bows and 
arrows (bow and arrow ordinance) in the territory, and finally, it implemented movement 
restrictions into French Togoland (created after the Milner-Simon Agreement in 1919 after 
Germany’s defeat in World War One (Talton, 2010, p. 59).  These restrictions did not deter the 
Konkombas social practice of inter-tribal collaboration, and the border restriction was violated 
with impunity.  Thus, Armitage proposed Dagomba imposition on Konkombas as the solution 
to the problem of the constant fighting among the Konkomba. To fulfill this proposal, 
Armitage mandated the Ya-Naa to enforce the ban on bows and arrows and exact fines on the 
culprits.  Significantly, this enforcement mandate given to the Ya-Na created a polar-opposite 
relationship between the Dagombas and Konkombas.    
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Certainly the resistance to, and confrontations by, the Konkombas undermined the 
colonial administration by exposing the limited power of the government.  Armitage’s attempt 
to impose the Dagombas as rulers over the Konkombas was an attempt to reconfigure pre-
colonial social and political relations into distinct hierarchies.  These distinct political 
hierarchies would then form the basis of law and order enforcement on behalf on the colonial 
administration.  As noted by Kopytoff (1987) such cephalous groups are configured as the 
organization system on which the architecture of indirect rule would be built.  Thus, the 
patriarchal worldview of the colonizers tends to favour cephalous groups that are perceived to 
be culturally superior 
The need to rule the Northern Ghana through their chiefs or traditional institutions was 
first championed by Irvine, the Provincial Commissioner in charge of the South.  He noted in 
1909 that “as it is impossible to govern the country successfully except through the chiefs, 
every endeavor should be made to strengthen their hands in their dealings with their people as 
far as it is compatible with equity and good governance.”(N.A.GA, ADM. 56/1/258, 1909).   
Clearly, Irvine’s preference for the chiefs to be allowed to exercise administrative and political 
authority, in my view, lacks any factual or empirical basis apart from the sheer equation of 
administrative efficiency to an imagined chieftaincy.   
In addition, Governor Guggisberg (1921) also supported a proposal for the 
empowerment of the chiefdoms to build strong native states.  Guggisberg’s plan for a strong 
native state was the foundation of an Indirect Rule practice that created:  
A tendency for the bigger states to break up to the detriment of 
development and trade …our policy must be to maintain any paramount 
chiefs that exist and gradually absorb under these, any small communities 
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scattered about. What we should aim at is that someday the Dagombas, 
Gonjas and Mamprusi should become strong native states. Each state must 
have its own public works department, and carry on its own business with 
the Political Officer as a resident and advisor.  Each state will be more or 
less self-contained.” (N.A.G.A, ADM. 56/1/258. 1921)   
The preconceived ideas embedded in Guggisberg’s statement symbolize the colonial 
administration’s notions of the amalgamation of small communities as unproblematic.  
I submit that this plan for the empowerment of chiefdoms could be explained by the 
inability of the colonial administration to exercise political authority over the natives.  
The limitation of the sphere of colonial influence on the acephalous groups provides a 
nuanced understanding of colonialism in itself.  Responsibility for the crucial 
development of Northern Ghana would be placed on the shoulders of chiefdoms that 
had been neglected in terms of development interventions.  
The end of Guggisberg’s term did not terminate the Indirect Rule policy for 
Northern Ghana.  His successors continued it.  Most significantly, Governor Slater 
took his cue from the framework identified by Lugard to ensure effective 
implementation of an Indirect Rule policy.  Slater identified four priority areas that 
would form constituent pillars of his Indirect Rule practice.  These are: a) the 
empowerment of chiefs to levy taxes; b)the support of native authority to adjudicate 
non-criminal cases and impose of fines; c) the granting of autonomy to native 
authorities to employ clerks, police, treasurers and court registrars and d) the 
absorption or incorporation of the acephalous communities into the cephalous groups 
(Talton, 2010, p. 81-82).   Chief Commissioner A.H. Walker-Leigh, however, rejected 
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the proposal to form native administration systems around the chiefdoms.  He opposed 
the proposed elevation of the chiefdoms on several grounds.  Two of the essential 
reasons for his rejection were that the chiefs lack effective political authority on their 
own, and have personal capacity and capability shortcomings because of their 
illiteracy.  Essentially, Walker-Leigh believed that it was premature to introduce these 
enormous administrative responsibilities to the chiefs because it could result in the 
abuse of authority the government allowed them.  
The rejection by Walker-Leigh did not deter the colonial administration’s plan, as a 
Special Commissioner for Anthropology was tasked to study the social structure of the 
different groups of people in NG.  This study was led by Capt. Rattray, an anthropologist 
attached to the colonial office.  The study resulted in the production of a two volume report, 
The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland Vol 1&2. In respect to the social structure of the people, 
Rattray’s report stated:  
Upon these more or less autochthonous peoples, with their primitive 
institutions, descended small bands of strangers within comparatively 
recent historical times.  They were better armed, clothed, familiar with the 
idea of kingship or chieftainship in our modern sense, in some case 
conversant with the rudiments of Mohammedism and accustomed (even if 
circumstances had not later compelled it) to a patrilineal manner of 
reckoning descent.  These strangers superimposed upon the primitive 
tribes, among whom they settled, a new and unheard of political 
conception, namely the idea of territorial and secular leadership in place of 
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a ruler, who was the high priest of a totemic clan and dealt only in spiritual 
sanctions (p. xii).  
Rattray’s comments reflect a lack of appreciation on his part for the diversity of traditional 
African societies.  Specifically, there is no absolute uniformity in the institutional arrangements 
of the diverse polities to warrant privileging any single practice over any other practice.  To 
place a premium on the capacity of a chief to political negotiation as a symbol of political 
maturity is an inaccurate measurement.   
In fact, subsequent anthropological findings challenged the political classifications 
assigned by Rattray.  Specifically, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) find that at least two of 
the alleged acephalous groups, the Nawuris and Nchumurus, have a chiefly tradition.  Brukum 
(1992) affirms Fortes and Evans-Pritchard conclusion’s that the Nchumurus have a chiefly 
tradition with clear patterns of promotion.  Skalnik’s (1987, p. 308, 318) research shows that 
there is actually no significant difference between the Nanumba (chiefdom) and Konkomba 
(acephalous/non-chiefdom) in the exercise of territorial control.   Shilliam (2011) suggests that 
the reduction in the complexity of the diverse socio-political world of the colonized to simple 
political hierarchies is based on colonial geo-cultural imaginary.  The colonial geo-cultural 
imaginary that assigned political maturity to cephalous groups framed the IR policy.  Given 
that the social realities among the different groups were inconsistent with the political 
classifications, however, any attempt to give primacy to one over the other was bound to result 
in endless contestations. 
On the subject of amalgamation of the stateless communities into the existing 
kingdoms, Rattray did issue a cautionary note.  According to Rattray:  
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It is always advisable, I think, when speaking or writing about 
amalgamations as those which comprise for example; the Mampruse, 
Moshi or Dagomba states to retain a strict sense of proportion and to 
describe the course of these events in terms of restraint.  Under the 
conditions existing when these states were first founded, a band of a score 
or less of well-armed and determined fighting men could, and often did, 
alter the political face of the map.  The real significance of such 
‘conquests’ is apt to be exaggerated in our eyes.  We are over prone to 
visualize absolute monarchy and autocratic forms of government, in what, 
in a rather grandiose manner, we describe as these great empires in pagan 
Africa.  As a matter of fact, such amalgamations affected the real inner life 
of the common people hardly at all (1932, p.549).   
Rattray’s findings ultimately stand in contra position to the colonial administration’s desire to 
amalgamate the ‘framed’ tribes.  His findings suggest the ineffectuality of the amalgamation 
policy that was driven more by racial and Eurocentric ideology than by an informed knowledge 
of the history and empirical realities of the territories. This submission certainly challenged the 
preconceived colonial Anglo idea about an African tribes being composed of homogenous and 
unquestionable loyalty to tradition.  Any evidence contrary to the established ideological 
viewpoint constituted an aberration.  Embedded in Rattray’s findings was a clear warning sign 
of the dire repercussions that would occur should the amalgamation policy be pursued.  
Certainly, past and current tensions have vindicated Rattray’s beliefs that the amalgamation 
policy was wrong.  Given this information, there is a need to understand pre-colonial societies 
from a nuanced perspective, instead of relying on preconfigured political representations.   As 
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suggested by Mamdani (1996) in his work on Citizen and Subject, at no point was there a 
centralized juridical institution with exclusive territorial control and the right to demand 
customary rights and entitlements over a long period of time.   The colonial administration had 
a declared position on amalgamation and ignored Rattray’s warning and established the 
proposed IR policy directive.  
In a further push for the IR policy directive, two commissioners were appointed by the 
colonial government to oversee the directive.  These were H.A Blair, appointed in 1929 to be 
in-charge of West Dagomba, and A.C. Duncan-Johnstone, appointed in 1930, to be in charge 
of the Southern Province of NG.  It is pertinent to note that Blair organized a constitution 
conference for Gonja Chiefs and Dagomba Chiefs in 1930, followed by similar conferences 
held for the Kusasi in 1931, the Mamprusi in 1932 and the Wa in 1933.  The conferences were 
held to codify the constitution of the kingdoms, determine the relative seniority of subordinate 
chiefs, and to establish the extent of their authority (NAG, Tamale, ADM1/65: Slater to 
Cunliffe-Lister, 1932, cited in Ladouceur 1979, p. 54-55).  These constitutional conferences 
were largely influenced by British ideas about colonial power which, according to MacGaffey 
(2006), redefined the rules of succession.  The Native Authority Ordinance (NAO) was passed 
in 1932 to provide legal backing to the formation of the native authorities.  As a result, Chief 
Commissioner W.A. Jones formed the Dagomba and Gonja Native Authorities in 1932 and the 
authorities of Mamprugu in 1933.  Notably, the passing of the NAO placed acephalous groups 
such as the Vagal, the Nchumuru, the Nawuri and the Mo under the authority of the Gonja 
Yagbumwura.  The Konkombas and Chakossi were placed under the authority of the Dagomba 
Ya-Naa.  With this incorporation, the acephalous groups were accorded minority status as 
opposed to the majority position of the cephalous groups.  
124 
 
The passing of the Native Authority Ordinance necessitated the legislation of the 
essential functional components to ensure effective native administration as suggested earlier 
by Governor Slater.  Thus the Native Tribunal Ordinance, Native Treasuries Ordinance, and 
Native Court Ordinance were passed in 1932, 1932 and 1935 respectively.  The Native 
Authority Ordinance empowered the Chief Commissioners to appoint chiefs as officers of the 
newly-created native authorities.  Further, the Native Authority Ordinance defined the 
operational scope of the native authorities to enforce rules on wide ranging issues ranging from 
areas of enforcement to rules governing: “firearms, liquor, markets, sanitation and infectious 
diseases, and others generally providing for the peace, order and welfare of the natives” 
(N.A.G.T.  ADM. / 479).   Staniland (1975) notes that an appointment by the Chief 
Commissioner was irrevocable, which made the appointees solely accountable to the 
appointing source.  Mamdani (2006) suggests that the use of customary law as the system of 
rule in the Indirect Rule invariably made the chiefs solely accountable to the colonial office and 
not to his own people.  This lack of accountability led to non-existent customary authority in 
the pre-colonial area that undergirded the conflicts in Northern Ghana.   
The mandate of the Native Court Ordinance was extended to cover the settlement of 
marital disputes based on the customs and values of the chiefdoms.  Certainly, the adjudication 
of marital disputes within the acephalous groups based on the customs of the cephalous group 
was an attempt to ensure uniformity of customary practices.  According to Mamdani (1996), 
the emphasis on uniform customary practices was a strategy to hide the non-customary 
practices to avert contestation.  The actual non-customary practice was the unilateral power 
exercised by the Chief Commissioners in the constituting the Native Authority to advance the 
interests of the government.  The implication is that Indirect Rule was a governing technique 
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instigated to manage diverse contestations from different groups of people.  These 
contestations were inevitable because the cultural and political marginalization of the minority 
groups were catalysts to instigate resistance.  
The conflation of centralized kingdoms with administrative efficiency and political 
control resulted in widespread abuse.  The resulting abuse invariably sharpened and structured 
pre-colonial tensions, particularly between the minority and majority groups. This abuse was 
the result of empowering chiefs with positions of authority that they were unable to exercise.  
Such an abuse leads to what Mamdani (1996, p. 37) calls ‘decentralized despotism,’ which 
highlights the incompatible interests between the colonial administration and the chiefs.  The 
incompatibility of interests related to the chiefs desiring to accumulate wealth without 
necessarily ensuring colonial order as consistent with the community doctrine.   
The Konkombas in particular contested the IR practices on the grounds of issues of 
autonomy (cultural and political) and extortion.  The most notable resistance resulted in the 
1940 ‘Cow War’ when Konkombas attacked and killed the chief of Jagbel for suspicion of 
conspiring with British Veterinary Officers to kill cattle owned by Konkombas.  According to 
Talton (2003, 2010) the immediate cause of the war was triggered by the undue fines imposed 
on the Konkomba cattle owner for failure to have his cattle vaccinated.  The extortion came in 
form of the chief demanding more than a bull for the vaccination violation instead of the 
mandatory £10.  The chief’s demand for a bull was countered by the Konkomba men, and the 
dispute degenerated into an attack on the village of Jagbel.  During the course of the attack, the 
chief of Jagbel, Zegbeli Na, was killed.  At the heart of the Cow War was a rejection of the 
colonial policy that empowered chiefs without restraining that power. In effect, the Cow War 
symbolized the Konkomba quest for political autonomy in order to curb arbitrary extortions.   
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The Cow War helped to consolidate the Konkombas grievances against the Dagombas.  
Extortionist practices perpetrated by Demon Na Mahama (Dagomba indigene), a divisional 
chief of the Konkomba villages, were challenged by Konkomba elders.  This challenge led to 
the usurpation of the administrative responsibilities of Demon Na by Djar, a Konkomba elder 
representative of the Kpalbtiib and Bimokpem clans.  Talton (2003, 2010) highlights Djar’s 
maneuvers to consolidate the Konkomba clans such as Kpalbtiib and Bimokpem in order to 
form a political authority independent of Demon-Na.  Although this request for political 
autonomy by Djar was not granted, his petition showed the varying strategies deployed by the 
Konkombas to challenge the colonial policy of Indirect Rule.  Another incident of the fierce 
Konkomba challenge to the Dagomba’s political authority was related to the Fish War in 1946. 
This war happened when a Konkomba indigene claimed fishing rights over a pond in which a 
Dagomba man was fishing (NT, A.D.M/5/1). 
The resistance was not only limited to resource use and the abuse of authority in the 
enforcement of vaccination policies.  According to Tait (1961), fines imposed by the Chief of 
Sunson on a group of men who committed adultery also led to the rejection of this authority.  A 
Konkomba man among the culprits questioned the jurisdiction of the Chief in a matter that was 
within the scope of Konkomba custom.   Another example of Konkomba resistance can be seen 
in the Benafiab (Konkomba tribe) complaint of persistent extortion from one of the sub-chiefs 
of Sunson, Dzagberi Na (Tait, p. 10).  This led to the assassination of Dzagberi Na following 
an attack on his house.  Konkomba resistance against extortionist policies resulted in the chief 
of Zabzugu being forced to remit 10% of the cattle and poll tax among Konkomba elders.  
According to Tait (1961) the 10% tax remission in Zabzugu to Konkomba elders was extended 
to Sunson as well.  Therefore, it can be suggested that the Indirect Rule had contestable effects.  
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The contestations between and within the ethnic groups have been more severe in post-
independent Ghana.  
 
State Formation Processes and Agrarian Strategies in Northern Ghana   
The incorporation of Northern Ghana into the modern nation-state of Ghana was characterized 
by sharp contrasts between southern and northern political interests and priorities.  These polar 
opposite interests have been shaped by the differing colonial experiences of the two socio-
spatial settings.  To be specific, southern politicians championed a national independence 
consciousness.  On the contrary, the northern political interest was driven by regional 
consciousness.  This regional orientation of northern political elites can also be attributed to the 
adversarial colonial development policies that created developmental disparities between the 
two colonies. The indirect rule policy cannot be exonerated in the inculcation of this regional 
consciousness.  The inward nature of Indirect Rule that privileged native political control 
virtually disconnected Northern Ghana from the main colony, especially in the fight for 
citizenship entitlements.  This regional consciousness was driven by fear on the part of the 
northern territories that southern politicians would dominate national governance.  A legitimate 
fear was aptly expressed by Braimah, who was a member of the Northern Territorial Council.  
Braimah averred that: “if we do not get the necessary education that will qualify us for senior 
and key posts then it means surely we are going to be politically dominated by people of other 
regions in no distant future” (NTC, Fifth Session 1949. Cited in Ladouceur, 1979, p. 91).  In 
fact, the prevailing social and political inequalities between the Southern and Northern Ghana 
confirm Braimah’s prediction. 
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Moreover, the weak educational background of the few northern politicians that were in 
powerful positions affected their political mobilization and articulation of national issues.  
According to Ladouceur (1979), the weak educational background of majority of northern 
political elites and the overriding regional consciousness kept them from being the main 
opposition party.  In fact, J.B. Danquah, a sympathizer of the Northern cause challenged the 
preparedness of the northern representatives in the Legislative Assembly.  According to 
Danquah: “well look, gentlemen of the North, we are prepared to wait for you, but how long do 
you want us to wait?...we are suggesting to you, go back quietly and think of the great 
responsibility you have placed on your shoulders, that is, you are holding up self-government” 
(Danquah, 1953, p. 489).  These sentiments from an acclaimed political doyen from Southern 
Ghana points to the inferior recognition accorded to the northern politician by their southern 
counterparts.  In the 1954 national elections, the Northern Peoples Party (NPP) had the second 
highest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly, enough to constitute leadership of the 
opposition in the Legislative Assembly.  Meanwhile, the Ghana Congress Party won a single 
seat by its leader rather was appointed as the leader of opposition in parliament (Ladouceur, 
1979, p.129).   
The long experience of southern political elites in legislative work, as well as their 
exposure to higher learning and wealth accumulation enhanced their political organization and 
mobilization.  It was not surprising when the Convention People Party (CPP), endowed with 
strong organizational resources and clear socialist ideological orientation was able to attract the 
support of the peasant population and the low class in both the Southern and Northern Ghana.  
This broad based appeal of the CPP certainly dealt a huge blow to the regional orientation of 
the NPP by its electoral triumphs in the 1951, 1954 and 1956 general elections.  Successive 
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defeats of the NPP led to the diminution of its political influence as the CPP infiltrated its rank 
and file.  The NPP’s leadership, out of mistrust for the southern dominated government, 
resolved on a petition to be sent to the British government.  To be more specific, the essence of 
this petition was for NG to be granted constitutional concessions that would secure a special 
development fund after independence.  But the leadership of the NPP was overtaken by Dr. 
Busia’s National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the NLM submitted the petition to the 
Royal Commission to grant constitutional concessions for three separate regions.  This 
partition request was not at variance with NPP’s request.  More significantly, the NLM 
leadership denied NPP the vital political representation required to articulate their quest to 
secure development funds that could be used to revamp their region. The final outcome of this 
petition was the rejection of the partition request.   
The Northern Territorial Council capitalized on the visit of the Secretary of State to 
Tamale in 1957, in order to present a request to the British Government to allocate £3 million 
per annum for ten years to develop the North.  This proposal, however, was cancelled upon the 
attainment of national independence.  The NPP, unlike the NLM, could not sustain their 
official stance against national independence and ultimately had to capitulate to the 
independence movement initiated by the CPP.  As Brukum (1998) notes, the NPP made two 
critical requests to the CPP as preconditions for northern support for independence.  The first 
request was for the allocation of funds for the rapid development of Northern Ghana.  The 
second request was to bring legislation forward that would allow the regional assembly to 
control the development fund. These preconditions, however, were not fulfilled by the CPP.  
The regionalism that was being used as a political mobilization force for the NPP dissipated 
after the passing of the Avoidance of Discrimination Bill in 1957.  This Bill abolished all 
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regional organs whose main goals were to advance the interest and benefit of specific 
communities or religious faiths.  A Regional Assembly Bill was passed into law in 1958, with 
its main thrust being to ensure that members of the government were voted into office in order 
to avoid the manipulation of chiefs and local officials.  
These uneven political processes attest to the weak political integration of the North 
into the modern state Ghana.  This weak integration impacted the policy direction that 
development was taking in the region.    The CPP that was now in government controlled both 
development decisions and expenditures in Northern Ghana as well.  Cooper (1994) suggests 
that the revolutionary zeal for national independence in most SSA countries did not correspond 
with the elimination of prevailing colonial economic and political structures, and the case was 
the same for the developmental situation in Northern Ghana after independence.  
A significant issue in relation to the perpetuation of colonial practices that led to the 
underdevelopment in the Northern Region was the maintenance of the dichotomous land laws 
in the country by CPP government.  According to Konings (1986), the CPP government 
amended the 1931 Land and Native Rights Ordinance with what became known as the State 
Property and Contract Act of 1960.  The subsequent amendments to that bill resulted in the 
passing of the 1962 Administration of Land Act.  According to Bening (1995), the 1962 
Administration of Land Act made the President the official landlord of the North. This act 
technically rendered all the lands in the Northern Region available for public service, with the 
resultant limitation on the autonomy of the chiefs and peasants of their own lands.  The 
inhabitants of Southern Ghana, however, exercised full autonomy over their land and its 
resource endowments.  It is important to state here that the post CPP regimes did not 
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denationalize the Northern Region lands till 1978.  I will discuss the circumstances that led to 
this denationalization lands and the ramifications thereof later in this chapter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The national development priorities and resource allocation policies did not depart from 
the inequitable trend set in motion by the colonial administration.  In fact, the continuous 
concentration of development in Southern Ghana accounts for the regional inequalities as 
suggested by Aryeetey, et al (2009).  For explanatory reasons, I will limit myself to the main 
agricultural policies of the postcolonial governments.    
The CPP government supported the prevailing economic export programme and the 
cocoa and mineral sectors in particular.  To further consolidate cocoa as a major crop, the CPP 
government established the Cocoa Purchasing Company in (1952).  As the main buying agent 
on behalf of the government, the Cocoa Purchasing Company substantially supported pro-CPP 
small-holder farmers with benign loans with the aim to boost production (Beckman, 1976).  In 
1953, the CPP established the United Gold Coast Farmers’ Council that metamorphosed into 
the United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council (hereafter called Farmers’ Co-operative).  
The main mandate of Farmers’ Co-operative was to serve as the advocacy center for small-hold 
farmers.  The advocacy goals of the Farmers’ Co-operative were essentially protectionist, and 
their main objective was to insulate small-hold farmers from foreign competition in cocoa 
marketing.  The political representation of cocoa farmers was essential in making the interests 
of farmers the integral component of national agricultural policy-making.  With the absence of 
cocoa in Northern Ghana, most of the peasants were left with limited political and policy space 
to articulate their social and developmental interests.   
The overwhelming support provided cocoa farming to the detriment of food crops 
inadvertently created a significant food shortage in Southern Ghana. The severity of the food 
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shortage resulted in the importation of 60.7% and 72.2% of the national rice requirement for 
fiscal years 1960 and 1961 respectively (Okoso-Amaa 1975, p. 73).  This net food import 
situation affected the balance of payment positions of a primary export-dependent economy 
like Ghana.  Just like the mixed farming practices of the 1940s that were pursued to address the 
post-depression food deficit in the southern colonies, so too was the Northern Region chosen to 
supply the food needs of the south.  It is quite intriguing that the CPP, an acclaimed socialist 
ideologically driven party with a strong rural base did not extend the same support to the 
peasants in the Northern Region.   
The food deficit in the south brought about the Seven Year Development Plan.  The 
driving strategy of the plan was to increase agricultural output was through the promotion of 
state enterprises in agriculture that would serve as model for peasants.  Further, the State Farms 
Corporation was established in 1961 to embark on large-scale mechanized food farming.  I 
suggest that the optimism in state enterprises for agricultural transformation implied that the 
CPP government had no faith in the productive capabilities of the peasants in Northern Region.  
This lack of faith in the peasants resulted in the setting up of production units, such as the 
Workers’ Brigade, The Young Farmers League and the United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative 
Council.  Ultimately the Northern Region, which constituted the hub of the new agricultural 
policy, had 20 state farms, 9 workers brigade farms and 235 cooperative farms (FAO, 1967, p. 
30). This state driven agricultural programme featured the limited engagement of peasants was 
anti-poor rather than pro-poor. The marginalization of the peasants cannot be exonerated as a 
reason for the enduring poverty situation in the Northern Region, a situation that is firmly 
rooted in the adverse relational nature of the production system.  Shepherd (1979, p. 46-50) 
also confirms that the peasants in the Northern Region have been heavily marginalized.  He 
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posits that the state farms actually benefited CPP party officials, the urban petty bourgeois, and 
the pro-CPP chiefs that ultimately created capitalist rice farmers in the Northern Region. Based 
on my interview with a former farmer in Tamale, suggests that the state farm system rendered 
most peasants casual labourers. 
A vital issue to note is that peasant output on their own farms was higher than the state 
supported farmers.  This dismal effect is captured in a government report in 1965.  The report 
states: “…It is very strange that peasant farmers with 3.5 acres per farm cultivate more than the 
large-scale farms with 2.8 acres per worker in spite of the heavy outfits of the stations equipped 
with tractors and all types of machinery” (Statistics of Large-scale Specialized, Institutional, 
Co-Operative and Young League Farming and Service Stations, 1965, p. 4).  This suggests that 
the peasants in Northern Ghana, regardless of their efforts, were invisible to the state’s policy 
consideration in terms of institutional, financial and technical support. I suggest that 
exclusionary politics and unfair political arrangements could be responsible for this 
discrepancy.  
The coup of 1966 brought an end to the state farm programme.  That did not, however, 
halt the marginalization of peasants in Northern Region.  The new military government, 
formed by the National Liberation Council (NLC), a right-wing ideological party, discontinued 
the state-led CPP agricultural policy system.  Its main development policy was based on 
economic mantras of stabilization and consolidation. On the recommendation of the IMF, the 
NLC privatized the state farms in order to achieve stabilization.  The agricultural policy of the 
NLC framed by its Two year Development Plan was the commercialization of agriculture.  It is 
worthy to note that the NLC regime, according to Konings (1986), relied on expert advice from 
the UNDP and FAO to adopt the green revolution orthodoxy. The thrust of this green 
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revolution orthodoxy was the prioritization of cash crops over staples food. The emphasis on 
cash crops was to increase export earnings in order to stabilize the economy.  The United 
Progress Party who took over the reins of government beginning in1969 had compatible 
ideological persuasions with the NLC, and the continuation of the commercial agricultural 
policy.  In addition, the United Progress Party government adopted a laissez faire instrumental 
approach, whereby privatization was one of the main mechanisms of development.  In 
justification of the privatization objective, the government of the United Progress Party posits 
itself as trying to ‘to de-emphasize state agriculture; to raise both the status of the peasant 
producer and his overall productivity; and to encourage full commercialization of agriculture’ 
(Cited in Koings 1986, p. 170).  Notwithstanding the laudable objective to raise the 
productivity of peasant producers, the real practices did not accommodate the interest of the 
peasants.   
In practice, the policy was essentially geared towards addressing the supply side 
constraints of the commercial and cash crop farmers.  According to an Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) pamphlet, the Bank invested 6.5 million cedis in the North from 
1968-1973.  This loan investment benefited 661 individual farmers and 226 cooperative 
farmers.  By 1975, the total investment had risen to 12.8 million cedis for rice cultivation in 76, 
518 ha in the Northern Region (ADB, 1975, cited in Konings, 1986).   In order to attract 
extension services, a limited asset base for collateral and the presence of a powerful urban-
based production sidestepped the peasant farmers because of their low production scales.  This 
urban-based production network, according to Konings (1981), comprises professional 
agriculturists, civil servants and businessmen who were charged with creating capitalist rice 
production relations.  Rice mills were built in Tamale and other parts of the Northern Region, 
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but the asymmetric distribution of productive incentives that benefited large-scale farmers 
meant that the peasant farmers were again isolated by state policy.  
The period 1972-79 marked a significant period in the agrarian policy of the new 
military government. The National Redemption Council/ Supreme Military Council 
(NRC/SMC) continued the large-scale commercial agricultural policy orthodoxy inherited 
from its predecessors.  As with the CPP, the NRC prioritized the public sector as the fulcrum of 
commercial agriculture.  The NRC/SMC regime adopted a self-reliance development strategy 
that was articulated through an Operation Feed Yourself program.  This Operation Feed 
Yourself program targeted the Northern Ghana as the food basket for the country, with rice and 
maize listed as the main crops for cultivation.  The first phase of the programme, which 
spanned from 1972-74, adopted the public sector as the engine of food production in Northern 
Ghana.  With the NRC/SMC being anti-laissez-faire the defunct state farms were revived, and 
United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council created the food production corporation to 
constitute the production units.   
The government, through the ADB, provided the necessary credit facility to the 
production units, along with the necessary production plants.  Notwithstanding this financial 
and plant investment and support from the government, the output was not encouraging.  
According to Girdner, Olorunsola, Froning, and Hansen (1980), the food production in the new 
state-supported production units was not better than that of the CPP.  The poor output was also 
reflected in the ADB’s decision to terminate loan support to the state sector production units.  
A critical issue at play was the marginalization of peasants under the first phase of the 
Operation Feed Yourself. The sentiments of the peasant farmers were articulated by Sibidow:  
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Today in the North, farm implements, machinery, spare-parts and of even 
more damaging effects, fertilizers, have vanished at the most crucial period 
of need…The interesting thing about this annoying situation, however, is 
that it is not that the fertilizer in particular has not been supplied by the 
government.  What is happening is that some privileged class of people has 
decided to distribute the fertilizers among themselves.  (Daily Graphic, 
1975, p. 4) 
The inequitable distribution of the beneficiaries of state support as depicted in Sibidow’s work 
reinforces my position in relation to the politics of decision-making and access to resources.  
Therefore, most peasants with weak links to political authorities more than necessary require 
active political mobilization to reverse this trend.  As will be discussed in chapters four and 
five, there exist similar trends in terms of the poor representation of the needs and the demands 
to their entitlements.   
 The failure of these state agencies in food production shifted attention towards the 
capitalist rice farmers in NG.  Shepherd (1981, p.74) notes that 800 capitalist rice farmers were 
supported with loans from the ADB and National Investment Bank.  The renewed focus of this 
Operation Feed Yourself in NG led to appreciable investment infrastructure: notably roads 
were upgraded, irrigation systems were constructed and a regional hospital was built.  In 
addition, three banks (National Investment Bank, ADB and Barclays) benefited from a loan 
facility of $2.3m from the African Development Bank.  Through this loan facility, the Nasia 
Rice Mill was established with a capacity to process 10,000 ha of rice per annum (See 
Konings, 1986).  This massive investment increased rice production substantially, which led to 
zero importation of rice for the fiscal years of 1975 and 1976 (see Kranjac-Berisavljevic’, 
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Blench, and Chapman, 2003, p. 8).  A critical issue that we should be concerned about is 
whether the zero rice importation had any positive effect on the majority poor in Northern 
Ghana.   
Notwithstanding these infrastructural investments, the peasant poor who constituted the 
majority of the population in Northern Ghana did not materially benefit.  I posit that the main 
reason for this was the non-prioritization of the poor peasant as an essential determinant of 
agricultural policy.  According to MacGaffey (2013), chiefs such Dakpema Alhassan, from the 
Andani gate, used his strong ties with the officials of the NRC government to embark on 
capitalist rice farming to the detriment of the Gulkpe Na.  Not only was the Dakpema Na the 
main beneficiaries of the rice project, other Andani sub-chiefs were active beneficiaries from 
1974-79 as suggested by MacGaffey (2013).  Indeed, Shepherd’s 1981 study suggests that both 
the state and private production systems benefited mainly indigenes of Tamale, Savelugu and 
Yendi.  A notable feature of these interventions was their concentration in the districts of the 
majority ethnic groups, rather than in the areas populated by minority groups (Konings, 1986).  
This discrepancy could be associated with the influence of the chiefs in the 
kingdoms/chiefdoms on past governments when they determined resource allocation.  
This asymmetric distribution of rice project participants reflects the extent to which the 
internal chieftain contestation in the Northern Region played into the national and regional 
development practices.  With this complex fusion of national politics and chieftain wrangling, 
the poor peasant becomes invisible to the policy-making apparatus.  It is pertinent to note that 
the peasants, in reaction to their marginalization and the dispossession of their lands, resorted 
to burning rice farms and the destruction of machinery (Goody, 1980). The poverty condition 
of the peasants, in my view, is a reflection of the political inequality that has narrowed the 
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political space for the representation and prioritization of the needs of the poor.  The political 
nature of the poverty in Northern Ghana makes the redemptive/emancipatory faith put into 
empowerment, capacity building and participatory approaches by the aid agencies intriguing, 
as I will discuss in chapters four and five.  
 
State Policies and the Intensification of Ethnic Conflicts 
Prior to 1978, past governments had maintained the colonial nationalization of the lands in 
Northern Ghana.  Political manipulation of the ethnic categories in the Northern Region by the 
past governments changed the trend in 1978.  The SMC administration experienced widespread 
civil and political unrest after 1977.  The protestations were instigated by the rising cost of 
living in the aftermath of the 1973 Oil crisis and the mismanagement of the economy.  
Secondly, the military government’s goal of banning political parties from forming a union 
government exacerbated the protestations that manifested in a plethora of strike actions.  In the 
end, this Union Government proposal was subjected to national referendum.   In order to win 
the referendum, the SMC government lobbied the chiefs of the Northern Region for their votes 
with a promise of returning the lands to the chiefdoms.  This led to the formation of the 
committee on ownership of land and positions of tenants in Northern and Upper Regions, 
chaired by I. R. Alhassan.   
There was a disproportionate representation in the composition of the Land Vesting 
committee.  According to Pul (2003, p.16), the committee was entirely composed of six 
members from the four kingdoms in Northern Region, one each from the Upper Region and 
Lands Secretariat respectively.  The remaining four were from Southern Ghana.  Significantly, 
the main 13 minority ethnic groups were denied representation and, in the end, they were 
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reduced to a position as settlers.  The restoration of democratic rule in September 1979 actually 
gave this land restoration committee the requisite constitutional recognition as reflected in the 
3
rd
 Republican constitution in 1979.  The constitutional provisions as found in Article 188, 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 read: “for the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that all lands in the 
Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana which immediately before the coming into force of this 
Constitution were vested in the Government of Ghana are not public lands […] all lands […] 
shall vest in any such person who was the owner of any such land before any such vesting or in 
the appropriate skin” (Government of Ghana, 1979, p.140).  Appropriate skin refers to the 
eligible royal clan. The effect of this constitutional recognition of the authority of the 
chiefdoms was to deny minority ethnic groups their autonomous economic, political and social 
entitlements.   
  The 1992 4
th
 Republican Constitution from Article 270-276 reaffirms the chieftaincy 
provisions in the previous constitution.  The 1992 constitution empowered the Regional House 
of Chiefs with adjudicating powers.  For example, Article 274, 3d, states that the Regional 
House of Chiefs “have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or skin 
or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queen mother to a paramount stool or 
skin” (Government of Ghana, 1992, p. 150). This clause in particular has further empowered 
the majority in terms of making determinations about which ethnic group can gain paramount 
status.    
Since early1980’s, there have been many inter/intra ethnic conflicts in the Northern 
Region, such as the Gonja-Vagla War in 1980 and Konkomba and Bimoba wars in 1984, 1986 
and 1989.  The Gonja-Vagla war was very much related to landownership conferred by the 
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1979 constitution (Awedoba, 2011) and independence from the exploitative relations instituted 
by the indirect rule policy.   
The first intense conflict to have erupted after this land restoration to the chiefdoms was 
in 1981 between the Nanumba and Konkombas, which started in a Pito Bar between natives of 
the two ethnic groups.  In the course of the year, a Konkomba native was stabbed by a Bimbilla 
attacker, and event that led to the destruction of Bimbilla villages by the Konkomba. The 
official casualty count recorded was eight, but within a year the Konkombas invaded Wulensi, 
resulting in the death of several hundred people.   All in all, at least 2000 people were killed in 
the conflict, with the Nanumba bearing the main casualties (Talton, 2003, p 2-3).  The critical 
underpinning of this war was the Konkomba claims of abuse by Nanumba chiefs in terms of 
tribute demands that were institutionalized by the Indirect Rule policy of 1932.  Apart from the 
traditional tributes to be paid, the Konkombas were expected to sell their produce cheaply to 
Nanumba women.  This extra demand was interpreted as extortion and exploitation.  The 
formation of the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) began as a tool for agitation for 
termination of these colonial stipulated payments to the Bimbilla Naa.  The Konkomba quest 
for political autonomy ties into their relationship to the land was a huge factor in these protests, 
especially considering that most Konkombas are predominantly farmers.  During my interview 
with Awedoba, he explains that land had been a critical factor of production for Konkombas, 
who are in constant migration in search of fertile land to secure.  Therefore, land ownership, 
which is tied to chieftaincy, constitutes a major source of the tension.  
 A committee of inquiry was set up to investigate the conflict by the Government was 
known as Justice Lamptey Committee. The military coup on December 31
st
 1981 initiated by 
the Provisional National Defense Council truncated the committee’s work.  The truncation of 
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the investigations left the causal grievances to a large extent unaddressed, which is reflective of 
the military government’s unwillingness to find a workable solution to the conflicts. The 
inability of the government to address the conflict would serve as a precursor to a bigger 
conflict. 
The high intensity conflict between the Konkomba-Nanumba erupted in 1994. This 
conflict spread into the Dagomba and Gonja kingdoms, which led to the Konkomba-Nanumba, 
Dagomba and Gonja war.  This war remains the most calamitous ethnic conflict in Ghana’s 
post-independent history by far.  It was fought in seven districts: Yendi, Saboba-Chereponi, 
Gushiegu-Karaga, East Gonja, Nanumba, Zabzugu-Tatale and Tamale Metropolitan Area.  The 
primary cause for this conflict was the Konkomba request for paramountcy, which would grant 
them their independence from the three kingdoms (Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba).   This 
quest for paramount chieftain status by Konkombas emerged in response to the saliency of the 
chieftaincy institution in the regional and national governance system.  The implication is that 
the Konkombas historically acknowledged acephalous polity had become a hindrance to the 
development of their districts.  The constitutional recognition of the chiefs from the cephalous 
groups enabled them to have better access to political authorities and thereby to lobby for 
development projects.  In fact, Manboah-Rockson (2007) explains that the chiefdoms used 
their connections to government to ensure that most Nanumba, West Dagomba and Bimbilla 
areas were connected to the national electricity grid.  Konkomba villages such as Saboba, 
Kpalka and Kpanjan, however, had limited access to electricity. The quest for paramountcy 
was geared towards political autonomy and space for the articulation of the long-term 
development interests.  The essence of this political autonomy was a strategy to correct the 
existing asymmetric distribution of resources.     
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The push for this paramountcy in 1993 was an outcome of a meeting between the 
Konkomba chiefs, the KOYA and elders.  A team of Konkombas leadership presented a 
petition to the National House of Chiefs, the core of which was for “the creation of a 
paramount Chief and a traditional council for all Konkombas in Ghana, a right to live in a 
clearly defined area of their own and finally the grant to them traditional independence” (Pul, 
2003, p. 14).  The National House of Chiefs could not grant the paramountcy, and referred the 
request to the Ya-Naa of Dagomba.  Given the Ya-Naa’s vested interest as the overlord of the 
Konkomba lands, such a request was very likely dead on arrival.  In the end, the Ya-Naa 
rejected the paramountcy bid.  Two reasons were cited for the rejection of the request by the 
Ya-Naa.  According to Awedoba (2011, p.226), the first reason was that the Ya-Naa did not 
believe that the Konkombas constituted the second largest ethnic group in the Northern Region.  
The second reason was that the Ya-Naa believed that the paramountcy plea was an attempt to 
claim land ownership and not a mere elevation of the chiefs as highlighted by the Konkomba 
leadership.   
The reasons assigned by the Ya-Naa attest to the saliency of the land factor, which has 
become a highly contestable resource tied to chieftaincy.  The implication of the Ya-Naa ruling 
was that the Dagombas were not willing to cede off their overlord status in exchange for 
Konkombas self-rule.  The 1994 war resulted in estimated death of 2,000- 20,000 people, over 
200, 000 residents were displaced, and 10,000 houses were destroyed in 400 locations (Linde 
&Naylor, 1999, p. 8, 28; Pul, 2003 and Bogner, 2009, p. 2). This nagging problem has not yet 
been resolved today.  A worrying trend is the contrasting narratives espoused by Konkombas 
and Dagombas, which attests to the fragile peace in the region.   Also, the high scale and 
magnitude of this conflict resulted in the urgent attention of the donor community who sought 
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for an active security intervention through conflict resolution mechanisms.  Chapter four of this 
thesis discusses the aid industry security related interventions in the aftermath of this conflict. 
Another major conflict was the Gonja-Nawuri war in 1991 and 1992.  The remote cause 
of this war has been linked to land ownership and the lack of autonomy on the part of Nawuris.  
Brukum (1992) notes that the Nawuris have historically claimed to be the original occupants of 
Kpandai prior to the invasion of the Gonjas led by Ndewura Japka.  On the other hand, the 
Gonjas, as noted by Brukum (1992), also claim to be the rightful owners of this land because 
they conquered the first settlers.  More importantly, the Indirect Rule policy firmly placed the 
Nawuris under the authority of the Gonja, which institutionalized customary payments and 
extracted labour services from the Nawuris.  The customary payments and unfettered access to 
land on the part of these two ethnic groups marred their relations.  In 1991, there was a fierce 
contestation in relation to the rightful owner of the Kpandai, the main town in the district.  
According to Brukum (1992), the Gonjas defeated the Nawuris and forced many of the 
Nawuris to flee their villages.  Those who fled from these villages relocated to communities 
populated by other minority ethnic groups (Nchumurus, Basares and Konkombas) who harbour 
extortion grievances against Gonjas.  Jönsson (2007, 2009) explains that a Konkomba farmer 
was mistaken to be a Nawuri man, which led to his violent death perpetrated by Gonja 
indigenes.  This killing incited the Konkomba invasion of Gonja villages in view of the pre-
existing grievances.  These three minority groups, based on their common set of grievances, 
mobilized a collective force against the Gonjas.  A government committee was set up again to 
investigate the conflict; this committee, chaired by Justice Ampiah, ultimately had their 
findings rejected by the Gonjas on the grounds that the government was biased towards the 
minority groups.  
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Conflicts have not been limited to the majority-minority binary.  Significantly, there 
have been internal conflicts within the kingdoms.  Such conflicts are more related to succession 
issues.  As I indicated in chapter one, the most tense source of insecurity in the Northern 
Region is currently the succession dispute between Abudus and Andanis.   There is also an 
ongoing Nanumba chieftaincy conflict which is an intra-dynasty competition for the skin by 
eligible nominees from the Gbomayili gate.  This succession dispute arose after the death of 
Abarka, the last king from the Bangyili gate.   The competition is framed by an accusation that 
each party did not exhaust the promotional requirements that are pre-requisites for enskinnment 
as the Bimbilla Naa.  According to Awedoba (2011) six of the nine kingmakers chose Andani 
Dasana Abdulai for enskinnment but the three other kingmakers objected to their choice on the 
grounds that the nominee had not been a sub-chief as required by customary practice.  On the 
other hand, the three kingmakers nominated Nakpaa Naa, Salifu Dawuni, who they believe has 
met the requirements.  The six kingmakers also rejected the claim that their nominee was 
ineligible, which resulted in their counter disapproval of Nakpaa Naa, Salifu Dawuni.  The 
reason cited for this rejection is that Dawuni is not the son of a former king.  Essentially, these 
arguments remain anchored in interpretations of the promotional processes that determine 
eligibility.   
It is vital to note that the burial of the King Abarka was followed by the enskinnment of 
the Andani Dasana Abdulai as the new Bimbilla Naa. According to Awedoba (2011), this 
enskinnment was facilitated through collaboration between the supporters of Andani and the 
keeper of the king’s regalia.   As a counter-measure, the Dawuni faction also challenged the 
legitimacy of Andani’s enskinnment.  The consequence of this enskinnment and the later 
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challenge is the sustained tension that continues to exist between the supporters of both 
factions.    
A key informant at GHANEP told me of the numerous mediation measures that they 
have facilitated for the factions to resolve this issue, but none have been effective.  Official 
mediation efforts were organized by the Regional Security Committee as an attempt to 
convince the factions to mend their differences.  In my view, these mediation exercises 
undertaken by both Regional Security Committee and GHANEP certainly did not address the 
broader dynamics that undergird the contestations.  From my perspective, it is vital to examine 
the multiple sources of motivations behind the contestation that the mediation exercises failed 
to address.  In the absence of any solution to these contestations, especially when the Regional 
House Chiefs has yet to adjudicate on the pending case, the tension generated between the 
supporters of the parties remains active. 
Considering all of this information, I posit that the state has both been complicit in the 
conflicts by only enacting a lukewarm search for constructive management techniques to deal 
with the contestations.  Another critical factor is the weak institutional structures used address 
the contentious conflict and insecurity challenges.  These weak state structures tend to be seen 
as enduring feature of contemporary governments.  In my view, these weak governance 
systems cannot be divorced from their colonial progenitors.  As Moore (2001) suggests, the 
colonial regimes in most African countries forced disparate territories to constitute nation-
states but lacked the capacity to govern them.  The long-term political disconnection between 
the southern and northern regions undermined political interests and commitment towards 
building cohesive country.   
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Concluding remarks 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the under-development and poverty of Northern 
Ghana, in addition to the conflict and insecurity, are rooted in the processes of its social 
formation.  The policies practiced by the colonial regime were anti-developmental in their 
thought and content.  This anti-developmental agenda was an integral part of the colonial 
policy whose development orientation was driven by capitalist and imperialist interests.   
In order to ensure administrative and territorial control of the territory, the British 
colonial administration re-engineered diverse polities.  The Indirect Rule policy empowered 
‘kingdoms’ of the chiefdoms with mandates they did not exercised in the pre-colonial era.  
Most critical with respect to the Indirect Rule was the incorporation of the acephalous groups 
into the empowered kingdoms.  This incorporation thus gave the acephalous groups minority 
status within the empowered kingdoms, which was a complete reversal of their pre-colonial 
relations.   The abuse of the mandate placed on the majority against the minority groups 
essentially crystallized the hostile/tensed relations between the two groups.   
Furthermore, postcolonial governments have not been able to resolve these colonially-created 
ethnic political identities.  In fact, the post-independence governments have used the various 
kingdoms to their political advantage.  In particular, the SMC government’s decision to de-vest 
the lands in Northern Region to the paramount chiefs reignited the ethnic conflicts from 1979.  
More importantly, these conflicts are underpinned by salient issues of social inequality and the 
abuse of authority.  Other predisposing factors are the varying constructions of ethnic identity, 
land ownership and control rights and political autonomy.  In a broader sense these issues 
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relate to social justice claims that cannot be unlinked from the structural and power relations at 
district, regional and national levels.   
On the development front, the postcolonial governments did little to alter the colonially 
inherited export economic structure.  Hence, the immediate post-independent period saw 
continued concentration of support for the southern peasants in the cocoa sector.  It took food 
shortages in Southern Ghana for the CPP government to institute a state-led capitalist 
agricultural strategy that targeted the Northern Region for food crop production.  Subsequent 
governments adopted both private and state led capitalist agricultural production practices in 
the region.  These initiatives were appropriated by the Northern elites comprising chiefs with 
connections to politicians, senior civil servants, military officers and politicians as a whole.  
Thus the poor peasant was not considered for clear policy and institutional support, and the 
structural poverty situation constitutes systemic multiple relational deprivations.  
An analysis of the historical dynamics of the current situation will provide the 
contextual basis necessary to understand the complex, enduring, unequal social relations that 
have created the current situation in Northern Ghana.  I posit that the complex historical 
development processes and conflicts in Northern Ghana reinforce the vitality of the central 
research question: how are the rationales of joint development and security interventions 
articulated and received by the local population in a conflict prone Northern Region of Ghana?  
The analyses in this chapter essentially aim to demonstrate the relational underpinnings of the 
current conflict, and the insecurity and poverty challenges in the region.  It is an approach that 
is limited in the literature on contemporary development-security discourses and interventions.  
The next chapter will address at substantial length the contemporary development aid and 
security interventions ostensibly used to secure and reduce poverty in the region.   
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Chapter Four 
Development and Security Interventions in the Northern Region 
 
Introduction 
The unequal development interventions between Southern and Northern Ghana, as well as the 
inequitable development interventions within the Northern Ghana discussed in chapter three 
created an interventionist space for donor agencies in the region.  The numerous unresolved 
conflicts caused by the Indirect Rule policy which intensified in the post-colonial era created 
conflict-triggered insecurity that has attracted diverse external aid interventions.  The focus of 
this chapter is to examine development and security as independent external aid interventions, 
prior to the adoption of the DSN as new aid lexicon in the region.  Examining the region-wide 
interventions on the part of external aid foundations will provide further contextual basis 
leading to an examination of the DSN related interventions in chapter five.  The basis for this 
approach is that, in the mainstream literature on development and security, the DSN is framed 
as new practice and discourse. A comparative analysis, however, reveals that this ‘newly 
developed’ DSN contains no new approaches. 
The first key argument of this chapter is that development and security related 
challenges in a conflict prone region cannot be substantially addressed by the deployment of 
liberal-oriented technical solutions.  The complexity of the development and security 
challenges in the Northern Region is the result of the outcome of adverse colonial legacies in 
the postcolonial era, combined with political and policy neglect by post-colonial governments.  
In addition, the complexity of the region’s development challenges cannot be decoupled from 
the territory’s weak incorporation into the global economy. Given the narrow interventionist 
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rationales of liberal and standardized interventions, the Northern Region will remain adversely 
effected by its poor incorporation in the global economy.     
Besides this poor incorporation in the global marketplace, there is a conceptual-
contextual gap in the conception of security as a precondition for stability and poverty 
reduction in the study region. This gap exists because most of the interventions in the region 
have yet to meet the contextual realities of the region.   Stability does not guarantee that the 
necessary transformations will occur, an issue that is at the heart of poverty of historically 
exploited and adversely incorporated regions.  The development challenges of ‘chronic’ 
poverty and insecurity require a broader and deeper approach than the one used by technically-
oriented programmes aimed at regional social engineering.    
In substantiating the arguments that underpin the central research question of this 
thesis, this chapter proceeds as follows:  the first component involves the conceptual overview 
of security and development interventions in the region.  Discussion of the conceptual 
perspectives of the aid actors will reveal the liberal foundation of various intervention attempts.  
The second component is an examination of the region-wide development and security 
interventions.  In respect to these developmental interventions, the agricultural and water 
sectors will be the main foci of analysis.  Within the agricultural sector, the Northern Growth 
Rural Project (NGRP) will be examined in depth.  Secondary to a discussion of the NGRP will 
be an examination of details that have been neglected in relation to agricultural development 
for the purposes of poverty reduction.  An examination of the neglected details in agricultural 
development will center on the adverse, international political economic policies and practices 
that underpin the region, including more domestic considerations.  The last component of this 
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section will focus on an assessment of the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) 
as a donor- driven water sector intervention for the reduction of poverty.    
The third section discusses the various international aid security related interventions 
that have been used in the area. These interventions have been driven by a liberally-oriented 
consensus in the sense that these interventions rarely involve in the wider polity and structural 
factors in the region.  This consensus orientation, my research demonstrates, is premised on the 
formal nature of short-term conflict resolution approaches.  The core practices of the liberally 
oriented conflict resolution strategy are the introduction of a peace accord, reconciliation, 
negotiation of settlement structures and positions and dialogue.  These conflict resolution 
strategies constitute an integral part of the contemporary expansive component of security.  
The section that follows discusses the need for renewed thinking in respect to the instrumental 
development and security interventions used by leading aid agencies.  The concluding section 
provides a summary of the chapter and introduces the UN JHSP as the subject of the next 
chapter.  As stated in chapter one, the UN JHSP is a constituent programme that encapsulates 
the DSN framework for interventions in Tamale and Yendi.  
 
Liberal Development and Security Perspectives of Aid Actors   
The broad development and security interventions used in NG, from their conceptualization to 
implementation levels, depict pro-market frameworks of individualistic competitiveness and 
deregulation.  These interventions appear to foster an attitude of inclusive liberalism, 
particularly through the reconfiguration of the role of the state as a regulator and enabler of 
market competition.  Individuals are reconstituted as responsible actors in their future well-
being and security.  From my viewpoint, this pursuit of inclusive liberalism reflects a 
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continuation of trusteeship.  Furthermore, this kind of trusteeship involves the foregrounding of 
external tutelage of domestic actors by aid agencies in order to ‘contain’ poor regions.  This 
external tutelage for containment is prioritized at the expense of a broader outlook for societal 
transformation.  These interventions rest on community participation and empowerment 
approaches that operate in sync with the simplistic and problem-solving nature of external 
interventions already in progress.  This problem-solving orientation of external intervention 
tends to configure conditions that ignore the historical and relational dynamics of the problem.  
For practical and conceptual reasons, I adopt poverty reduction as the pre-eminent 
development goal in the region, along with conflict prevention as a security objective in the 
overall quest towards securing the region.  The continuous rediscovery of poverty reduction as 
the foremost priority of international development aid practices is well noted by Hulme (2013) 
and Duffield (2006).  Kaldor (2007) identifies poverty as a vital component of the ‘new war 
thesis’ that has given an interventionist booster to international aid institutions.  The new war 
thesis suggests that the contemporary development and security challenges that exist in 
developing countries are the result of unfair globalization practices.  I find this causal relation 
between globalization and conflict and poverty as suggested by the ‘new war thesis’ is a 
restrictive proposition.  Problematizing globalization for the developmental problems of the 
poor economies invariably absolves exploitative capitalist practices prevalent in colonial and 
post-colonial eras of responsibility for these situations.   
From my analytical angle, I deem it necessary to examine the conceptual meaning of 
poverty as espoused by the prominent aid agencies working in the region.  An engagement with 
a conceptual understanding of poverty provides a strong analytical lens to assess the 
prescriptive remedial solutions to the poverty.  Official conceptualizations of poverty within 
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the development policy context of Ghana have been based on technical formulations that create 
categories such as extreme poverty and relative poor.  Almost all of the international aid 
agencies in the study region rely on the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS).  The GLSS is 
a household survey undertaken by the Ghana Statistical Service that aims to establish a poverty 
line whereby individuals who fall below the line are classified as poor.   
The GLSS surveys provide the benchmarks for poverty acceptable by the IMF and 
World Bank.  A senior official of the MOF confirmed to me during an interview that the 
poverty and income indicators revealed by the GLSS are vital for the determination of donor 
support for the country.  According to Mr. Arthur, an official of the MOF, the GLSS findings 
were crucial in Ghana’s application for Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief and 
Millennium Challenge Account.  Based on my review of the household surveys from 1994-
2010, it came to light that by approximating nationwide poverty to an index constituted 
through aggregated findings rendered the day to day lived realities of individuals and groups 
invisible.  The likely consequence of this aggregated data is the utilization of the derived 
poverty index to formulate technical solutions to reduce poverty.    
Despite recent attempts to broaden the scope of poverty (income and non-income) by 
aid institutions and development scholars, the primary focus on the individual and income 
metric remain the norm in the Northern Region.  Standardizing and classifying poverty 
benchmarks based on income per individual is a tactic to render the poor visible.  Rendering 
the poor visible aligns the aid industry’s predisposition for quick-fix universal technical 
solutions with the country’s poverty situation.  This technical rendering of poverty condition 
tends to isolate the poor from vital societal institutions, structures and systems.  Green and 
Hulme (2005, p. 868) also aver that, notwithstanding the numerous innovations in poverty 
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measurement, money centric or growth primacy policies still dominate poverty reduction 
analyses in the Northern Region.  Further, Green and Hulme (2005) suggest that household 
income and expenditure statistics, government statistics, and participatory poverty assessments 
are used to measure the extent and depth of poverty.  I contend that due to limited broad 
participatory practices to reflect dissenting views, most of these participatory assessments, in 
the end reflect official predetermined priorities.  
This technical rendering of poverty can be seen in the World Bank’s (2007, 2011) daily 
consumption benchmark of less than $1.50 a day as the proxy of an absolute poor person in 
Ghana.  The donor sponsored Participatory Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (PPVA, 
2011) based on the income criterion categorizes the poor into different sub-groups.  These sub-
groups are: ‘fluctuating poor,’ near poor, so-called ‘living dead’ (indigent) and ‘survival 
seeking chronic poor’ which is used to represent someone who lives with institutionalized 
hunger as a norm (Korboe, Dogbe and Marshall, p. ix).  As such, the Participatory Poverty and 
Vulnerability Assessment categorizations of chronicity of poverty cannot be accurate because 
the vital structural and institutional foundations of chronic poverty cannot be quantified.   
The chronicity of poverty requires a critical examination of poverty from a broader 
relational perspective to provide a better grounding to search for a complex solution to a 
complex problem.  My numerous encounters with aid agencies in the Northern Region suggest 
that the search for complex solutions is not part of their agenda.  By complex solutions, I 
suggest interventions that take into account issues related to the political economy, the 
historical/nature of initial conditions, the social relations, and non-positivistic assumptions.  
The steadfastness of a money-centric framing of poverty analysis reflects the 
dominance of mainstream economic thinking on the ideas, knowledge and practices of the aid 
154 
 
industry.  A combination of neoclassical economic thought and institutionalized unequal power 
relations tend to mute opposing viewpoints.  It is necessary to understand the rationales and 
assumption behind aid industry interventions.  An examination of these rationales are crucial 
given that aid actors are not neutral entities, but are rather aligned to specific ideological, 
theoretical and ontological perspectives.   
I contend that a narrow view of poverty shows a limited characteristic (poverty) of a 
person but fails to explain why people are ‘poor’.  My conceptual understanding of poverty in 
the Northern Region is based on a defective socio-economic system.  This defective socio-
economic system has been produced by historical imbalances in structural and power relations 
at the local, regional, national and global levels.  Poverty is not a natural condition that can be 
solved through depoliticized solutions.  In order to understand why these characteristics of 
poverty are correlated and conflated as causes, and the aid industry serves as a machine that 
generates solutions to problems of which it only has a limited understanding.  In this respect, 
failure becomes a justification for further intervention.   
It is ultimately critical for an aid agency pursuing poverty reduction to painstakingly 
engage with the ideologies, practices and processes that created the adverse living conditions 
for ‘poor’ people.  This relational position requires a thorough institutional analysis of both 
formal and informal institutional structures and the unique history of the particular region.  I 
posit that there are critical social institutions within the local economy that must be accorded 
recognition.  These critical social institutions include: kinship structures, network relationships, 
local politics and ethnic cleavages in addition to state formation and the interplay of 
international forces. In so doing, aid agencies will have a better grasp of the structure, social 
processes and practices that shape, produce and reproduce poverty as a core development 
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challenge in the region.  This refocusing may also serve to identify more appropriate and 
productive ways to intervene.    
Aid agencies, however, have been guided by their linear assumptions and obsession 
with universal quantitative targets, and have thus ignored social relational processes 
exceptionally important to explain the complex causes of poverty.  Ferguson (2006) and Mosse 
(2007) note that the tendency to avoid the long search for the reasons why poverty occurs is 
due to the bureaucratization and de-politicization of the development apparatus and processes. 
This de-politicization, according to Ferguson, is based on the aid industry’s bureaucratic 
apparatus that relies on technical experts to formulate standardized solutions that are foisted on 
developing countries.  I deem it essential to investigate how these depoliticized interventions 
interact with the real socio-cultural and political realities in the locality of intervention.  
Significantly, Dr. P. Desroches, a Senior Economist of the World Bank office in Ghana 
accorded physical constraints as the causal reasons for the entrenched poverty condition in the 
study region.  Dr. Desroches identified the following constraints: “the multiple factors 
accounting for the high level of poverty in Northern Ghana are: erratic rainfall, low quality of 
seeds, lack of adequate services- education, water, health facilities sanitation, food 
inaccessibility, human rights abuse, ignorance, weak capacity and lack of entrepreneurial skills, 
lack of finance, ecological degradation and laziness/apathy.” (Dr. P. Desroches Interviewed on 
August 5, 2011).  These factors objectify chronic poverty in study region in order to facilitate 
the deployment of technical approaches as the main panacea for poverty.  Individuals who are 
detached from their structural conditions become reconstituted as merely objects of 
intervention. The identified non-relational factors seek to localize the causes of poverty that 
invariably exonerate aid agencies of any possible programme failures.  Interestingly, Mosse 
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(2005, 2010) and Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2010) also suggest that localization of 
problems is a systematic attempt by the aid industry to push for the deepening of local reforms.  
I contend that this localisation of the causal factors of poverty is a reductionist approach in 
which the quest for poverty reduction will be an elusive goal.  An analysis of implementation 
failures must shift from the normative problematization of the local to consider a critical 
examination of the conceptual understanding, rationales and assumptions of interventions.   
The UN system relies on participatory approaches to conceptualize poverty.  This 
participatory approach in itself did not interrogate the reasons why people are poor in order to 
find plausible means to address the problem. Focusing on the characteristics of the framed poor 
person, whose poverty situation is technically decoupled from his/her society, leads to a failure 
to address the core reasons for poverty.  This focus on the traits of individuals has the tendency 
to naturalize and de-politicize poverty in the region.    
From a national development policy viewpoint, this technical conception appears to be 
the norm.  The Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), established in 2010 by 
Government of Ghana (GoG) with the mandate to bridge the north-south developmental gap 
also reinforces the pursuit of stability as a perquisite for poverty reduction.  The main strategic 
report for SADA indicates that there are two main factors that predispose the Northern Region 
to high scale vulnerability (GoG, 2010, p. 92-93).  These two factors have been identified as 
ecological devastation and persistent conflicts.  The report identifies peace building as 
fundamentally critical for development of the area and the drive to reduce poverty.  A critical 
assessment of the basis for SADA’S position of conflict and insecurity suggests that a narrow 
negative effect of conflict on development outcomes appear to be normative thinking.  This 
normative thinking is firmly consistent with the UNDP notion of freedom from ‘fear’ and 
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‘want’.  I further suggest that the narrow focus on negative effects provides an interventionist 
urgency to pursue short-term technical solutions.   
The short-term and technocratic conceptualization of poverty used by aid agencies have 
resolutely challenged by some local residents who I interviewed for this study.  These local 
residents demonstrate a particularly nuanced understanding of their peculiar poverty and 
underdevelopment circumstances.  Some of the respondents declare:  
I do not understand why the people who come to save our social and 
economic difficulties in this region rather support some and neglect others.  
Our living conditions are bad, they come and give us cutlasses but they 
forget farming entails more than cutlasses. They behave like the 
government who does not care about us, concentrate everything viable in 
the South, but only come to us when national elections is around the corner 
and dole gifts as well as make empty promises. I have lost faith in 
everyone now and only look up to God to determine my faith and when my 
time is up, I will join Allah.  (Mr. Mohammed. Date of Interview: July 30, 
2011) 
I had wanted to be an engineer so that I can make a decent living because I 
was very brilliant as a pupil but when I father died I had to farm in order to 
support my mother.  One day I was approached by a gentleman, who I 
could not recognize, but he introduced himself to me as Agyare, a 
classmate of mine at primary school, who is a civil engineer now. I could 
not make him out because I looked too old for such a strong energetic man 
to be my classmate.  I felt ashamed of myself.  I have promised myself that 
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I will try my best to educate one of my seven children to train as an 
engineer.  With this, there will be peace in my heart.  My son! We are 
suffering; please talk for us because no one listens to us. I hope the work 
that you are doing now will wake the ‘Big men’ in the capital up. May 
Allah be with you! (Mr. Bukari.  Date of Interview: July 30, 2011.) 
These responses on the part of my research participants demonstrate a persistent poverty 
condition and point to the state’s neglect in providing institutional support.  They point to the 
continuity of the state’s preference for the Southern regions is similar that of the colonial 
administration.  An emergent issue for residents is that they are saddled with high cost of farm 
implements.  Their responses are suggestive of a historical trajectory for their poverty.  From 
my perspective, these historical accounts of poverty draw attention to the institutional 
processes and structures that are responsible for creating poverty in the region.  The saliency of 
the institutional and structural turn as captured in the responses of my interviewees challenge 
the relevance of the supply side constraints identified by the World Bank and UNDP.  These 
testimonies give significant credence to the fact that the poverty situation in Northern Ghana is 
not a natural phenomenon.  I posit that poverty, as revealed in their testimonies; suggest an 
adverse incorporation problem, which makes it imperative to examine the broader relational 
poverty issues.  
 A female respondent who was interviewed provided a nuanced response that gave 
further credence to the broad sociality of her poverty circumstance.  She declares with deep 
concern that: 
Some officers came to me and my friends to inform us of their intention to 
help us on condition that we join a producer group that they have formed 
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so that we can work as a collective team.  The second condition is that we 
need to have some assets such as land and savings account.  In the absence 
of those assets we should not expect any assistance from them.  So I told 
her that if I have assets to be productive, why would I need her company’s 
support?  Since my husband died his family members came for the land he 
had been farming on and that is the practice of our customary tradition.  
What can I say?  So my daily sustenance is by working on farms of the big 
men who pay me monthly, sometimes the pay delays and he pays me 
whenever he has money to pay me, else I will have to work as a cleaner in 
some villages in exchange for food. (Memuna. Interviewed on August 4, 
2011) 
Memuna’s response attests to the way a customary rule of inheritance undermines 
widow’s rights to a sustainable livelihood. Her job as a farm labourer has obviously 
made her much more vulnerable and unable to address her future needs and priorities 
because her major concern is how to survive day to day. Ultimately, her submission 
points to the urgent need to reconsider women’s inheritance rights as an area of worthy 
of examination.  By confronting the cultural norms and practices, aid agencies need to 
seek equity rather than resorting to failed apolitical technical solutions. In fact, a few 
other widows that I had informal interaction with attribute their current poverty 
condition to the discriminatory cultural practice of inheritance of their tribe. 
The framing of conflict and economic insecurity and its relation to poverty was 
undertaken through axiomatic liberal deductive thinking.  A liberal orientation is evident in the 
SADA 2010 Strategy Report. The Report states: “conflict in northern Ghana severely 
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undermines efforts towards good governance, sustainable development and poverty reduction.  
Such events have resulted in heavy loss of life, political instability, delays in development 
activities, and skews development opportunities.  In many respects, much of Northern Ghana 
could be considered as [a] conflict-prone area” (p.92).  I must emphasize that this deductive 
linkage between conflict, under-development and poverty does not capture the broad and 
complex relational factors in the region.   More significant is the silence on the part of aid 
agencies related to the interplay of historical and contemporary politico-social and economic 
relations across the regional, along with national and global issues that also impact the region.  
Therefore, the deliberate stripping of the broader relational dynamics provides an avenue to 
suggest only a reductive and narrow scope of intervention geared towards crisis management 
rather than toward seeking sustained processes of transformation. 
It is important to stress that these conceptual framings of reciprocal linkage between 
conflict instigated insecurity and poverty reduction is only intuitively appealing. This method 
is actually empirically deficient in demonstrating the mechanisms and processes that produce 
the acclaimed causal relations.  The weakness of such a conceptual linkage is compounded by 
an inadequate income proxy for poverty and an inability to understand the more nuanced 
effects of conflict.  The ultimate policy and practical interventions emanating from such 
deductive framing of the poverty situation leads to the deployment of time-bound problem-
solving approaches to address a much more complex problem.  This inflexible programmatic 
orientation underscores the UN JHSP’s predetermined intended beneficiaries, and identifies the 
outcomes and outputs expected by collaborating agencies.  In my view, this deductive 
approach de-politicizes the aid process by relying on standardized formal processes of 
intervention, rather than ones that are specific to the region.   
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The predisposition toward the short-term problem-solving approaches of the aid 
industry, makes it possible for aid actors to relieve themselves of the search for 
transformational long-term approaches.  More especially, these short-term approaches, which 
are conditioned by a results-driven rationale, tend to prioritize project coordination issues over 
the content of any particular intervention.  This co-ordination obsession among the aid agencies 
was revealed to be an issue during an interview with Mr. Glenn Morgan, Programme Manager 
of Catholic Relief Services.  I asked him to explain the challenges that arise during the 
implementation of their programmes.  He stated:  “the main factor that undermined successful 
implementation of the peace negotiating activity was the inability to coordinate the diverse 
stakeholders, especially the government officials, traditional leaders and the representatives of 
the various youth groups.  It seems they have their own agenda and not fully committed to the 
laid down processes.” (G. Morgan, Interviewed on August 10, 2011).  This programme 
manager’s response seeks to normalize the rationales and content of the reconciliation and 
peace education process which has been deemed a potent remedy to the entrenched tension and 
insecurity in the area.  It also blames the implementation failures on the problem of 
coordination among aid agencies. I will provide an extensive discussion of this coordination 
mantra in chapter six of this dissertation, which deals with the various development and 
security intervention impasses.  The UN JHSP will be discussed in detail in the chapter five as 
it entails virtually all the dictates of the responsibility to protect prescriptions. 
The diverse framing of security challenges by the UNDP consistently paints a negative 
outlook of what?  The negative perceptions of the area as advanced by Mr. Aaron 
Nantongmah, regional programme officer of the UN JHSP include: deleterious impacts and 
effects of socio-economic development, low investor confidence, and the destruction of 
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productive infrastructure.  Mr. Nantongmah further identified the destruction of social cohesion 
and capital, regional instability and danger to national stability as some of the deleterious 
effects of conflict on development in the region.  Furthermore, this negative framing requires 
conflict prevention mechanisms, based on tightly budgeted timelines and engaging with key 
stakeholders.  All the officials of the agencies I interviewed during my fieldwork affirm the 
deleterious effects of conflict and instability on the persistent poverty conundrum in the region.   
An issue of scarcity in the region has been attributed to conflict-generated insecurity in 
the region.  This is evident in responses I received from different officials of German 
International Development, the World Bank and ActionAid.  The German International 
Development official, Dr. Hesse, stated categorically that employment, financial stability and 
land scarcity are the main driving causes of the conflict in the Northern Region.  Dr. Desroches 
of the World Bank has also attributed the conflict to the scarcity of market opportunities and a 
lack of fertile lands for youth to access as fundamental triggers of the conflict and insecurity.  
These kinds of responses are based on either a rational choice model or the greed hypothesis 
espoused by Homer-Dixon (1999) and Collier and Heofler (2003).  These framings tend to 
negate the historical roles of the IR and state policies in the structuring and intensification of 
conflict.    
 I suggest that the diverse negative framings by aid agencies are symptomatic of their 
‘trusteeship’ mentality.  This trusteeship orientation is a driving force behind the agencies 
preference for externally-devised solutions that demonstrate the inability of government 
officials to address poverty issues.  
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Development Interventions for Poverty Reduction 
The aid industry has featured actively in developmental interventions in the region, with the 
ultimate goal of poverty reduction since independence in 1957. The two dominant areas of 
development-focused poverty reduction interventions are in the agricultural and social services 
(primarily water, health and education). Notable among water interventions are the current 
Northern Region Small Town program, funded by CIDA, and WaterAid community-driven 
borehole projects. Other notable agriculture- related interventions include JICA’s Project for 
Sustainable Development of Rain-fed Lowland Rice Production, which started in 2009, the $20 
million Millennium Village Projects funded by the DfID and the German International 
Development’s  Market-Oriented Agricultural Programme (MOAP) that aims to stimulate 
market- competitive agricultural products.  There are also various community-based food 
security projects undertaken by the Ghana Development Communities Association, United 
States Agency for International Development, and Danish International Development Agency.    
Notwithstanding these past and present interventions outlined above, I will use the 
NRGP and CWSA as subjects for analysis because of their wide regional scope of intervention.  
I suggest that these interventions are reflective of both technical supply-side options and 
community persuasions.  Hence, it becomes imperative to examine the rationales for these 
interventions were articulated in the field. 
 
The Northern Rural Growth Program: Potential for Agrarian Transformation? 
The NRGP is a donor funded agricultural sector intervention program, and its overall goal is to 
promote sustainable agricultural growth, and food security for the rural poor in Northern 
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Ghana.  The targeted beneficiaries of the program are small-scale farmer, and the four-year 
program is due to cost $150 million.  The programme is funded by the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), ADB, European Union (EU) and GIZ) in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA).  
The NRGP was conceived of through the Government of Ghana’s request to IFAD and 
the European Union concerning the feasibility of transforming agricultural productivity in 
Northern Ghana.  This request was the product of the GoG’s recognition of the funding 
capabilities and expertise of the two international bodies to support the proposed programme.  
The first stage of the proposed programme was series of dialogues and negotiations between 
the European Union & IFAD and GoG representatives, meetings that also included various 
technocrats from the MOFA.  Furthermore, the aim of these meetings was to identify the 
problems and determine the priorities and operational plans moving forward.  According to Mr. 
Alhassan, a key informant from NRGP, the government initially submitted a proposal for 
funding to IFAD and ADB.  Experts from the aforementioned donor agencies sent to evaluate 
the proposal and later streamlined the technical and operational details.  Mr. Alhassan, who is a 
senior official, revealed to me that the donor agencies, have, from the start, exercised 
significant control of the programme.  Key areas of control by the donor agencies are 
expenditure disbursements and the determination of experts.  With these areas of control under 
the influence of the aid agencies, Mr. Alhassan notes that the programme has to rely on foreign 
experts who had the power to determine which crops to fund.  
According to Mr. Alhassan, the rationale behind this top-down program is to reduce 
conflict in NG.  He testified that, “we have noticed over the years an increased level of conflict 
during the lean season because most farmers become virtually unemployed.  The 
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unemployment then degenerates into violent robbery which escalates the conflict and tension in 
the region.”  To curb the conflict eruption, Mr. Alhassan notes that the government has 
“introduced this innovative tri-cycle planting season that will keep the farmers productively 
engaged through-out the year.” (M. Alhassan Interviewed on August 12, 2011).  The causal 
linkage between lean season and conflicts, from my perspective, is not conclusive because, as I 
discussed in chapter three, the complexity of conflicts in the Northern Region are conditioned 
by multiple factors.  Therefore, the primary focus on economic motives behind the conflicts 
may possibly defer the conflict but will not address the root causes in a constructive manner. 
A scrutiny of the program’s components reveals an overwhelming focus on the narrow 
supply-side priorities.  These include: commodity chain development (another buzzword in the 
agricultural sector), rural infrastructure, and access to rural finance and programme 
management and coordination.  Largely missing from the program are the demand-side 
constraints that reflect the intricate priorities of the farmers.  Mr. Alhassan reiterated the 
dominance of technical advisors recruited by the donor agencies in each step of the process: 
problem definition, concept development, infrastructure prioritization and crop selection.  I 
asked why the notion of the value chain has become a priority aspect of the processes of 
agricultural sector intervention.  Specifically, my curiosity was piqued in the following grey 
areas: the source of value chain policy discourse, its nature and how it impacts the famers both 
individually and collectively to optimize their livelihoods.  Mr. Alhassan response is as 
follows: “the value chain has become an operative strategy which was adopted from the FAO.  
Through the value chain, farmers will be integrated with all those key actors from retailers, 
seed companies, agro-processors, the financial industry and export firms to mention a few.  We 
are yet to know the real impact on the farmers.” (M. Alhassan. Interviewed on August 12, 
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2011).  The problem with this view is that most farmers have complained bitterly about these 
actors in the supply line of tools, equipment and the high interest rates charged by banks.  As a 
result, the farmers are further exposed to poverty and an unregulated value chain.  This policy 
depicts an unyielding faith in the market to solve a complex problem.  I suggest that given the 
weak policy advocacy and state support for these small-hold farmers, further exposure to the 
market will not transform their lives.    
In its concept note, the NRGP affirms that rural communities constitute the poverty hub 
of the region because of the low level of productivity on the part of the peasants. The NRGP 
blames the poor savannah vegetation for this low level of productivity. I must stress that their a 
spatial categorization of poverty farming, defined as holding land between 1ha and 5ha in size, 
problematizes the vital search for  reasons why poverty is chronically persistent in the region.  
The salient effect of such a categorization has led to the conflation of poverty with the 
characteristics and correlates of poor person (Harris, 2007, Green and Hulme, 2006). This 
unacceptable correlation ignores the vital relational causal factors of poverty in the region. In 
the end technocratic and simplistic approaches become the remedial option.  
Technocratic solutions dominated the core activities of the NRGP.  The programme 
provided prioritized areas for inclusion, including: water- pumping machines, the supply of 
improved seeds and the construction of roads needed to improve productivity and marketing.  
In view of the prevailing vital policy neglect and land tenure challenges of the peasants, these 
restrictive input-driven interventions are unlikely to reduce poverty.  I would add that the 
NRGP may succeed in instituting disciplinary and regulatory constraints against targeted 
farmers.  In fact, the regulatory constraints are already in place and are composed of imposed 
new farming practices and sanctions meted out to farmers who fail to adhere to the guidelines.  
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An instance of this has occurred when farmers were unable to constitute groups of at least five 
members to gain further support.  
It is critically important to note that output during the initial 2 years of the intervention 
was not significant, as suggested by Mr. Alhassan.  The intriguing issue, however, is the 
continuous indictment of the poor farmer as the source of challenges to implementation.  This 
example of blame being placed on the poor is part of a scheme on the part of aid agencies to 
subject peasants to deeper technical reforms and keep them from questioning the rationales and 
assumptions of these aid interventions.  Under the NRGP, Mr. Alhassan attributes the 
program’s poor outcome to three main factors. He explained that it was difficult to change the 
mentality of farmers, their poor organizational skills, and a difficulty in coordinating 
stakeholders.  With respect to the mentality of the farmers, Mr. Alhassan’s position is that the 
long years of subsistence practices have made it difficult for peasants to adapt to change.  In 
my view, this is a reductionist position; my discussion with some of the farmers suggests a 
contrary opinion.  Some of the farmers revealed to me that there was no assurance on the part 
of the government that there would be a significant yield if they joined the program. In fact, 
this element of uncertainty – part and parcel of technocratic programs – creates, in my opinion, 
a disincentive for peasants to join.   
A growing trend in the aid industry is an obsession with faith in the formation of groups 
as a route for poverty reduction.  Virtually all the agencies that were interviewed for this study 
have rolled out schemes that require group formation to benefit from the NRGP.  This 
attraction to group formation as an approach to funding is linked to the entrance of social 
capital onto the development aid thinking.  However, the conditions under which a group 
functions to the collective benefits to its members are not given thoughtful consideration.  Due 
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consideration, in my thinking has not been given to the macro structural, political and 
economic conditions of group formation.  Also not given critical attention is micro socio-
cultural issues involved in the region, including kinship structures, ethnic relations and rule-
making systems.  Secondly, this consensus-oriented strategy tends to perpetuate donor 
hegemony, as evidence from my interview did not suggest any effort towards the structural 
change that is an inevitable factor for poverty reduction.  In fact, in similar interviews I 
conducted with an official of JICA in relation to the Sustainable Development of Rain-fed Low 
Land Rice project, it was revealed that the program was to focus mainly on technical issues 
rather than on structural issues.  According to Alhaji Tanko (senior official of JICA), the 
technical packages of the project are land preparation, an extension support system, rice 
cultivation and post-harvest management.  The JICA programme also focuses on group 
farming, in which Alhaji Tanko identified the formation of cohesive groups as one of the key 
challenges of the project.   
An intriguing issue relates to the assumption behind this notion of group formation and 
its implications on poverty. The producer groups established by the NRGP within communities 
are based on an untenable assumption that group consensus is a precondition for group success.  
This shortcoming confirms Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) and Fine’s (2007) skepticism about the 
poverty reduction prospects of group formation.  In fact, a group of farmers that I interviewed 
in Tamale expressed their disdain for production groups.  The leader of the group, Mr. 
Abraham Yakubu stated: “we have had bitter experience with this group work because our first 
time membership of a group formed by one of the aid agencies rather impoverished us.  So 
what is the point in joining groups only to be worse off?  We cannot gamble with our future 
like that.”  Mr. Yakubu attributed their impoverishment to the dominance of ‘middle class’ 
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members who drove the group’s collective interests to foster their own personal interest.  This 
shows that little consideration on the part of aid agencies is given to the unequal power 
relations within such small groups.  The multiplicity of interests does not make groups 
formation an easy all-inclusive strategic framework to boost productivity of peasants.   
The possibility of remaking groups to be productive must instruct the administrators of 
the NRGP who develop working group norms, values and rules to maximize efficiency, but 
this is not an overnight process.  The presence of diverse socio-cultural beliefs, an imbalance in 
power relations and multiple identities do not allow for the easy formation of a viable group.  
Further, Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer (2005) and Fine (2007) assert that the values that drive 
groups to work equitably and efficiently are a politically demanding task.  The logical 
implication here is that it takes time for effective group dynamism to be nurtured and enforced.  
The axiomatic, seamless, group dynamism thinking of the NRGP demonstrates a limited 
appreciation of what Eyben (2008) calls the ‘chaotic’ socio-cultural and political economic 
relations within communities.  Hence, smooth formation of cohesive group cannot be taken to 
be given. 
The aversion on the part of the aid agency to diversity and dissent is another reason for 
their unyielding faith in group formation.  A more significant issue is that even a theoretical 
link between group cohesion and productivity is not firmly established as suggested by Fine 
(2007, p. 262-265).  In the absence of any clear theoretical linkage between group formation 
and productivity, it becomes crucial to question the basis for such a belief within the aid 
industry.  Based on the findings in relation to the NRGP, I contend that simplistic 
interventionist assumptions of desirability and possibility of change significantly explain the 
reasons why aid agencies pursue ‘programed to fail’ interventions. 
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Another vital issue to consider is that the NRGP’s goal of linking peasants to the 
financial market to access loans, however, ignores important questions regarding the terms on 
which the peasants are being linked to the banks.  In the absence of any special subsidized 
interest rates set out for peasant farmers who are accessing loans, especially after the SAP 
terminated the hitherto subsidy regime, it may be impossible for peasants to secure loans.  This 
is not to suggest that subsidies are the main bane of agricultural productivity but rather to 
suggest that the removal of loan subsidies compound the complex structural and institutional 
challenges.  In addition to the issue of subsidization, there is only one national bank for 
agriculture (specifically the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) which, as of June 21, 
2013, has a lending base rate of 21.5% per annum.   The ADB offers concessionary loans to 
farmers as part of its core mandate, but this concessionary facility has only been secured by the 
commercial food and cash crop farmers and a few others operating at a high scale in the animal 
sector.  The sum effect is that the peasants remain crowded out of any access to the state’s 
financing program because they are invisible not only to the banks, but also to policymakers 
and politicians.  An ironical issue is that the NRGP is unable to advocate for concessionary 
facility for the peasants, because the dominance of powerful political forces and business elites 
remains unchanged.  
 
Limitations of Supply-side Driven Agricultural Interventions 
The pertinent nature and quality of socio-economic and political relations between broad actors 
within the agricultural sector remains a non-issue to aid agencies operating in the area.  In my 
view, it is essential to engage with the complex and chaotic relationship between actors in the 
agricultural sector to avoid simplistic interventions that have been proven ineffective.  The 
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complexity in this situation extends beyond merely the set of relations between agrarian classes 
and highlights unequal relations between different sets of peasant farmers and capital-intensive 
commercial farmers.  There are also other active actors involved in the value chain situation: 
banks, seed companies, commodity chains, capital circuits, agents of technical change and agro 
processing firms all have a stake in the aid situation of the study region.  Globalization 
processes have also had adverse implications for most deprived farmers.  I will contend that 
crises of production and labour evident in capitalist globalization processes constitute a 
significant factor in the pauperization of the peasants in the Northern Region.  This is 
evidenced by numerous complaints by informants in villages that they have become meager 
wage earners instead of producers because their lands have been acquired by large-scale 
farmers.  The loss of productive lands demonstrates that securing land tenure for peasants alone 
is not enough to guarantee them improved livelihood.  Thus, the nature of the international and 
domestic capitalist practices and its implications on the well-being of peasants need to be 
considered.  
A cursory look at the Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy, a donor- 
financed report, shows the policy practices that neglect crops from the Northern region:  
Crops such as mango, cashew, oil-palm, rubber, plantain and citrus, as well 
as small ruminants (sheep and goats), poultry and vegetables will be 
promoted on the basis of the comparative and competitive advantage of 
agro-ecological zones and availability of markets.  Indigenous staple crops 
and livestock species produced by the poor can be commercialized through 
linkages to industry. Research on these crops and livestock species to 
identify genetic material with desired qualities and to improve productivity 
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along the value chain will contribute to poverty reduction” (FASDEP, p. 
34, 2007).   
The official preference for selected crops typifies the continuation of the colonial government’s 
prioritization of exportable crops.  The selectivity of crops excludes the products of the poor 
farmers in the Northern Region.  According to the World Bank (2007), the most prominent 
products of small-hold farmers in the Northern Region are sorghum, millet, rice, and yams.  
This report is also suggestive of an imbalance in power relations in terms of representation of 
the needs of the poor, with the scale balanced towards donor priorities.  The Food and 
Agricultural Development Policy predilection for specific crops is based on the international 
and regional market appeal of particular crops.  The primacy of this market appeal is supported 
by the national Growth Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), an over-arching national 
development policy framework that promotes export competitiveness as means for poverty 
reduction.  Export promotion, in and of itself, is not a bad practice, but pursuing an export-
driven growth strategy to reduce poverty must, however, be attentive to the policy space that 
would ensure that the products of poor farmers are accommodated.  It would also be 
worthwhile to support the production systems of the poor, not necessarily for export 
promotion, but to explore domestic opportunities.  Given the scale and magnitude of poverty 
challenges in the study region, impose an urgent need for multi-leveled sustained interventions.  
These interventions must be broad enough to accommodate the interests, priorities and needs of 
the poor farmers as a specific group, rather than as an aggregate or homogenized group.   
The Northern Region is endowed at with at least four major crops of enormous 
commercial value that could be the initial catalyst for poverty reduction in the region, which 
has a single rainy season that lasts from July – October. There has been a failure on the part of 
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the past governments to invest adequately in the Northern Region to generate sustained 
livelihoods beyond the agricultural sector.  Because of this, there is minimal diversity in the 
socio-economic base of the region. The implication of the limited rainy season is the need on 
the part of the government and aid agencies to search for strategies that would create and 
sustain non-agricultural employment in order to diversify the economic base of the region.  
Importantly, the piecemeal interventions being rolled out by donor agencies essentially 
downplay the complexity of poverty reduction. There is also a need for production costs of 
agriculture to be low in order not to impinge on the return on output, and it is imperative to 
ensure that fair and guaranteed prices are offered to peasants in exchange for their products.  
This pricing issue has been raised by the various farmers I interacted with, who blamed the 
exploitative practices of transport owners, wholesalers and other middlemen from Southern 
Ghana for offering them low prices of their products.   
The privatization of agricultural services has not been in the interest of peasants in 
Northern Region.  According to Owusu-Baah (2008), the privatization of extension services 
gave disproportionate accessibility to commercial farmers within the forest belt of the southern 
regions.  This privatization of extension services limited most farmers in the savannah belt of 
the Northern Region to extension support due to financial and geographical reasons.  The 
discriminatory privatization practice reflects a continuation of colonial practices as I explained 
in chapter three, which denied Northern Region needed state support because the government 
believed that the region was not endowed with cash-exportable crops.   
Indeed, some farmers complained bitterly to me about the agony they undergo 
attempting to secure farm implements because they lack any kind of financial resources to do 
so.  Many of these farmers outrightly rejected various loan offers from many of the NGOs, 
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because, according to the group leader, Seidu Mumuni, they have had “dismal experiences with 
similar NGOs that only make us sign binding contract agreements that we did not understand. 
They only pursue their interest by demanding a 40% share of our declared output. This 40% 
entitlement as claimed by the NGO was as exorbitant as the official commercial bank lending 
rate.” (S. Mumuni, Interviewed on August 28, 2011).  Significantly, exploitative practices are 
still in vogue, especially in relation to role of Northern middlemen who mediate between the 
farmers and traders from the south.  The result of the use of these Northern intermediaries, 
according to the farmers, is that minuscule prices are offered for their produce.  The farmers 
attributed their weal control of the prices to the lack of government protection since the SAP 
practice and post Highly Indebted Poor Country era. 
 
Processes of Community Involvement in Water Privatization   
Water as a resource in a normative sense is deemed to be vital for sustainable livelihood, for 
poverty reduction, for and overall human development.  Given the importance of water for 
human sustenance, its shortage has created an opportunity for international development 
intervention.   Water scarcity, however, does not invalidate critical questions about the 
rationales that drive these interventions.  In analyzing the formation and practices of CWSA, it 
is necessary to discuss the broader macro-national political and multilateral institutional 
processes surrounding water deregulation and privatization that have precipitated its 
establishment.  The CWSA is a donor funded ‘community’-oriented water and sanitation 
service delivery for small town and rural communities in the Northern Region.   Water 
privatization and deregulation were integral components of the structural reforms that affected 
essential social services in the late 1990s and still pertinent in the post SAP era.  In this 
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instance, the IMF, and World Bank embarked on fierce policy campaigns towards privatization 
and deregulation of water services in the name of getting the ‘prices right.’  
Apart from the dominant Bretton Wood Institutions that pushed for the privatization of 
water delivery in Ghana, there are other INGOs that play an intermediary role.  WaterAid has 
provided an immense outreach role in support of the deregulation and privatization of water on 
behalf of the World Bank and IMF.  WaterAid’s function of mobilizing public support for the 
liberalization of the water sector was confirmed by a key informant during my fieldwork.  
According to Mr. Illiasu who works with CLIP:  
Indeed, WaterAid facilitated numerous seminars and workshops for water-
related organizations including some of the state agencies regarding 
liberalization of the water sector. Various officials of WaterAid claim that 
privatization of water services would correct the state’s deficiency and 
increase physical investment to boost water production and distribution to 
enhance the capabilities of households. Out of curiosity, I attended a 
couple of their capacity training workshops since they boast of their 
expertise to enhance water generation and distribution.  In fact, they 
sounded like World Bank officials who are tried to sell bad commodity to 
the poor. 
This information reveals the state’s technical inefficiency as a reason for water problems, 
which makes the market a reliable solution through privatization.  Limiting the blame for 
Northern Region’s water problems to state incapacity de-politicizes water accessibility in its 
entirety.  The politicization of water accessibility from the purview of the study region is 
salient when we take into consideration the role of power and politics in determining who has 
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access to resources.  In light of the fate of the poor in this system, various CSOs mounted 
resistance against water sector liberalization. Third World Network, the Coalition Against the 
Privatization of Water and ISODEC utilized diverse platforms for protest, ranging from 
demonstrations, public workshops and media to campaign against water privatization on the 
grounds that it is socially and economically irresponsible. 
It is crucial to appreciate the processes that enabled conditions for the deregulation and 
privatization agenda enacted by various aid agencies. The conditions that facilitated this agenda 
could be linked to the main state actors, to institutional shifts, or the prevailing orthodox 
political discourse.  Notwithstanding the ruinous social effects of structural reforms in Ghana, 
privatization and deregulation were top policy priority issues that framed the government’s 
political and economic discourse between 2001 and 2009.  This era marked the consolidation, 
privatization, and deregulation of water delivery, a move that was driven by the ‘Golden Age 
of Business’ policy expressed by President John Kufuor.  It is important to note that this 
‘Golden Age for Business’ opened a political space for contestations among a wide array of 
interest groups.  The pro-business policy mantra was subject to different interpretations, 
particularly on the part of the neoliberal ideologues who endorsed deregulation and 
privatization possibilities.  On the other hand, the Trade Union Congress and other progressive 
movements indicted the potential concentration of corporate control the Ghanaian economy, 
especially in reference to the delivery of public goods.  I suggest that unequal power relations 
in the determination of policy priorities weighed heavily in favor of the government for a 
further push toward water deregulation and privatization.  
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   The vested interest of state officials in deregulation could be assessed in my interview 
with Ms. Gladys Bappuroh, senior official of ISODEC, Tamale.  In support of her claims 
against state officials’ complicity in the water sector liberalization, Ms. Bappuroh posits that:  
Very limited space was granted to the civil society groups in the 
negotiation processes.  To my surprise, senior government officials were 
very accommodating of the water privatization, because it further 
strengthened their control in the water sector.  It might interest you to 
know that some of the engineers and management of the state owned 
Ghana Water &Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) had lucrative jobs with the 
private water companies that emerged.  Some government officials also 
jumped on this private water delivery services, so certainly we were fought 
against internal and external enemies of human progress. With all these 
campaigns that we embarked upon, government did not yield to our 
demands to ensure that water is affordable and accessible to every 
household. (Ms. Bappuroh, Interviewed on August 16, 2011). 
From this response, it is evident that the reconfiguration of the state as a facilitator of the 
conditions necessary to allow the market to work in consonance with normative small but 
effective government orthodoxy.   In support of this reconfiguration of the role of the state by 
international aid industries, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) reject the demise of the state 
argument as suggested by liberal-leaning scholars such as Fukuyama (2004) and Bellamy 
(2009).  To Abrahamsen and William, the state is an adaptive system that, notwithstanding the 
immense structural reforms in most African states, such states were actually reformed to play 
an enabling or facilitating role.  As part of the move to institute enabling conditions according 
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to Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011), the re-articulation of the public-private divide 
through de-nationalized processes is necessary.  In my view, Abrahamsen and William’s 
(2011) notion of the evolving role of the state needs further qualification in terms of the nature 
of the state in question.  My position is that taking account of the development history of 
Northern Region, the state has not ensured an equitable allocation of essential resources.  As I 
discussed in chapter three, the state’s distribution of assets since colonial times has favoured 
the southern regions.  The relative security of the Southern regions in relation to the northern 
regions reflects a problematic state formation policy whereby questions of political settlements 
in respect of the Northern Region remain unresolved.  Secondly, the changing role of the state 
does not impact regions of different endowments evenly.  The unevenness of different regional 
endowments and intra-regional inequalities might produce different cataclysmic effects.   
The crucial role of domestic actors in the enactment and actualization of state policies 
attests to the role of politics and personal interests that undergird development interventions.  
With the establishment of the CWSA, the state’s function has metamorphosed from being the 
main provider of water towards a new role as facilitator of water services.  Mr. David 
Chirawurah, a convener of one of the workshops organized by the Coalition Against 
Privatization of Water contends that: “water is too precious a national asset to be left in the 
hands of multinationals, which are driven by the greed for gain more than anything else.” 
(Chirawurah, Interviewed on September 5, 2011).  The core of Mr. Chirawurah’s position is 
the crucial issue of an individual’s inalienable right to have unfettered access to water.  This 
unrestrained right I insist is based on the principles of humanity as a living being and is part of 
citizenship entitlement.  The fears that he articulates are valid considering that the stringent 
privatization of water can possibly shift the universal requirement for unfettered access to 
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water towards conditional accessibility.  With the conditional accessibility, only the privileged 
can have fluid access to water, because the commodification of water will restrict the poor 
financially.    
A predominant phenomenon in the cause of international development interventions is 
the tactic of problematizing the State’s performance as both ineffective and inefficient.  Dr. 
Simon Acquah, a water policy consultant, informed me that the defunct GWSC was chastised 
by the World Bank for covering less than 35% of the national population in its water delivery.  
Other problems identified include poor revenue recovery, negative balance sheets and under-
investment in physical infrastructure.  Therefore, the privatization of the water system became 
the sole option available.  In resolving on privatization, however, other plausible options such 
as organizational reforms, prudent political and administrative changes and the promotion of 
competition usually necessary to resuscitate struggling public enterprises were ignored.  The 
reliance on discrete economic and financial performances became grounds on which the push 
to decouple rural water services from urban supply was based.   Spatial bifurcation in terms of 
rural and urban water led to the formation of the CWSA.  Information obtained from Ing. 
Dauda Mahama, my key informant at CWSA, suggests that his organization constitutes part of 
the structural reforms that took place in the early 1990s.  He posits: “the CWSA was 
established by Act 564 in 1998, which mandates it to deliver potable drinking water to rural 
communities and small towns.  We are to ensure active community involvement in the 
management of their water services and coordinate all the activities of the diverse stakeholders 
including the district assemblies and private providers and facilitate the supply of operational 
materials.” (A. Mahama, Interviewed on August 18, 2011).     
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The dichotomous spatial concentrations in water supply are also the result of the 
national decentralization policy.  Thus, the CWSA was essentially an agency that facilitated the 
decentralization of the water supply in rural sectors.  In effect, communities are reconstituted as 
purveyors of water privatization and deregulation and will be reassigned governmental 
functions.  Following Rose, a community is defined as : “a sector is brought into existence 
whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and 
techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity 
construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” (1999, 33).  This definition is 
appropriate to the Northern Region, whereby heterogeneous communities have been imagined 
as mobilizing social spaces.  Through expert practices, various local actors were trained to 
exercise responsible agency in the management of shared resources to advance their livelihood. 
The Northern Region has been defined by the World Bank as a vast, rural, geographical 
setting that makes the operation of CWSA vital to sustain the livelihood of the residents.  
Adoption of pertinent ‘community’ addendums of ‘ownership and management’ has been the 
main pillars of water supply by CWSA.  The CWSA practices engender inclusive liberalism; 
this liberalism is in the form of private providers who are put in charge of water generation, 
and communities bear 5% of the capital cost and are responsible for the full expenses related to 
maintenance and ownership.  The 5% payment of the capital investment cost has made the 
CWSA and donor officials create the impression that rural water is subsidized for beneficiaries.  
This subsidy is not accurate when it is only one factor in the entire processes of water supply 
and communities have the ultimate responsibility to pay for both maintenance and ownership 
to ensure a working the water system.   
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The World Bank official, Dr. Desroches, chastised the state for being weak, which in 
his liberal thinking justifies the need for communities to be responsible for their water supply.  
Dr. Desroches told me: 
Listen Eric! You know the state is over-stretched and weak; therefore, it is 
important that communities should take over the state’s job.  That is why 
the Bank is pushing for further government from the bottom so that 
communities will form the mobilizing resource for participatory water 
supply.  Also community as an organizing factor will forge peaceful 
communal relations and enhance community productivity vital to reduce 
poverty.” (Dr. Desroches, Interviewed on August 5, 2011).   
When I asked him to clarify what he meant when he called Ghana a week state, he did not 
answer my question. The sustainability, productivity, poverty and peaceful rationalities as 
suggested by the Dr. Desroches, are unfounded and based on a misleading consensus-oriented 
notion about community.  The vital issue is that this same development aid water intervention 
has sparked community tensions in some localities as suggested by Mr. Illiasu and confirmed 
by research participants that I interviewed in some villages in Tamale.  
Furthermore, the deductive claims by Dr. Desroches raise significant questions. To 
begin with, he did not provide empirically testable strategies and processes through which the 
expected outcomes could be realized.  Moreover, he failed to situate the water crisis within 
broader structural political economic relations at multiple levels beyond the communities.  An 
important observation that I made during fieldwork is that accessibility to resources in most 
communities cannot be assumed to be an unproblematic issue.  Crucial to the determination of 
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accessibility to resources is the inevitable nature of the contestable embodiment of social 
relations, rather than being merely based on individuals’ payment ability.   
Also, contestations surrounding tariff payments remain inevitable due to these tariffs 
being incompatible with the rule- and meaning-making systems of the different ethnic groups 
in various communities.   Indeed, during an interview with a respondent, Mr. Jibril Azeem, 
from Chereponi, who testified, “Hmmm! You see, I am a Konkomba farmer and we believe 
that water as a natural resource is governed by our Tendana (earth spirit) therefore, I don’t see 
why I should pay for this resource that is owned by my spiritual leader.  I don’t think the spirit 
will be ok with me should I pay for something meant for free use by his people.” (J. Azeem. 
Interviewed on August 18, 2011).  Another respondent, Baba Osumanu, from Gushiegu is also 
in support of the non-compliance with the tariff payment.  Osumanu justified his non-
compliance on the grounds that the big men in his community have monopolized the use and 
access of water, which leave him with the sole option of non-tariff payment. These responses 
suggest the fallacy of using tariffs as a mechanism for both water management and 
accessibility in a poor region imbued with salient socio-cultural values.  Clearly such a tariff 
regime is being run by ‘big men’ who are consolidating their power base through their 
authority over water resources. 
The responses from my informants also support Mr. Illiasu’s attestation regarding the 
stimulation of water politics instigated by this new arrangement.  This conflicting situation 
informs Ostrom (1990), Mosse (2003) and Mehta’s (2005) position that water is not a common 
good because it generates its own politics.  Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to 
develop naturally, especially in conflict prone region such as Northern Region.  However, I 
disagree with Ostrom’s suggestion that: “the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in 
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natural resources is to end the common-property system by creating a system of private 
property rights” (p. 145).  Ostrom’s remedial proposal supports the consolidation and 
privatization of commoditized natural resources.  This can be seen in the current aid industry 
lexicon of private-public partnership as a solution to water management and supply problems.  
The tariff levying is a mechanism of re-regulating of water accessibility in the region, a 
practice that is inconsistent with conventional practices in different communities.  Tariff as one 
of the major issues of contestation was confirmed by Ing. Mahama of the CWSA:  
We keep receiving increasing reports about the non-compliance of many 
community members when it comes to payment of water fetched.  In fact, 
this non-payment of water levy is one of the main reasons why the water 
maintenance is under severe threat in the communities.  In lieu of this 
payment, we have in the interim suggested to the communities through the 
District Assemblies to adopt non-monetary payment such as voluntary 
works to defray the cost of water they use.  We are yet to receive a 
feedback as to whether this recommendation is working or not. (D. 
Mahama. Interviewed on August 18, 2011). 
The reality is that the non-payment of tariffs reflects a bigger picture beyond income and needs 
to be situated within the disparate value and meaning making systems, beliefs, gender and 
multiple identity features of the community in which it is used.  
The unalloyed commitment to use the market approach to address social and relational 
challenges is rife within the CWSA practice.  In an attempt to remedy poor community 
management issues, the World Bank recommends that: “The  private-public partnership in the 
water sector should regain momentum and CWSA should encourage communities to consider 
184 
 
contracting out the operation, maintenance and management of small towns’ water supply 
systems especially for schemes serving populations above 10,000 to the private sector” (2008, 
P.38).  Interestingly, Ing. Mahama also indicated his preference for the private-public 
partnership in the wake of the intractable implementation challenges.  He asserts that: 
A series of management meetings have been held in discussing and 
pushing for the adoption of private-public partnership, especially when the 
communities have demonstrated a weak capacity to manage the water 
systems. In fact, we have received some proposals from some private 
agencies…we are carefully scrutinizing them and once we are satisfied 
with the assessment, the district assemblies will be informed about the way 
forward.  On the other hand, we have given the District Assemblies rights 
to also source for private ventures that we can assess their technical, 
financial and economic capacities.   
Ironically, Ing. Mahama could not adduce a justifiable reason to support his own faith in the 
private-public partnership program. This leads us to the impression that interventions under the 
rubric of development and poverty reduction are a wrong strategy to posit liberal policies as 
universal solutions to aid issues.  What is clear from his response is the clear simplification of a 
complex problem, which also suggests his antipathy for historical insights.  On the other hand, 
his comments could also reflect his ignorance with respect to Ghana’s abysmal record with 
privatization.  
The unavoidable issue here is that water accessibility in the Northern Region must be 
situated around social differentiation and power relations. This implies that the common good, 
a notion which is driven by a neoclassical economic understanding of water as having features 
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of non-rivalry and non-excludability, is not applicable in real practice.  In my view such a 
simplistic understanding of water accessibility is oblivious to the historical evolution of society 
and unequal social relations that define and determine resource use.   These unequal social 
relations (materially and discursively) invariably generate hoarding and exploitation 
possibilities, which ultimately result in resistance and struggles for resource use.  Water 
accessibility is a conflict-ridden process.   This unavoidable conflict-ridden water management 
system points to the need on the part of aid agencies to avoid this pristine community 
consensus oriented water supply and embrace an approach that reflects reality. 
The use of technical experts in the articulation of development interventions is a key 
part of CWSA plans.  From the context of water privatization, the role of experts is prominent 
in reconstituting the communities as responsible actors for managing their water supply.  
According to Ing. Mahama, the CWSA relies to a significant extent on experts recommended 
by the donor agencies, most notable of which are the World Bank, European Union, African 
Development Bank and CIDA.  These experts are responsible for drawing various community 
maps and baselines, facilitating conceptual designs and procuring requisite/standard materials 
and the organization of workshops for training participants from the various communities.  Ing. 
Mahama indicates that the CWSA, in tandem with other external experts, constituted the 
District Water and Sanitation Plan.  The District Water and Sanitation Plan is a training 
programme for officials of the District Assemblies in areas of information collation and 
community needs assessment.  Essentially, this training functions to consolidate both water 
decentralization and privatization agendas.  In my view this is an integral part of the 
subjectification processes of inclusive liberalism.  
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As part of ensuring community ‘ownership’ and management of water systems, Ing. 
Mahama avers that two boards were established to boost the capacity of identified community 
members.  These two bodies, the Water and Sanitation board and the Water board, through 
expert-driven capacity-building training are tutored in water system maintenance and 
modalities for tariff setting.   I suggest that this belief in technical training as the epitome of 
capacity-building reduces the complex management of water systems to technical solutions.  
Technicalization of the problem is facilitated through the silencing of power imbalances and 
broader structural conditions within communities. Within this managerial prism, 
implementation issues and challenges are thereby reduced to capability motifs.  This 
reductionist, technical approach is symptomatic of the problematic linear assumptions and 
rationales that drive interventions.   
 
Political Dynamics of Community Water Supply and Management  
The selection of communities for siting of boreholes for water supplies in each community 
entails political contestations.  These contestations could be linked to the arbitrary nature of 
processes of community selection by the district assemblies.  An interrogation of the criteria 
for identifying communities for intervention reveals that the selection process is heavily 
influenced by local political systems and political party affiliations.   A group of residents 
interviewed in Yendi District indicate that their community has been denied the two boreholes 
meant for them because the community constitutes one of the strong-holds of the major 
opposition political party.  The logical conclusion here is that accessibility to water is beyond 
the technical diagnoses, and is rather underpinned by both formal and informal political 
practices.  Mr. A. Illiasu, of CLIP, also confirms that “the district assemblies not only select 
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sites for the boreholes but actually collect bribes from some communities before being 
selected.  In fact, I have encountered several problems when we go for approval for our 
boreholes that we earmark for certain communities.  They systematically slow you down 
purposely to induce you to give bribe before your request would be granted.” (A. Illiasu. 
Interviewed on August 14, 2011). What is evident in Illiasu’s response is the vibrancy of 
adverse or exclusionary interactional practices in the communities that are given further 
potency by ignorant, technically-oriented intentions.  These exclusionary practices manifest 
themselves in the abject exploitation of residents and ultimately ensure social closure to those 
outside the web of the patron-client network.   
Residents of the various communities impute the appointment of the District Chief 
Executive by the President of the Republic as being responsible for these non-accountable 
marginalization practices.  Further, Mr. Azong, who is a local resident in Yendi, suggests that 
the appointment of the District Chief Executive by the President has foreclosed upon the 
necessary and vital political space to demand responsive and accountable leadership.  In 
sharing his local governance experience with me, Mr. Azong proclaims that:  
I think this district assembly system, which was established to be the savior 
of the poor residents in the various communities in terms of fostering 
participatory development and meeting the interests of the people, is just 
an official mega lie by the government.  What I have observed over the 
years is the continuation of the old style of central planning. The worst 
situation is that with the return to democratic rule since 1993, the District 
Assemblies are seen an appendage of which political party is in power.  I 
don’t think the interests of the poor have been considered over the past 2 
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decades. Therefore, for the government to tell us that the district assembly 
is a way to bring government to the doorstep of the poor is unacceptable 
because the poor folks do not have any influence in the management of the 
assemblies.  
What is obvious from Mr. Azong’s comments is the failure of the depoliticized and technical 
assumption that decentralization, common in mainstream development thinking, is a vital 
partner to address development challenges of poverty.  A further essential point to note is that 
decentralization is not a substitute for the burdensome structural and relational conditions that 
have plagued the region.  These complex realities in the study region make me wonder why 
donor agencies keep pushing for a deepening of decentralization.  
It is quite striking to note that almost all of the officials of the aid agencies I 
interviewed unanimously endorse the strengthening of the district assemblies as a prerequisite 
for poverty reduction.  A confirmation is found in the testimony of Dr. Desroches, World Bank 
Lead Economist, when he posits:  
The position of the bank is that the central government is too weak to 
govern effectively to reduce poverty and promote security in the region.  It 
is for this reason we keep advising the government to marshall the 
necessary political will to support a successful decentralization system.  
The Bank over the years has committed significant resources to boost the 
capacity of the district and metropolitan assemblies. (Dr. Desroches. 
Interviewed on August 5, 2011). 
I suggest, however, that political will is not a main panacea to deep-seated institutional 
and structural challenges.  The contradictory aspect his response is the convenient 
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designation of the state as weak, but the same weak state is expected to mobilize strong 
political will.  I deem this a deductive assumption that equates political will to capacity-
building problematic because the critical poor state formation issues have been negated.   
Decentralization is also the instrumental agency preferred by the UN system.  A senior 
economist with the UNDP, Dr. Ndiaye, explained his organization’s position on 
decentralization and poverty reduction in the study region:   
This Northern Region, with its severe poverty and other development 
problems, needs more decentralization than ever and that is one of the 
major pieces of advice we have been offering to the government and the 
region.  The region is too remote from central government, and that is why 
we continue to use our expertise in governance to boost the capacity of 
staff of the various assemblies.  Our target is to enhance their capacities in 
the areas of planning, statistics, project and policy planning, financial 
management, monitoring and evaluation. (Dr. Ndiaye. Interviewed on 
September 21, 2011) 
It is important to point out, however, that the exact mechanisms by which the supposed 
decentralization would accrue benefits to the poor remain largely absent.  My position is that 
this decentralization is a perpetuation of expert-led intervention that lacks the capacity to 
transform relational deficiencies endemic within and outside the region.  I contend that Dr. 
Ndiaye and Dr. Desroches selectively ignore the adverse ramifications of global capitalist 
economic practices in order to conceal their complicity.  Continuous localization of problems 
by the aid actors rather obviates a critical examination of the rationales behind the preference 
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of the district assemblies.  These interventionist rationales tend to exclude wider institutional 
contexts that simultaneously impact districts. 
 
Conflict Resolution: A Key to unlock the Conflicts of the Northern Region?  
The security interventions that continue to take place in the Northern Region could be 
classified into two main approaches, namely the traditional approach/‘hard security’ in terms of 
peace-keeping and peace enforcement, which is undertaken by the Ghana Armed Forces and 
the Police Service.  The other approach which could be classified as ‘soft security’ are related 
to development aid agencies security related interventions.  These ‘soft security’ interventions 
include conflict resolution, formal peace accords, negotiated settlements and reconciliation.  It 
should be noted that these stated approaches reflect a hyper-conservative model of apolitical 
formal intervention.  The likely effect of these apolitical interventions is ‘negative security,’ 
because it fails to engage with conflict and insecurity in a constructive manner.  I use the term 
‘negative security’ to denote the inability to search for long-term approaches to the insecurity 
challenge, which, in reality, only amount to the deferment of insecurity.  The genesis of the 
active aid agencies security interventions in the Northern Region was instigated by the alleged 
poor state handling of the 1994 Nanumba -Konkomba War. In fact, the government was 
blamed by the Catholic Relief Services for its lethargic approach to seeking a lasting solution 
to the conflict crises, a position reiterated by Mr. Morgan to me. 
The other traditional approach undertaken by the state, as noted in chapter three, is the 
constitution of commission of inquiries.  The thrusts of these commissions are to investigate 
and identify perpetrators for prosecution, and make recommendations to enhance resolution of 
the problem. It needs to be restated that the perceived mistrust between the ethnic groups and 
191 
 
governments constitutes a major reason for the lack of enforcement of the recommendations 
past commission of inquiries. So also are the non-functional institutional and administrative 
structures that hinder implementation of recommendations.  
  Beyond the weak institutional quality is an issue of state’s unwillingness to implement 
numerous recommendations.  According to Dr. Aning, the Director of Research at the Kofi 
Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre:  
The numerous commissions of inquiries set by the governments over the 
past decades and recent ones are mere gimmick.  In fact, they are sheer 
impression management ploy to showcase government’s seriousness to the 
international community in maintaining security and stability in Northern 
Ghana. The reality is that there are state actors who have stake in the 
conflict and instability in the region; therefore, full implementation of these 
numerous recommendations should not be expected.   
Clearly the inevitable political nature of the implementation invalidates these 
recommendations. The search for the implementation of recommendations would require 
critical social and political analysis.  The question of how to manage these entrenched interests 
should be given considerable priority in the search for long-lasting solution.    
Another point to note is that there is no clear linkage between the state security forces 
and the development and relief agencies.  Significantly, an interview with Colonel J. A. 
Adams, of the MOD confirms this non-working relationship between the two independent 
actors, which is contrary to what the mainstream development and security literature appears to 
suggest.  Col. Adams supported his claims when he posits that:  
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The military’s main duty is to foster stability and security of the region, 
after that we leave.  In fact, when we stabilized the situation after the 1994 
guinea fowl war, we had to vacate to base for other deployments.  We do 
not have any working relation with the development and humanitarian 
organizations.  In case there is an infrastructural break down like bridges, 
we deploy the field engineers regiment as part of restoring normal life to 
the communities. (J. Adams, Interviewed on September 3, 2011) 
The absence of working relationships challenges the possibility of forging coordinated 
relationships among the actors as expressed in the DSN literature. It is this linkage issue among 
development and security actors that the UN JHSP seeks to foster to prevent conflict and 
reduce poverty in the region. Col. Adams response implies that the interventions on both the 
security and development ends are geared towards the short-term.  Underlying this short-term 
horizon of intervention are the problem-solving rationales that do not aim at addressing the root 
causes of the problem.  
Respondents in some of the communities interviewed expressed serious reservations 
about the state security forces being deployed to intervene in conflicts.  They contend that the 
militant force that the army and police usually apply has created yet another level of tension 
between some local residents and state security forces. There was reported partiality relative to 
these peace- keeping operations, which has led to violent clashes between the feuding parties 
and state security.  As a matter of fact, an 80 year-old interviewee disclosed to me that the 
military patrol was akin to the colonial administration, because in most cases they support the 
group that the government supports.  In support of such a response, Luttwark (1999) and 
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MacGinty (2010) also notice the tendency of state apparatuses to take sides and are especially 
biased towards the preferred faction. 
As I stated earlier, the 1994/95 gruesome Konkomba-Nanumba War was the main 
factor that instigated international aid security interventions in the Northern Region.   The main 
security framework was conflict resolution, which was a short-term liberal peace oriented 
project.  Furthermore, the involvement of aid agencies was stimulated by the high levels of 
destruction to development projects, which I would suggest was an attempt to draw a linkage 
between development and conflict in the Northern Region.  Thus the war, according to Bogner 
(2000, 2009), was blamed for the ruin of the development fortunes of the region. This led to the 
formation of the Inter-NGO Consortium (henceforth will be referred to as the Consortium) that 
works in the areas of humanitarian and development assistance.  The members of Consortium 
were Action Aid Ghana, Action on Disability and Development, Amaschina Self-help 
Association, Assemblies of God Development and Relief Services, Business Advisory 
Development and Consultancy Centre, Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Secretariat, Council 
of Churches, Gub-Katimali Society, Lifeline Denmark, Penorudas, Oxfam, Red Cross, 
Tiyumba Development Association and World Vision.   
Through selective processes of adoption, the expert-led Nairobi Peace Initiative model 
was adopted.  The operating philosophy of the Nairobi Peace Initiative, according to Bogner 
(2009), was mediation and peace building.   The consortium, given its short-term orientation, 
rejected the peace building aspect.  According to Mr. G. Morgan of the Catholic Relief 
Services, the primary focus of the intervention was reconciliation and mediation through 
negotiated peace agreements.  Pertinent to this decision was the convening of consultative 
meetings among diverse stakeholders: youth associations, chiefs, religious leaders, 
194 
 
parliamentarians.  In my view, this quest to address the complex political contestations through 
reconciliation sidestepped the root causes of conflict and insecurity.  The consultative 
processes fit into what Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Cleaver (2005) refer to as ‘invited 
participation,’ whereby the invited parties were to be tutored on the importance of living in 
peace.  
 I contend that this kind of invited participation is akin to the colonial ‘civilizing 
mission’.  The civilizing mission as explained by Huntington (1968), declares that colonized 
African societies lack instrumental institutions and value systems to create conditions for their 
peaceful co-existence.   Huntington (1968) further suggests that external tutelage of civilized 
societies is the main solution to these ‘primitive’ and ‘barbaric’ modes of existence.  North 
(1981) also reiterates a similar cultural superiority argument when he postulates that the fixity 
of customs and tradition of African societies are responsible for their poor developmental 
outcomes.  Hence, it is the duty of the international development community to develop 
autonomous subjects who can exercise rational choices to optimize social and economic 
outcomes.  Thus, the ‘invited participation’ of the residents in Northern Region could be seen 
as being framed as attempting to involve ‘uncivilized citizens’ by aid agencies.  These invited 
participants are expected to uphold with new values and beliefs that will make them behave as 
rational subjects and thereby ensure peaceful coexistence.   
There was a strong emphasis on peace but one that was devoid of critical engagement 
with the proximate and structural dynamics of the contestations.  A former Nawuri participant 
in one of the consultations opines:  
These NGOs only invited us to come and be taught how to promote 
brotherly living with our neighbors.  But they forget that our ancestors 
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have lived with each other for centuries, so what is new about this teaching 
of brotherhood. We are not barbaric to be attacking each other.  I can tell 
you that it is never our wish to fight the other ethnic groups, however, for 
how long can we be denied our rights due to our minority status created by 
the British ‘looters’. (Mr. Adamu, Interview date- September 14, 2011) 
This response is a counter-response to the normalization of conflict and insecurity, a practice 
that defies short-term responses.  Again, this buttresses my argument that the international 
development aid security practices constitute an interventionist streak that is incapable of 
addressing relational problems because its inherent rationales and assumptions are problematic. 
Another former participant from the Konkomba ethnic group also faulted the ethnic 
composition of the various committees formed to promote the reconciliation goal.  He states: 
We were told that each and every ethnic group would be given equal stake 
in the negotiating processes. To my shock! The ethnic make-up of the 
various negotiating committees was dominated by people from the 
majority groups.  I felt alienated and asked myself; who will listen to me?  
How would these people from the chiefdoms accommodate my grievances 
and how can these NGOs assure me of their neutrality and commitment 
towards lasting security of our great region (Mr. Abukari, Interviewed on 
September 7, 2011). 
These responses attest to the complexity of conflict-generated insecurity in the region, where 
social justice claims appear to be salient. Therefore, construing complex problems into 
simplistic technical diagnostics through reconciliation, in my view, may, at best, provide an 
ephemeral relief, or what could be termed a fragmented or fragile peace with no long-term 
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promising future.  What is noticeable from above that is the attempt to maintain unequal 
relations between the majority and minority ethnic groups.  The maintenance of the status quo 
emerges out of the position that the representatives of the chiefdoms came as traditional 
custodians of the minority groups.  The representatives of the chiefdoms as noted by McGaffey 
(2006) were not to be challenged as for example the Dagbon custom requires from minority 
groups. Thus, the traditional political weight of the chiefdom’s representation neutralized the 
mediating role of the Consortium.   
Again, this contestable ethnic composition reflects the weakness in a rational 
choice/liberal reconciliation approach as it enters into a non-western society.  The field of 
articulation is not seamless, but driven by unequal power relations that generate its internal 
contestations.   Furthermore, the chaotic space of articulation depicts the active and 
unpredictable political forces at play; therefore privileging technical security solutions through 
reconciliation becomes an illusory project.  These complex processes confirm the futility of 
participation that is framed from the beginning as a supposed ‘egalitarian participatory’ effort.  
It is no wonder that this peace negotiation did not resolve the fundamental issues of 
contestation, and thereby sustained the tension in the region.  The current tension in the region 
has been confirmed by an official of the UNU and will be discussed in chapter five.  
Interestingly, the UN JHSP has adopted similar reconciliation and peace education 
programmes contrary to its DSN framework aimed at conflict prevention.  This creates an 
impression of perpetuation of business as usual aid practice.    
This Consortium was made to work in parallel to the GoG-established Permanent Peace 
Negotiating Team, which was also a conflict mediation entity mandated to forge peace and 
security among the contesting factions.  In addition to the Permanent Peace Negotiating Team, 
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the UN was engaged to provide technical assistance to the GoG in mediation efforts.  I need to 
stress the point that, due to institutional disagreements between the State and Consortium, the 
Consortium was confined to working only at the local level.  On the other hand, the Permanent 
Peace Negotiating Team as part of its formal conflict resolution persuasion worked with 
official representatives of the feuding parties.   
After numerous contestations in the negotiation processes through the Kumasi 1- 3 
peace building processes, the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation was signed on 
March 30, 1996 by representatives of the majority and minority groups.  These peace accords, 
however, did not translate into improved living conditions, a transformation of political 
relations, or the improvement of interpersonal relations.  The continuous tension among the 
groups as stated in chapter three attests to the inability of the peace accords to resolve the 
contestations.  Evidently, this expertly-designed peace accord depoliticized the ethnic and other 
salient identities and failed to address historical relational roots of the conflicts.    
The main thrust of the Nairobi Peace Initiative’s reconciliation agenda was to promote 
peace education and create a trans-ethnic organization to mobilize youth groups to serve as the 
foundation for enduring peace in the region.  Following the signing of the Peace and 
Reconciliation agreement, the Northern Region Youth and Development Association 
(NORYDA) was formed to carry out the peace education mission and promote youth 
development.  This primary focus on youth is another form of securitization of disparate 
groups as the source of insecurity in the Northern Region.  In fact, this narrow securitization 
policy ignores the indeterminate driving motivations and incentives behind conflict-instigated 
insecurity as well as the broader historical, political, and economic relational forces.  Notably, 
a primacy on youth reflects Collier’s (2003) ‘youth bulge’ dictum as one of the factors that 
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causes of conflict and insecurity in SSA.  Again, I contend that this ‘youth bulge’ factor fails to 
indicate any comprehensive understanding of the triggers of conflict and insecurity in most 
SSA countries.  As a newly established organization, NORYDA was assigned specific 
responsibilities, including the formation of peace committees to educate people in the region 
about tolerance, developing ways to control the inflow of weapons into the region, being 
involved in the resettlement and reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas by mobilizing 
resources from NGOs as well as government, and to function as a  catalyst for the overall 
economic development of the Northern Region by galvanizing interest from inside and outside 
the country (Assefa, 2001, p.177).  Thus the formation of NORYDA was an attempt at a joint 
articulation of security and development, but did not actually manifest in reality.  The heavy-
loaded responsibilities of NORYDA raised vital questions about the assumptions that informed 
these ambitious responsibilities.  Furthermore, the NORYDA was programmed to fail as an 
organization because it lacked the fundamental relational resources to address its burdensome 
responsibilities.     
As usual, capacity building was deemed as the catalytic factor in NORYDA’s quest to 
discharge the stated responsibilities.  An official of Ghana Network for Peacebuilding 
(GHANEP), Mr. Y. Adongo suggested to me that: “GHANEP, through expert training received 
from the UNDP technical team also facilitated training to the leadership of NORYDA in the 
areas of forging communal relationships, advocacy against violence and conflict and the 
settlement of disputes and misunderstandings.” (Y. Adongo. Interviewed on September 9, 
2011). Mr. Adongo, however, did not appreciate that there is a limit to what capacity building 
can influence in terms of structural and institutional rigidities.  It should also be acknowledged 
that the institutional forms do not easily translate into perfect or optimal institutional functions.  
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Therefore, simply training members of NORYDA did not translate automatically into the 
achievement of imposed responsibilities. 
The complexity of insecurity defies technical rendering.  Hence, a neglect of the 
complex relational underpinnings make such a thinly-veneered intervention doomed to fail.   
There was much anticipated disintegration of NORYDA’s mandate almost immediately after 
its formation.  A local informant proclaims: ‘NORYDA only exists on paper because it lacks 
recognition by the various youth groups in the region.’  A further investigation points to the 
failed functionalist thinking of amalgamating diverse identities into homogenous entity.   The 
distinct politicized differences were too resilient to be ignored by the Consortium.  The 
apparent rejection of the Peace Agreement and NORYDA by minority ethnic groups such as 
the Konkombas, Nawuris and Nchumurus was not surprising.  The rejection was initiated by 
the dominant Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA), who felt that their pressing demands 
were not met by the organization.  A former member of the KOYA, who granted me an 
interview, explained to me as follows, “I knew from day one of the futility of the negotiated 
settlement and formation of voluntaristic regional youth group that we were not committed to.  
The organizers did not listen to our views, so we had no choice than to kick against it” (Mr. 
Baba Musa).  These deeply political contestations require deeper processes to engage with the 
fundamental underpinnings of the poverty problem.  It is therefore to be expected that when 
there is no space for grievances to be addressed, failure is the likely outcome.   
There remains an important question relative to the cultural acceptability of this kind of 
conflict resolution mechanism.  Some research participants informed me that they have their 
own culturally acceptable customs and norms when it comes to addressing feuds.  The effect of 
this cultural rejection has been manifested in some respondents ridiculing activities such as 
200 
 
‘fanfares’ where ammunitions are burnt to signal end of conflict.  This failure of the conflict 
resolution strategy, according to Jönsson (2007; 2009) may be due to gross disregard of the 
political vibrancy of these ethnic groups.  The vibrancy of the Konkombas, for instance, could 
be linked to the reconstruction of their pre-colonial independent social relations to support their 
current quest for political autonomy.  Further interactions with members of the community 
suggest that they favour an informal negotiation of grievances over time to this elusive search 
for peace.  
 
Implications of Neoliberal Development Policies on Conflict Prone Regions   
Though aid agencies push for further domestic reforms in the Northern Region, without 
changes in the global economy, there will be no transformation in the development and 
security conditions of the region.  The current development aid agencies operating in the region 
using Anderson’s (1996) ‘Do No Harm’ maxim only localizes problems and fails to address 
wider factors.  The cumulative effect of this localizing of poverty and insecurity conundrums 
absolves the aid industry and donor countries, particularly the Anglo-American imperialists, of 
their global complicity.  It must be noted that the Northern Region is adversely integrated into 
the global economy, a fact that mimics Ferguson’s (2006) suggestion that SSA countries reflect 
the negative aspects of globalization. These unfavorable terms can be located in the effects of 
unfair global policies of trade liberalization that impacted negatively on the pricing and 
production of peasant crops such as rice and tomatoes.   
Particularly, the liberal trade regime has caused significant debilitating effects in 
vulnerable regions, which are missed when problems are analyzed from a state-centric 
perspective.  According to Khor (2006, p. 26), Ghana’s trade liberalization practices of the 
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SAP era displaced a substantially high number of people, including tomato farmers from their 
vocation in the Northern Region.  Significantly, liberalization has also been a result of the 
IMF/World Bank policy of the conditionality of subsidy removal.  Thus this subsidy removal 
increased the operational costs of the peasant farmers, whose product prices then became non-
competitive with those from highly subsidized economies like the EU and USA.  An elderly 
research participant who had to migrate to the national capital in search of a daily sustenance 
had this to say: “I was once a prosperous farmer in the 1970s, when the government supported 
us and we could rely on family members in times of need.  I was able to educate my children to 
the secondary school level. Nowadays things are tough for us so this uncertain migration 
becomes the only option for survival.”(Mama Abiba. Interviewed on July 31, 2011). The socio-
economic displacement of this strong-willed woman cannot be attributed purely to 
unsupportive domestic factors alone.  Certainly, the unfair international political economy 
cannot be exonerated in predisposing many peasants such as this woman into quagmire 
circumstances. 
The effects of the SAP affect the rice sector to the extent that most farmers in the 
Northern Region have been impoverished.  An attestation to the debilitating effects of trade 
liberalization as narrated by the Tamale Rice Coalition appears here:  
In the 1970’s, Tamale used to be known as the ‘rice city,’ and with good 
reason.  There was every prospect that the northern region could supply the 
nation’s rice needs within a decade…Rice in the Northern Region is a pale 
shadow of its previous self… There is still a coalition of rice farmers in 
Tamale, which meets regularly to deliberate on the state of rice farmers in 
the region.  When they meet these days they bemoan the state of the 
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industry instead of its prospects, as was the case in the 1970s…the 
coalition believes that it is still possible for the northern region to capture 
its glory days in rice production but for this to happen that government has 
to intervene.  This means reversing the trend that began with the 
introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme, which introduced the 
removal of agricultural subsidies (ActionAid, 2005, p.35)   
The dismal situation for current rice farmers might not get better, especially considering the 
demand for deepening liberalization of the agricultural sector as seen in the current WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture.  The ultimate goal of the Agreement on Agriculture is to ensure 
zero tariffs for agricultural imports.  Even more disturbing is the loss of legislative autonomy in 
the Northern Region that occurred in 2005 when, at the instance of a directive from the IMF, 
the Parliament of Ghana had to reverse its rice import tariff adjustment bill.  This bill increased 
the tariff for imported rice from 20% to 25% in order to protect local production (Oxfam, 2005, 
p. 9).  This loss of legislative autonomy leads to a bleak outlook for domestic farmers in 
Northern Region, especially against the backdrop of prevailing domestic, structural, policy and 
institutional bottlenecks.   
The problem is compounded even further by pressure being put on the GoG to fully 
ratify the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union.  The Economic 
Partnership Agreement is framed on the notion of a partnership, with sole emphasis on market 
access through the elimination of trade restrictions, including further tariff reduction for 
agricultural goods from 2015.  From the European Union end, the Economic Partnership 
Agreement is justified as a pact to open wider markets for Ghana’s export base to compensate 
for revenue loss due to the tariff reduction. This European Union’s overriding market 
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orientation, however, is not sound.  Because accessibility to global markets is determined by 
the productive capacity, infrastructure, standard testing means, effective research and 
development and sound socio-economic institutions of the country, not by be sheer adoption of 
laissez faire policy as the Economic Partnership Agreement appears to suggest.   
Another contentious issue that remains unaddressed as of now is the terms of the 
pricing of the products grown in the Northern Region.  The pricing issue is vital given the 
historically disproportionate balance of power in price determination by the dominant 
European Union economies.  Furthermore, just as the SAP virtually colonized the policy and 
governing landscape of the Ghanaian economy, the potential for the European Union to 
recolonize the country cannot be ignored.  The donor community already has significant 
leverage over the broad governance systems of Ghana and most SSA countries.  Thus, the 
traditional Westphalian notion of absolute sovereignty typifies a mere fantasy or what 
Ferguson (2006), describes as contingent sovereignty as the existing reality.  The likely 
consequences of these exploitative international and global political and economic relations 
will aggravate the poverty situation in the Northern Region, a situation that is akin to the 
colonial era deprivation practice.   
Under the interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the GoG and the 
European Union, there will be an 80% drop in import duty over 15 years dating from 2008, and 
though essential products such as tomatoes have been eliminated under the interim agreement, 
it is not clear whether they will be included in the final Economic Partnership Agreement. The 
FAO (2006, p. 1-3) reports a 70% increase in rice importation for the period 1998-2004 in 
Ghana, with United States accounting for 33% of the country’s rice imports. Domestic 
production, however, reduced to the average to 150,000 tons per annum, with the effect that 
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domestic rice production reduced from 43% in 2000 to 29% in 2003.  The dire effects of this 
reduction on the poor farmers in the Northern Region cannot be underestimated, considering 
that the region constitutes the rice basket of the economy.   
The adverse effects of this liberalized rice import regime become more critical due to 
the high number of small-scale rice farmers who account for the bulk of the production.  
According to the World Bank (2007, b), at least 70% of rice production in Northern Region is 
done by rural-based small hold farmers.  The pertinent question, then, is how pro poor these 
interventions on the part of donor agencies are, when rice production and distribution is 
constrained by the global policies and international commodity market?  The answer stems 
from the complex neo-colonial unfair global development institutions that have substantially 
weakened Ghana’s socio-economic prospects with its relations with the developed world. 
Global development institutions, given their heavy presence in developing countries, seek to 
regulate and control the policy and political spaces of SSA economies.  Underlying the limited 
policy and political autonomy of SSA economies are the unfair rules of global economic 
relations in trade, finance, investment and essential services.  This relation is further worsened 
by the laissez faire globalization practice of deepened liberalization that effect finance, trade, 
investment and services.   
I view this global policy push for market access as a catalyst for poverty reduction as a 
simplistic approach to avoid the unequal global political economy.  The market access policy 
directive is a misplaced priority insofar as the structures and processes that shape, produce and 
reproduce poverty and insecurity are unaddressed.  Critical issues of the nature of state 
practices and formation, social relations and history are thereby stripped off the diagnostic 
template.  The vital question that remains relates to why the aid agencies are not interested in 
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addressing the adverse global relations.  Noticeable are the monotonous rhetorical statements 
about global partnership.  From my analytical perspective, a regional empirical assessment of 
the implications of these global policy frameworks and the practices that accompany them 
would be appropriate.  The regional appropriateness lies in the blurring effect of state centric 
studies.   
The pursuit of development-focused poverty reduction and security cannot be reduced 
to technical solutions.  Ferguson’s (2006) suggestions have been that the working principles of 
the aid community are to de-politicize a complex problem.  The essence of this depoliticization 
is to categorize problems in unproblematic, non-relational terms that allow for technical 
solutions.  I further suggest that these unequal global governance practices continue to shape 
and produce the unjust and inequitable decision-making processes which have affected the 
Northern Region.  In addressing this lopsidedness, Hettne (2010, p.47) suggests that the focus 
of aid agencies should be directed at correcting global injustices.  Therefore, the emphasis on 
deepening liberal oriented development and security interventions that rarely address the 
poverty and conflict challenges require rethinking.  
Another crucial factor that is usually glossed over by both the donor countries and 
international development institutions is the historical trajectory of western-developed 
economies.  I therefore concur with Wade, who argues against the denial of poor countries 
from practicing protectionist policies: 
Almost all now developed countries went through stages of industrial 
assistance policy before their capacities of their firms reached the point 
where a policy of (more or less) free trade was declared to be in the 
national interest.  Britain was protectionist when it was trying to catch up 
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with Holland…The United States was protectionist when trying to catch up 
with both Britain and Germany, right up to the end of World War II.  Japan 
was protectionist for most of the twentieth century up to the 1970s, Koreas 
and Taiwan to the 1990s. (2003, p. 9)  
If protectionism was instrumental in the phenomenal growth and development of now-
developed countries, certainly struggling SSA countries must be given the autonomous policy 
space to protect its local base.  In so doing, the poor rice and other farmers at least will not be 
wiped out by the external forces that continue to invade the local economy as a result of liberal 
trade regime.  Therefore, a call for the restoration of historical justice will be an appropriate 
option. 
A cursory assessment of the development and security interventions suggests to me that 
they were undertaken by aid agencies to serve other purposes.  I deem contemporary 
interventions are the replication of colonial development practices as a form of a neocolonial 
‘civilizing mission.’  The pursuit of these lame interventions in the name of development and 
security, as the unfolding evidence from my fieldwork suggests, constitutes an unbridled 
attempt to maintain unequal relations between rich and poor economies.  
The analyses advanced thus far in relation to interventions from mainstream aid actors 
indicate its inability to secure the region. This ongoing tension and fragile stability in the 
region portends the weakness in the positivistic assumptions and rationales of the interventions.  
I suggest that the development and security challenges of poverty and insecurity in the region 
must be examined from a broader lens of dialectical social change.  This will entail a critical 
assessment of the nature of state formation after over a century of colonialism, the past and 
current adverse incorporation of the region in the national and global economy.  Therefore, the 
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UN JHSP, with its emphasis on the joint articulation of development and security activities 
cannot secure Northern Region.  Chapter five will deal extensively with UN JHSP prospects.  I 
will suggest further that the failure of the past and existing interventions have, to a significant 
extent, necessitated the formulation of DSN as an emancipatory or transformational approach.  
Whether the DSN is a new framework or not will be examined thoroughly in chapter five.    
The search for the means to address poverty and insecurity challenges from a critical 
development and security perspective must entail processes beyond the narrow confines of the 
current liberal project.  This will necessitate a significant change in the ideological and 
normative persuasions of the dominant aid actors in order to appreciate the specific ways in 
which development and security challenges can be viewed as a necessary catalyst for 
transformational change.  Such transformational changes in both the domestic and international 
political economies are needed instead of the current myopic, static, ahistorical and apolitical 
interventions. There is an indispensable need to correct the historical and contemporary 
injustices meted out to disparate groups within the region.  In my thinking, the demand for 
justice is crucial now.  I view emancipatory justice as an integral part of a long search for 
sustained broad social change.   The search for such emancipatory change is necessary for the 
transformation of the region in the wake of the disappointing outcome of the hollow liberal 
project.  
Transformational change will require a thorough shifting of approach from the apparent 
failed ‘consensus prone’ governmental approaches towards long-term processes that recognize 
the politics of difference, the everyday struggles and the politics of the region.  This politics of 
difference, which underlines the dialectical social change, will involve pursuing the diverse 
strategies aimed at promoting efforts to enhance effective state society relations in the Northern 
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Region.  Essentially, processes towards confronting the unequal power relations within the 
region and state must be embraced.  The current ahistorical and apolitical interventions tend to 
consolidate the status quo which is inimical to the long quest to secure the region.  It is 
therefore urgent to pursue long-term, sustained approaches that are not reducible to calcified 
results based indicators.  
There will be an urgent need to undertake long-term processes of institutional 
development that will generate equitable rules and practices to enhance state-society relations.  
In my view, it is time for aid agencies to abandon standardized toolkits and recognize the 
complex political projects they were designed to address.  Aid agencies must be prepared to 
pursue unorthodox approaches that will be informed by specific history and grounded realities.   
Another area that requires reconsideration is the negative effect of conflict on 
development (including poverty).  Such deductive linkages have been underpinned by a narrow 
instrumental assumption that external interventions in each sector will necessarily secure the 
region. Efforts must be directed towards recognition of conflict, insecurity and under-
development as reflections of systemic institutional failures that will not benefit from short-
term or quick fixes.  The logical implication I posit is that it is time to avoid privileging non-
relational interventionist catchphrases like ‘conflict trap’, ‘capability trap’ and ‘poverty trap’.  
In my view, such buzzwords consistently tend to simplify the development and security 
challenges and ultimately resort to ‘crisis management’ technical solutions. Therefore, it 
behooves aid agencies to avoid the expert inspired transplantation of best practices and the 
idealized imaginations.  
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Concluding remarks 
In summary, I have analyzed the broad, liberal-oriented development and security interventions 
by multiple aid agencies in the Northern Region from the mid-1990s.  The reality is that these 
interventions, from the conceptualization to implementation processes, have been driven by 
positivistic rationales and assumptions.  Security-related interventions from the state were and 
still appear to be conservative in approach. In addition, the security interventions articulated by 
the aid agencies, however, were geared towards conflict resolution through peace accords and 
reconciliation instruments.  
 The agricultural interventions as managed by the NRGP are heavily supply-side driven 
and the evidence so far does not suggest appreciable support to peasants.  Also, the supply-side 
interventions have capacity building as one of the vital approaches with market access as the 
overriding strategy.  Comprising the market access biased interventions are group formation, 
facilitation of commodity chains, supply of inputs and skill training.  The water sector 
intervention was also analyzed. In particular, the essential processes that enabled the water 
privatization and deregulation were analyzed.  It needs to be reiterated that the underlying 
orientation of this intervention is to reregulate water supply and management through 
community.  An inevitable phenomenon of this intervention is the resistance and contestation 
that defined the deeply political character of the water resource itself.  The effect is that 
accessibility to water remains conditioned by an unfettered process in which case 
marginalization of communities is the reality.   
A number of neglected domestic factors in regard to the agricultural interventions have 
been analyzed.  Core issues such as neglect of shea-nut crops, structural and institutional 
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constraints of peasants and the nature of the overall agricultural policy regime were examined.  
More importantly, external factors vital to the transformation of the Northern Region to address 
its development and poverty conditions were assessed.  
Various security interventions by aid agencies were given critical assessment.  These 
interventions were largely underpinned by a liberal orientation.  Hence, conflict resolution was 
the framework for these interventions.  The main instruments of this conflict resolution 
framework were peace accords and reconciliation.  On the basis of the intractable nature of the 
conflict dynamics in the Northern Region, these approaches failed to resolve the contestations.  
The crux of my argument is that conflict resolution as a framework lacks critical 
epistemological orientation and realistic rationales and assumptions to address the conflict 
dynamics in the Northern Region.  More importantly, a failure to address the underlying 
dynamics of these conflicts was marked by total rejection of the peace accords by minority 
groups.  Also the NORYDA, which was formed to be a conduit for peace education and 
reconciliation, was dysfunctional in the discharge of its stated duties.  
The intractable nature of the development and security challenges in the region could 
be linked to the interplay of multiple critical factors.  Among these factors are capitalist 
production practices, the nature of state formation, global development policies and internal 
relational dynamics in the region itself.  These factors, from the analyses advanced, 
significantly contribute to the complexity of the security and development challenges in the 
region.  In view of the complex nature of the problems at hand, I suggest that time-bound and 
ill-conceived donor interventions cannot address them in a constructive way.   
I posit that local contexts are not the bane of interventions; instead it is incumbent on 
the aid agencies to reconsider their epistemological, ontological and ideological orientations.  
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From the context of the Northern Region, a recognition that the field of intervention is 
complex, dynamic and constitutes an open system needs to be made.  Therefore, imposing 
input-output technical interventions will not yield any transformational impact. The quest to 
address the development and security challenges of the Northern Region will require, as earlier 
stated, sustained dialectical social change suffused with an indeterminate number of 
interlocking systems and processes.  Hence, the marginal tinkering of the complex challenge 
by the aid agencies, in my judgment, might exacerbate the problem rather than solving it.  
The inability of the diverse aid agencies to prevent conflict and reduce poverty in the 
region led to formulation of DSN as the potent framework.  Thus the next chapter deals with 
the UN JHSP programme, which exemplifies the DSN as its interventionist framework.  A 
salient point to note is that the UNJHSP is operationalized through Human Security, which is 
one of the frameworks under the DSN.  This chapter five will essentially examine whether this 
Human Security framework has the knack to transform and secure the region as its proponents 
suggest.   
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Chapter Five 
Human Security Interventions in the Northern Region 
 
Introduction 
The discrete, region-wide development and security interventions that I examined in Chapter 
four could not secure the Northern Region, especially when it came to conflict prevention and 
poverty reduction. Furthermore, the UNDP has labeled the current state of Northern Region as 
a post-conflict society because the last major hostility occurred in 2002.  The essence of this 
post-conflict designation of the Northern Region is that the requisite interventions needed to 
secure the region must be anchored around DSN.  This translates into a joint articulation of 
conflict prevention and poverty reduction strategies to transform the region.  An underlying 
expectation in conflict prevention, as noted by Uvin (2008), is a focus on the root causes of 
conflicts and instability.  The Human Security framework, which is one of the main 
components of DSN, has been adopted by the UNDP as an underlying strategy to secure the 
Northern Region.  According to Gasper (2006), the human Security framework places the 
‘human’ at the center of interventions to ensure the transformation and emancipation of people 
and communities. The human security framework constitutes one of the most preferred options 
for the reconstruction of post-conflict regions with the goal of securing people and 
communities (Bueger &Vennensson, 2009, p. 16; Duffield, 2007, p. 111).  How this human 
security translates on the ground, however, should constitute an area of investigation.  
A significant problem in relation to the normative instrumental claims of the human 
security framework/approach is a neglect of the underlying assumptions and rationales of 
practical interventions.  Relevant rationales to consider are: the possibility of change through 
externally conceived frameworks, the localization of problems, the inevitability of external 
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tutelage, and the desirability of intervention.  The underlying assumptions in this framework 
are beliefs in technical and managerial solutions based on expert knowledge and the 
unproblematic transfer of technical solutions.  Another assumption in this framework is that the 
empowerment of an individual, independent of the relational structures involved, holds the key 
to both conflict prevention and poverty reduction.  
  A second major issue of concern is the limited attention given to empirical 
investigations into the underlying drivers of the human security framework.  I suggest that, to 
authenticate the transformational attribute of human security, its foundational pillars must be 
examined.  The goals of this chapter, therefore, are to examine the pivotal drivers of the human 
security framework and the way the rationales and assumptions on which the interventions 
have been based have been implemented in the Tamale Metropolis and some parts of Yendi of 
the Northern Region.   
A core aspect of the orthodox international intervention literature on human security is 
the dominance of constructed conflict prevention prospects rather than empirical investigation 
of those claims.  Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 35) deem human security as a 
comprehensive development and security framework that would formulate effective policies to 
reduce poverty and conflict.  Within the mainstream literature, Mack (2004 and 2005) frames 
human security as a smooth amalgamation or coordination of development and security 
practices to prevent conflict and stimulate poverty reduction.   In addition to these instrumental 
views on human security, the proposal document for the UN JHSP reinforces the imagined 
integrative nature of the human security framework as an effective merger of development and 
security.  The UN JHSP proposal document states: 
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The afore-mentioned projects and programs have contributed to tackling 
various aspects of the human security challenges in Northern Ghana.  
However, these activities have not strategically linked conflict preventions 
and livelihoods/capacity development to ensure sustainable peace and 
development in communities.  Thus this will be the first program which 
addresses multifaceted challenges of Northern Ghana, aiming at conflict 
prevention, through holistic, community-based, and preventative measures. 
(UN, 2009, p. 10)   
I contend, however, that to ascribe co-ordination problems as the bane of the development and 
security interventions in Northern Region is a simplistic recognition of the complex problems 
on hand.  I suggest that to make co-ordination a precondition for the successful joint 
articulation of the development and security interventions is to normalize interventionist 
rationales and assumptions.   
The key argument of this chapter, therefore, on the basis of the information gathered 
during my fieldwork, is that the human security framework lacks any transformational power 
whatsoever.  Instead, it is a strategy used to perpetuate liberal, economic, and political doctrine 
in conflict prone regions.  To facilitate critical analysis, the UN JHSP will be analyzed within 
the context of dominant development policy frameworks and the historical social relational 
underpinnings of Northern Region.  The UN JHSP’s main implementation instruments are thin 
on community driven empowerment, capacity building, empowerment and participatory 
programs. The adequacy of these approaches to secure the region will be examined critically. 
The argument of this chapter proceeds in three parts. Section one examines the 
orthodox international development orientations of the human security framework.  The aim of 
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this section is to demonstrate that the UN JHSP is essentially an amalgamation of existing 
liberal development policy frameworks.  The human security framework, without any stretch 
of imagination, lacks any heterodox or new revolutionary policy initiative.  Section two 
discusses specific interventions under the rubric of development and security.  The main thrust 
of this section is to expose the rationales, assumptions, complexities, contestations and 
contradictions inherent in the deployment of tangible interventions in the real world of the 
Northern Region.  The third section encapsulates the concluding part of the chapter, which 
weighs in on the implications of the inability on the part of aid agencies to secure the region 
under the auspices of the acclaimed preventative and transformational UN JHSP.  This section 
also reiterates the need to rethink the interventionist rationale of the UN JHSP.  This necessity 
for rethinking informs the next chapter, which deals with implementation challenges.  The 
operational challenges encountered have been framed by the aid industry as capacity and 
coordination constraints.   
This chapter relies on empirical data obtained in the course of my fieldwork, through 
in-depth interviews with officials of the UNDP, and UNU, identified local residents in Tamale 
and officers of TAMA.  It also relies on information obtained from my interview with 
government officials of the MOD and MOF and a reading of relevant policy documents has 
been utilized when necessary to support the key arguments.  
 
Drivers of the Human Security Framework 
It is critical to understand the normative meanings that conditioned the programming of UN 
JHSP as an interventionist framework to secure the Northern Region.  A senior official of the 
program, Mr. Animzoya, suggested to me that the operational understanding of the UN JHSP is 
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based on the Commission of Human Security 2005 report’s definition of human security.  
From the 2005 report, Mr. Animzoya offers the following definition of human security: 
To protect the vital core of all human life in ways that enhance freedoms 
and human fulfillment.  Human security means protecting fundamental 
freedoms- freedoms that are the essence of life.  It means protecting people 
from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations.  It 
means using the processes that build on people strength and aspirations.  It 
means creating political, social and environmental, economic and military 
and cultural systems that together give people building blocks of survival, 
livelihood and dignity (Mack, 2005, p. 4)  
Noticeable in the definition is that the human security framework is predisposed to alter the 
referent object and dimensions of security.  The cardinal change in the referent object of 
security is the shift from a realist -preferred focus on state or territory toward a focus on 
individuals and groups, as well as communities.  This new turn towards people-centered 
security syncs with the neo-liberal ideological focus on individuals whose agency is constituted 
as object of intervention.   This definition seeks to broaden threats from military to conflict and 
non-conflict threats as well as offer a reorientation of development towards enhancement 
human freedoms.   
The crucial issue here is whether realization of human freedom through the market is 
both feasible and desirable to attain collective security.  Shilliam (2012) questions ideas that 
the market is the source of human freedom on the grounds that the same market, in a 
contradictory manner, has undermined collective human freedom through the inherent 
exploitative practices of the market.  Shilliam further explicates, from a decolonization angle, 
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that different colonized people have their own unique understanding and expectations of 
human freedom. To push for a universal achievement of human freedom without considering 
the peculiar meaning and understanding of the meaning of colonization is doomed to fail.  
Another vital point is that this push for human freedom, from my perspective, negates the 
broader structural and relational factors that determine and define the conditions of individuals.  
A reduction of development and security notions to Sen’s idea of the enhancement of human 
capabilities poses bleak transformational prospects of the region.  The importance of boosting 
human capabilities independent of the existing systems and structures of society, be they 
formal and informal, make the human security approach an endorsement of the status quo 
similar to the other practices discussed in chapters three and four. 
The transformational prospect of the UN JHSP is in serious doubt because its 
implementation framework is anchored in existing non-transformational international 
development frameworks. This notion implies that the UN JHSP has no room to devise 
heterodox approaches that will deal specifically with the development and security challenges 
in a particular region.  During an interview I conducted with Mr. Ambrose Tsagli, a Program 
Manager of the UNJHSP national office, I was curious to know the source(s) of ideas and 
frameworks that underpin the conception and programming of the UN JHSP.  The information 
I received indicated that that the UN JHSP essentially appropriated concepts and frameworks 
of both global development institutions as well as regional bodies.  Mr. Tsagli explained the 
templates on which the UNJHSP was modeled upon:  
The core influential models behind the joint human security program are 
the  Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy [GPRS 1&2, 2001-2009], the 
New Partnership for African Development position on development and 
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security, relating to conflict prevention, the Millennium Development 
Goals [MDGs] on poverty reduction, and finally the Ghana Shared Growth 
and Development Agenda [GSGDA].  Our ultimate goal is to work within 
those established frameworks in order to bring lasting democratic peace, 
stability and prosperity to the people of Northern Ghana.  As a post-
conflict region steps must be taken to focus on communities and 
individuals to prevent conflict. (A.Tsagli. Interviewed on August 3, 2011) 
With this commitment to the liberal pro-growth orientation confirmed by Mr. Tsagli, the UN 
JHSP is not necessarily an innovative program that can be used to address context-specific 
issues.  Instead the UN JHSP seeks to rebrand conflict and poverty challenges in Northern 
Region as novelty issues in order to gain the legitimacy for interventions based on existing 
frameworks. Indeed, the Mr. Tsagli’s narrative is an indication of the labeling of the Northern 
Region as a post-conflict region.  As expected of the aid industry, this labeling of the region as 
a post-conflict society has invariably endorsed pro-market policy practices as the most 
effective solutions to development issues.  Post-conflict labeling gives a further impetus to the 
adoption of existing frameworks.  Since the UN JHSP lacks transformational character, it 
stands to reason that it is imbued with piecemeal and technocratic programs used to address 
complex problems it barely understands.  The next section will deal with the technocratically-
driven activities of the UN JHSP.  
The GPRS 1&2 were the development policy frameworks that the GoG had to adopt as 
part of the conditions for the Highly Indebted Poor Country relief under the auspices of the 
IMF and World Bank in 2001. It is a growth-led private sector driven development policy 
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framework.  The country assistance strategy document between the Ghana Government and 
World Bank highlights the development priorities of the country:  
The GPRS II places private sector-led development at the forefront to 
achieve higher and more broadly based growth.  Modernization of 
agriculture and linkages to industry are seen as central to the structural 
transformation of the economy that will be needed to sustain higher growth 
and drive poverty reduction.  A broad range of efforts will be needed to 
remove constraints related to sustainability and shared growth.  Strategic 
priorities across the pillar include: improving the enabling environment for 
business, including trade and financial services, facilitating stronger 
regional integration to stimulate productivity and trade links.  (World 
Bank, 2007a, p. 35.)   
With the private sector as the preferred driver for poverty reduction, the policy framework 
strategies identified the promotion of competitive entrepreneurship as the preferred 
implementation strategy.  The instrumental mechanism for entrepreneurship was essentially 
reduced to capacity building in both production and marketing.   
 The private sector’s policy endorsement as the medium to generate employment through 
the promotion of entrepreneurship is a cardinal strategy of the UN JHSP.  Prioritization of 
private-led employment strategies was justified to me by Mr. A. Tsagli, when he stated: 
There is truth in the proverb that the devil finds jobs for the idle hand and 
for that matter job creation is considered as prime policy objective.  The 
World Bank deems employment or job creation as both a solution to the 
conflict and poverty situation, and in line with all Government’s 
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development partners’ belief in the private sector as the engine of growth, 
the UN must not be seen to diverge from established priorities and policies.  
Therefore, the program has earmarked agro-processing, skill training to the 
youth, small scale projects for the women, and support to food crop 
farmers through capacity building to increase production and their overall 
well-being. (A.Tsagli, Interviewed on August 3, 2011) 
Tsagli’s response is a depiction of what William Easterly refers to as the cartel nature of aid 
agencies that aim at the harmonization of programs (2002).  Within this cartel ideology, there 
is no room for a critical introspective analysis of rationales behind their interventions.  In fact, 
Easterly (2002, p. 26-34), in his description of aid agencies as cartels, makes a point that the 
agencies strive for convergence of ideas and objectives though the content of their practices 
differ.  The essence of this labeling of aid agencies as cartels is to convey their good intentions 
to address a framed indigenized problem.  With the indigenization of the problem comes with 
re-composition of the localities as sites of intervention, these localities are constituted as 
wholly responsible for interventionist failures.  From this angle, I view the UN JHSP as a 
decontextualized program meant to foster effective harmonization and alignment with existing 
frameworks that seek to perpetuate a trusteeship relationship with the intervened population.  
The burdensome effect of these unequal relations is that the local population bears the ultimate 
remedial responsibility.  In this hypocritical light, the UN JHSP is a perpetrator of self-
exoneration in order to maintain its interventionist hegemony and credibility.   
  Tsagli points to the de-politicization of both poverty and insecurity, an idea that further 
casts doubts about the capacity of the human security approach to challenge existing power 
relation structures.  The reliance on best practices points to the decontextualized 
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implementation orientation of the HS program.  From a normative perspective, Alkire (2010, p. 
61) views the human security approach as one that protects the vital core of human life through 
empowerment and becomes a complement to human development.   Missing in such an 
instrumental linkage is what specific practices are pursued in the name of human security in 
order to achieve an imagined reciprocal linkage.  Also missing in Alkire’s submission is an 
assessment of the specific conditions in which empowerment could protect the vital core of life 
and complement human development.  It is vital to note that the protection of the vital core 
through exposure to the turbulent and indeterminate market in my view is a counterproductive 
exercise.   
 Indeed, Ghana is rated as among the 5 star reformers in SSA by the IMF and World 
Bank.  The UN JHSP, however, in its zeal to create a space of intervention cleverly draws 
attention to an important contradiction inherent in this kind of glorious praise by its 
‘Washington’ counterparts.  To be more specific, the UN proposal document states: “between 
1980 and 2002, there were at least 23 conflicts in the three Northern regions” (UN, 2009, p. 6).  
The timeframe of these prolific conflicts, however, can be aligned with the height of liberal 
reforms that the country arduously implemented.  An intriguing issue here is that, as the UN 
JHSP tends to problematize the structural reforms, it is difficult to reconcile UN JHSP’s 
attempt to deploy liberal interventions to secure the region.  The replication of liberal programs 
reflects a recycling of failed interventions that are re-packaged as novel instruments to address 
newly-constituted problems.  Duffield notes that the critical issue in intervention application is 
not whether there is connection between security and development, but what new elements 
exist within this monotonous relationship (2010, p. 62).  In further developing this argument, I 
deem it essential to reiterate questions about the rationales of the interventions that have been 
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articulated.  Evoking these rationales, in my view, gives further impetus not to take the 
normative accounts of human security as a given, and to see them instead as highly subjective 
practices to suit particular ideological interests. 
 The adoption of the international development frameworks also structured the core 
objectives of the UN JHSP.   A Socio-Economist of the UNU, Dr. K. Shikita, who granted me 
an interview for this thesis outlined the five core objectives of the UN JHSP.  These are: a) the 
capacity development of local institutions and civil society for good decentralized governance 
and conflict prevention; b) the enhancement of mechanisms of conflict prevention and peace 
consolidation in Northern Ghana; c) the support to increase production, productivity and 
income-generating capacity through micro and medium enterprises; d) the improvement of 
agricultural productivity and nutritional status for enhanced food security; and e) promoting 
and mainstreaming the advocating of the Human Security Concept in the Ghanaian 
development context.  These lofty objectives, as my research findings show, are far from 
realization.  There exists a contradiction in that attainment of these lofty objectives will require 
long-term structural changes and must be guided by critical thought; the reality of the situation 
is that the liberal development logic underwrites these interventions.  The failure of these 
programs, and the admissions on the part of the program managers, should be expected.  
 The stated objectives of the program that draw inspiration from already-existing 
development frameworks make the transformational orientation of the UN JHSP highly 
infeasible.  What these objectives suggest is that the rationale of simplifying a complex 
problem through liberal-oriented, manageable, time-bound and technical prescribed solutions is 
implausible.  I will discuss this particular point further in chapter six.    
 A notable continental development and security framework that influenced the UN JHSP 
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is the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). The NEPAD framework was 
developed in 2001 and saliently mutes the historical formation of the postcolonial African 
states.  Significantly, NEPAD ignores the effects of global policies and practices on African 
states as it imposes the sole burden of development on African governments.  The NEPAD 
policy document has peace and security as one of its 3 prominent priorities.  Furthermore, the 
underlying strategy for peace and security as postulated by NEPAD is through joint 
development and security practices as a long-term solution to poverty, insecurity and conflict 
challenges across continental Africa. The NEPAD document declares that:  
African leaders will take joint responsibility for the following: 
Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution at the sub-regional and continental levels, and to ensure that 
these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace…Long-term 
conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa require policy 
measures for addressing the political and social vulnerabilities on which 
conflict is premised.  (NEPAD, 2001, p.23)   
The responsibilities of African governments, here, amount to vain attempts to absolve the 
international community of the security and development challenges in SSA.  With such 
ambitious goals against the backdrop of the limited resources, to discharge this herculean 
mandate rendered most SSA countries susceptible to the caprices and whims of the donor 
community in exchange for international aid (see Adesina et al, 2005).  These goals, therefore, 
are infused with the rationale of reconsolidating the donor community’s influence on the SSA 
governments’, especially in relation to the management of its internal affairs.  Strikingly, 
NEPAD pushes for the SSA’s development programs to be aligned with that of the IMF and 
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World Bank in the search for poverty reduction.  The NEPAD policy document has identified 
the following frameworks as vital for poverty reduction:  
Work with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the United Nations (UN) agencies to accelerate implementation and 
adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy and related approaches. It further recommends: 
establish a task team to accelerate the adoption of participatory and 
decentralized processes for the provision on infrastructural and social 
services. (2001, p. 28) 
 The recommendation for the need to work in tandem with the IMF and World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework, in my view, is a firm endorsement of the shift from 
the coercive adjustment program era towards programmatic conditionality.  Liberal 
assumptions and thoughts underpin the new approach.  
The need for the UN JHSP to ensure harmonization and alignment with the GPRS 1&2 
is problematic given that the GPRS, which is the Ghana version of the IMF and WB poverty 
conditionality for debt relief, is an economic growth-driven framework. The GPRS is an 
aggregative or composite development blueprint that could not specifically address Northern 
Region development-oriented poverty needs.  Owusu-Sekyere (2005, p.112) suggests that 
circumstantial and other non-technical issues in the Northern Region are downplayed by 
policies made in the South, with the support of donors in relation to the PRSP.  The GPRS 2 
and GSGDA policy documents respectively state:  
Against this background, the GPRS II was adopted and implemented over 
the period between 2006-2009 with a shift in focus and context to 
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accelerated growth of the economy towards sustained poverty reduction 
and the attainment of middle- income status within a measurable planning 
period. It focused on implementing growth-inducing policies and programs 
which have the potential to transform the structure of the economy and 
maximize the benefits of shared accelerated growth. (2005, p.2) 
The goal of the medium-term national development policy framework, 
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013, is 
to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability while placing the economy 
on a higher path of shared growth, and poverty reduction to be realized 
through- industrialization especially manufacturing, based on modernized 
agriculture and sustainable exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources, 
particularly minerals, oil and gas. (2010, p.10) 
These statements show that the GPRS 1&2 and GSGDA are primarily growth-driven 
development frameworks that are critical in order for a country to be eligible for successive aid 
support from the BWIs.  Further, the GPRS and GSGDA independently aim to achieve 
macroeconomic stability goals through private sector led growth, which makes their 
commitment towards poverty reduction very questionable.  Even more problematic is the 
narrow understanding of poverty reduction we can infer from the policy goals and strategies 
communicated by these policy documents.  Poverty, as conceptualized by these development 
blueprints, is given a non-relational meaning with the attainment of middle-income status.   
The discriminatory colonial development policies and the complexities of the interventions 
analyzed in chapters three and four should pragmatically have informed the human security 
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interventions and urged aid agencies to take a radically different route.  The reverse logic of 
mimicking the prevailing development orthodoxy is the operational reality. 
  The traveling nature of development goals and targets such as MDGs is indicative of 
how MDG’s constitute one of the adopted prototypes for the institutionalization of the UN 
JHSP.  Mr. Tsagli lamented about the inability of the three Northern regions to meet the 
MDG’s core issues:  “the three northern regions have not responded appropriately to the MDG 
goals, and among these regions, the Northern Region appears to be lagging behind in mortality, 
poverty and education trends.” (A. Tsagli. Interviewed on August 3, 2011).  The MDGs are a 
derivative of the universal statistical average that does not reflect the specific nature of their 
developmental challenges.  Imposing de-contextualized benchmarks on the Northern Region is 
a faulty solution to adopt because the MDG’s do not account for the historical dimensions of 
development challenges.  It is untenable to blame the Northern Region for not responding 
positively to hollow and misguided interventions without recourse to the adverse structural and 
relational determinants of development challenges in the region.  
From my perspective, the UN JHSP reflects a confluence of external interests because 
of its adoption of externally designed frameworks.  It is important to note that these 
frameworks are imposed on Ghana under the rubric of delusory national ownership.  Even the 
GPRS, based on an interview I conducted with Mr. Arthur, of the MOF, confirms this evasive 
country ownership goal.  Mr. Arthur told me about the ruse of country ownership he was made 
to believe: 
All along I was under the impression that the Ghana Government and 
Ghanaians own the GPRS.  However, during a validation workshop in 
Washington DC, as part of the last stages in drafting the final country 
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memorandum, most of the social development priorities were slashed 
down on the grounds that they were anti-growth. From that day I drew the 
conclusion that as a country we do not own any policy program. 
I suggest that more contentious issue, here, is that the international development agencies have 
a policy preference for country ownership as a way to ensure aid effectiveness, but which 
rather negates pressing development challenges.  Essentially, the country ownership principle 
works to maintain the adverse global structures and practices that continuously undermine the 
development prospects of poor economies as a result of its non-commitment for radical change 
in global relations.  The undesirable effect of this imbalance in the international political 
economy has led to the increasing consolidation of neoliberal policies as the acceptable 
interventionist option.  As I discussed in chapter four, further strengthening of these liberal 
interventions will dislocate the socio-economic fortunes of the region.  
When I interrogated Mr. Arthur, the MOF official, about his information regarding the 
Human Security Program, he provided the following response:  
We are being treated like robots that rely on external controls and 
directives from the UN bodies in line with what they intend to do and what 
role they expect us to play alongside. Yes, I have seen and read the concept 
note regarding the human security project for the three regions in Northern 
Ghana. The problem is that we are already struggling with the management 
of this economy. And now they want us to incorporate human security as 
an integral part of our development framework in the coming years.  We 
have passed the stage of myopic experimentation, as we did with the 
structural reforms. (S. Arthur.  Interviewed on August 19, 2011) 
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This response points to the disdain accorded by local officials to the UN JHSP.  This disdain 
can be linked to incipient despondent attitudes by domestic policymakers towards the existing 
development framework.  With the UN JHSP failing to bring transformational innovative 
processes, the cold reception demonstrated by the MOF official is not surprising.  Mr. Tsagli, 
however, complained about national government officials’ lukewarm attitude towards the 
UNJHSP.  Mr. Tsagli confirmed his disappointment with state officials towards the UN JHSP 
when he stated that: “after some consultations that we had with the government officials from 
the finance, interior and local government ministries before the inauguration of the program, 
you could easily tell about their obvious apathy for the program.  Our official position is that 
the novelty of the program might be the reason for this apathetic reaction.” The above-reproach 
thinking displayed by Mr. Tsagli is unacceptable.  The unacceptability of this issue is 
conditioned by the self-righteous attitudinal disposition of aid actors, which blurs the faulty and 
misleading assumptions from critical scrutiny.  With the domestic officialdom’s apathetic 
attitude towards the program, complex receptions are accorded to the interventions practiced by 
officials of Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TAMA) and other residents. 
A more critical issue, here, is the failure to examine the rationales and assumptions 
behind the various interventions undertaken by the six UN organizations in Tamale and Yendi 
of the Northern Region.  In lieu of this failure to consider the interventionist rationales is the 
prioritization of coordination as an important factor critical to the success of interventions.  But 
I view such an administrative and programmatic priority as a cover-up for the gross 
incompetence of aid agencies in unraveling the complexities of development and security 
challenges.  It needs to be recognized that reducing the complexity of conflict and poverty 
issues to coordination problem amounts to an endorsement of the prevailing development 
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frameworks.  The UN JHSP is an endorsement of the status quo because it does not engage the 
social-relational reasons why problems persist or whether or not the rationales behind aid 
interventions are realistic.  Chandler (2012) expresses a legitimate fear regarding the utility of 
the human security framework as a pragmatic, integrated approach, and remarks that it the 
human security program is meant to perpetuate liberal practices.  The next chapter will discuss 
in the detail how this coordination function has been framed as the source of implementation 
challenges.    
Considering the transformational claims of the human security approach I have 
analyzed thus far, it is important to examine broad policy discourses and frameworks that 
support aid programs in order to give empirical weight to my contestations.  My critical 
position stands in sharp opposition to Martin and Owen (2010), Newman (2010), and other 
policy advocates who frame the human security approach as a catalytic instrument used to 
mobilize newly prioritized initiatives.   
In the context of post-conflict and post-colonial society, the poverty conditions, 
conflicts, and underdevelopment in the Northern Region have attracted immense security 
attention.  As a matter of fact, an official of UN JHSP alludes to the securitization of 
development in both Tamale and Yendi as experimental practices that will be extended to 
many communities in the coming years. Col. J. Adams of the Ministry of Defense briefed me 
about proposed plans to consolidate military operations in the Yendi:  
The current military high command has resolved to establish a military 
base in Yendi, in addition to the 6
th
 Infantry Battalion of the Kamina 
Barracks in Tamale. This additional base will boost operations to contain 
the rising violence perpetrated by the youth and others. Our investigations 
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show that the high youth unemployment as a result of the 8 months lean 
season is one of the major causes of the violence in the big and small 
towns. This intermittent violence jeopardizes the security of the region. 
(J.Adams. Interviewed on September 3, 2011). 
Col. Adams’s remarks affirm a reciprocal linkage between unemployment and violent conflict, 
particularly when he attributes the cause of violent conflicts to high youth unemployment rates.  
Such an attempt to make a deductive linkage between unemployment and violence, however, 
rather obviates a critical examination of the interlocking structural and institutional factors and 
policy failures that are responsible for high youth unemployment rates.  Furthermore, to blame 
high youth unemployment for the insecurity in the region eliminates the broad and complex 
factors that trigger conflicts in the region.  The logical corollary of the Col. Adams’s statement 
is that once unemployment is addressed, the possibility of conflicts ceasing in the region will 
be higher.  Critical issues, including the processes of addressing unemployment, and its 
underlying rationales, are taken for granted.  The outcome of this belief is, the tenuous linkage 
that is inevitably drawn between unemployment and violent conflict.  I will discuss the link 
between unemployment and violent conflict under the youth skill development section of this 
chapter.  I conclude, however, that the UN JHSP lacks the necessary transformational interest, 
orientation, and capability to address the security and development challenges of the Northern 
Region.    
The securitization of development as reflected in the Human Security approach labels 
the entire Northern Region as a post-conflict society, for which there are predetermined 
programs formulated to address development and security challenges.  I sought to understand, 
from UNDP official Mr. Erasmus Doe, how this organization conceives of development and 
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security challenges in the Northern Region.  Mr. Doe offered the following response in relation 
to his organization’s perspectives on conflict and development in the study region:   
This region is a post-conflict society because there has not been major 
conflict since the killing of Ya-Naa in 2002; therefore, the ultimate goal is 
to prevent the eruption of any violent ethnic conflict through the human 
security program. The human security program will promote the private 
sector by supporting agriculture and entrepreneurship as well as supporting 
community conflict prevention committees. (E. Doe, Interviewed on 
August 21, 2011) 
The ill-conceived ameliorative template endemic in Doe’s response is the pursuit of conflict 
prevention through market-oriented programs. An implicit belief here is that economic 
incentives and motivations are the main drivers of conflict and insecurity.  A reliance on this 
kind of market approach confirms my position that the UN JHSP program is a patent 
endorsement of the existing frameworks lacking in transformational capabilities.  In labeling 
the Northern Region as a post-conflict society, the UN JHSP silences the relational and 
historical contextual factors that exist in the region.  The silencing of structural and relations 
factors in a reconstituted site provides the basis for the deployment of standardized aid 
packages.  The implementation of these predetermined practices manifests themselves in 
contradictory and contestable outcomes within the intervened-upon population as will be 
shown in this chapter.   
It is important to note that the prevailing conditions of poverty, unemployment and 
insecurity in both Tamale and Yendi have been used to justify the necessity for aid 
intervention.  These same factors have been framed as a core component of what Kaldor (2007) 
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calls a ‘new war thesis.’  The crucial issue, however, is that there is nothing new in the 
insecurity, unemployment and poverty problems in my study sites.  Reifying such untoward 
phenomenon as new, therefore, constitutes an interventionist ploy.   The conflict and poverty-
ridden nature of the Northern Region has been articulated by Mr. Tsagli:  
Tamale and Yendi were chosen as places of intervention because the cities 
are seen as currently the most volatile areas in the Northern Region with a 
high level of poverty as well.  Specific problems are the twin problems of 
insecurity and mobilization for conflict, and a vivid case in point is the 
current unresolved Dagbon crisis, as you may recollect.  Also, our studies 
have shown that the poverty incidence and conflict propensity are equally 
rife in other districts in the region, such as Saboba, Bunkpurugu Yunyoo, 
and Chereponi. (A.Tsagli, August 3, 2011) 
The newness of this ‘war’ is highly contestable because the adverse conditions that exist in 
Tamale and Yendi date back to its colonial annexation.  In my opinion, reconstituting an old 
phenomenon as a new one demonstrates the aid industry’s aversion to examining the complex 
history of poverty and insecurity phenomena.  Ignoring the historical dimensions of the 
challenges in Northern Region, in my view, is a strategy to enable the deployment of 
standardized, short-term, technical solutions that have been developed by many policy and 
development experts.  
Implementing the UN JHSP’s plan on the aforementioned international aid frameworks 
seeks to reinforce the subjective socio-institutional character of program formation.  As Hall 
(1993) and Peck and Theodore (2012) point out, policy adoption is not predicated upon current 
socio-economic conditions, but is based rather on acclaimed hegemonic policy thinking.  Peck 
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and Theodore (2012, p. 23) postulate that policy diffusion and mutation must not be viewed as 
an objective practice, but should be examined within a particular social and ideological 
context.  It is from these ideological and social contexts, where the pertinent social 
constructions of policymaking are constructed as hegemonic tropes, that subsequent policies 
are developed. The current, dominant liberal ideology of the aid architecture, which underpins 
the UN JHSP, renders it inconceivable that the new human security framework will adopt a 
more heterodox approach.   
Adoption of policies and programs entail not only the discrete benchmarks, but also the 
ideas, visions, rationales and values embedded in current, externally induced frameworks.  It 
becomes imperative, then, to assess the human security program in line with its modeled 
frameworks, and is not viewed as a new interventionist approach, but rather as a ‘business as 
usual’ framework.  I suggest, therefore, that in the course of privileging the identified 
frameworks, the human security approach has invariably delimited both epistemic and material 
alternatives.  The likely consequence of such a delimitation is the reinforcement of existing 
institutional power structures that continuously produce the same development and security 
challenges in the Northern Region.  
The consequences of defining the UN JHSP interventions under the notion of ‘novelty’, 
treats the historical dynamics of the conflict conditions in the Northern Region as episodic 
issues of no real, programmable significance.  The UN program manager to whom I spoke 
hails from one of the three regions in Northern Ghana, and recounted the adverse colonial 
practices that contributed to the current development and security challenges in the region.  A 
significant issue to note is the complicity of the colonial administration in the current crisis in 
the Northern Region.  My source declared: “Brother! You are right to ask about the historical 
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source of the current predicaments.  I directly link it to the colonial administration control of 
Northern Ghana whereby my forebears were reduced to nothing than mere workers in southern 
plantations, denied of educational infrastructure and essential services required for human 
development”.  Considering his recognition of the historical foundation of the current crisis it 
is highly inconceivable that aid interventions have not been used to correct existing colonial 
distortions.  He fails to recognize that the complexities of the development and security 
problems in the Northern Ghana require complex structural and process-based approaches at 
different scalar levels.  
An intriguing factor in the officially declared transformational character of the human 
security approach is its consistent reliance on existing orthodox frameworks.  I pressed Mr. 
Tsagli to further explain further why the UN JHSP remains anchored or modeled on the ‘failed 
and misguided’ MDGs, NEPAD, GPRS and GSGDA.  He issued the following response to 
justify UN JHSP’s non-departure from existing frameworks:  
I was hired to manage the JHSP, having being appointed after a successful 
interview at the UN headquarters in New York.  I was hired due to my 
vast, rich experience and expertise associated with conflict resolution, 
negotiated settlements and Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration 
and small arms control programs in Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone.  
This JHSP framework was designed by various technical committees, 
having in mind to ensure consistency and congruence with the main 
working policy frameworks of the country.  Our ultimate goal is to foster 
effective coordination of existing practices into a collective entity. (Tsagli, 
August 3, 2011) 
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His statement reveals that the UN JHSP focused on discrete projects guided by expert 
knowledge in order to provide a problem-solution approach that can be implemented through a 
liberal market policy framework.  The interventions, far from being neutral programs and 
projects, are heavily driven by liberal oriented frameworks and positivistic rationales.  From 
the mainstream perspective, development and security aid frameworks are stated as normative 
practices; as discursive practices from a critical perspective, however, it is vital to reiterate that 
these rationales provide an operational impetus.   
 
Security Driven Interventions: Processes of Community Oriented Conflict Prevention  
Under the security interventions with a focus on human agency as a source of solutions for 
both prevention and protection problems, numerous community-focused practices have been 
deployed. These practices specifically include community-based conflict committees and peace 
education. 
The UN JHSP, true to its community mantra that runs akin to the colonial development 
rationale, prioritized the capacity building of community members with the goal of equipping 
individuals with skills for conflict prevention in order to secure the metropolis.  My key 
argument is that this individual-driven human security approach is bereft of any 
transformational prospects because it obviates any serious engagement with the complex 
structural and institutional factors.  Among the factors at issue are the problematic nature of 
institutional weakness, justice, minority rights, systemic distributional challenges, and 
defective political systems.  Dr. K. Shakita, of the UNU, made an effort to rationalize the 
prioritization of communities as a space for instrumental conflict prevention: 
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Community focus was adopted because of our firm belief in a cohesive 
community as a source of sustainability of activities to create a harmonious 
and prosperous region.  Our understanding is that when you repose 
responsibility for ensuring peace and prosperity onto community members 
they tend to develop the necessary social capital, especially rules to 
represent their collective interest. (K. Shakita. Interviewed on October 19, 
2011) 
I deduce that the idealistic understanding of community used here is symbolic of the UNU’s 
simplistic approach to complex problems.  The dominance of this community mantra has led to 
a futile search for an idealistic consensus-building tactic rather than dealing with the pertinent 
social justice claims that have been articulated by diverse ethnic groups in the area.  The likely 
consequence of this institutionalization of liberal discriminatory practices is that the insecurity 
in the region will be sustained indefinitely because of an unwillingness to examine important 
local contestations. 
Another pertinent factor germane to the community-oriented conflict prevention 
initiative are the  processes by which individuals, groups and local government officials are 
identified for training in conflict prevention objectives.  Remarkably noticeable in these 
objectives is the formalistic nature of the composition of participants.   Preference is accorded 
to officially recognized bodies for selection, which essentially silences officially prohibited 
groups from participation in security conflicts.  According to Dr. Shakita: “government 
officials, youth groups, chiefs, opinion leaders, women groups, occupational groups, notably 
butchers and youth groups, and the media were selected for training.”  I was curious to know 
the criteria used for selection and probed for further information.  Dr. Shikita explained that: 
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“since we do not have to go contrary to government recognized bodies, we ultimately denied 
groups and individuals who are considered illegitimate by the statutory agencies.  We wish we 
could broaden the scope of people trained to discharge this great task.”  The implication of this 
selection process is that essential voices are silenced in order to unleash simplistic practices 
and meet project timelines.  This official silencing of critical voices is similar to the 
discriminatory conflict resolution practices that I examined in chapter four.  On the basis of the 
state’s role in the conflicts in the Northern Region as discussed in chapter three, this neutrality 
in the recognition of legitimate groups must be thoroughly reconsidered.   
Information from relevant youth groups indicate that political party interference equally 
manifests itself in the selection process.  Regarding the perception of political interference in 
the selection processes, a youth leader, Sumaila Fuseinu, states that: “our organization and 
many others were not selected for the so-called bogus training because the metropolitan 
assembly has strong influence in determining who gets admitted.  Our group is perceived to be 
surrogates of major opposition political party, hence our denial of participation.”  Fuseinu’s 
remarks confirm that the fueling of existing unequal power relations is inherent even in 
apolitical interventions.  Other youth groups expressed similar issues with the partisan nature 
of the selection processes to explain their non-participation. The turbulent consequences 
brought about by these kinds of selection processes must be accepted by the program managers 
as the inevitable outcome of their programs and not as pathological deficiencies associated 
with the diverse groups of inhabitants of Northern Region.  
The mechanisms of conflict prevention to be used in the region were articulated 
through workshops and training seminars.  According to James Gorkeh, a program officer for 
the UNDP in Tamale, his organization usually recruits and facilitates workshops for some 
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experts before they are given their assigned roles.  Security and conflict prevention experts 
were utilized particularly for guidance related to developing teaching modules and other 
content development.  Gorkeh notes that: “multiple level training schemes were organized 
invited groups in areas such as: the mechanisms of trust and confidence building, tolerance, 
and the identification of symptoms of conflict behaviour and negotiations.”  The apparent 
implication of this emphasis on community-oriented conflict prevention is to deploy 
depoliticized practices in order to stimulate attitudinal change.  I posit that this apolitical 
approach seeks to render complex relational undertones in technical terms, a move which 
homogenizes both the problem and the solution to conflict and insecurity in the region.  In 
addition, the primary focus on individual behavioural change denotes a gross denunciation of 
the value and belief systems of diverse groups by the UN JHSP. The outcome of such a cultural 
denunciation is the imposition of liberal values as corrective measures on participants who are 
expected to disseminate these values to their community members.  
Another critical issue that instigated resentment among some participants was the 
attempt on the part of aid agencies to foist liberal values on different ethnic groups.  Different 
groups of local residents participated in the workshops, and the leader of two groups, Abdul 
Mubarak, told me that: 
I deeply regret attending this workshop because it didn’t meet my high 
expectations.  The moderators of the workshop attributed the causes of the 
conflicts and insecurity to the cultural beliefs and practices of the ethnic 
groups.  These experts, who are not even abreast with your cultural system, 
do not even appreciate that we have values that implore us to be law-
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abiding, promote good neighborliness and love for humanity.  (A. 
Mubarak, Interviewed on August 4, 2011)  
Mubarak’s comments are an attestation to the saliency of traditional values in the 
region, which are critical to their decision-making processes, and integral in shaping 
their mode of interaction.  His comments also confirm the complicated nature of 
interventions as they inform the worldview of local people.  The prevailing rationale 
within the UN JHSP, and the wider aid industry, that change is possible through 
external intervention requires urgent and reflexive rethinking.  The emphasis placed 
on training participants to develop sound values for cooperation, I suggest, is a short-
term, misguided approach that makes the emancipatory and transformational viability 
of the human security approach exceedingly unattainable.   
The leader of a second youth group, Mr. Ranford Nyamah, made some critical 
remarks in relation to the broad array of pressing needs that have been neglected by 
the aid agencies in the area. Mr. Nyamah told me that: 
There are pressing economic, social, environmental and political issues that 
we would like to be addressed instead of this unproductive workshop.  Our 
group members and most youth associations acknowledge the state of 
hopelessness in which they live.  Just see the high unemployment rate in this 
city and region among the youth population.  I am sure ever since you came 
to this city, you would have noticed the high number of beggars on the 
street.  I am talking of beggars who are able-bodied and sane but cannot find 
any sustainable means of livelihood to even survive.  For how long shall we 
remain poor and live in tension in a region with so much potential?  We are 
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looking and campaigning for sustained job creation, not those nine-day 
wonder jobs. (R. Nyamah, August 4, 2011) 
On the basis of the information provided by these group leaders, an attempt to seek simplistic 
solutions to complex aid problems leads to the adverse prioritization of critical needs in 
disparate communities.  In this instance, critical and pervasive issues of hopelessness and 
despair that have engulfed the region are yet to be given the consideration they deserve.  The 
pervasive feeling of hopelessness in these statements implies that there have been systemic, 
multiple deprivations created by policies of socio-cultural exclusion, political inequality, 
systemic institutional failures and an exploitative global political economy.  These are only 
some of the contentious issues that the UN JHSP has managed to avoid or has treated as outlier 
issues that will undermine time-bound programming.  The highly-favored short -term 
approaches that avoid interaction with structural and relational deficiencies in the region have 
little potential to transform the region.  
The relevance of the workshops remains a bone of contention between the UN JHSP 
administrators and local groups.  Mr. A. Moro, program officer of UNJHSP in Tamale, 
highlighted the positive effects of training programs when he declared that: “this community 
conflict prevention committee is ideal for the numerous communities scattered all over the 
region.  Through this initiative some communities have begun to interact with each other.”  
The consensus of the UN JHSP is manifest in their response, but contentious issues of 
economic and social justice have been relegated to the background. Mr. Badong, an official of 
the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, provided a counter-claim to the alleged positive 
outcomes of the UNJHSP:  
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The UNDP did organize workshops and teaching seminars on conflict 
prevention for us and at the end of the training they donated a photocopier, 
laptop and printer to us.  At least you can see them over there with UNDP 
boldly inscribed on it.  Is that all what is needed to prevent conflict?  Conflict 
prevention is not limited to dialogue, there requires action in the system to 
effect changes.  See my brother! My heart boils when I see these officials of 
UNDP churn out such ill-informed ideas about conflict prevention for us 
adopt.  In fact, all that they said in the recent workshop were just repetition of 
the workshops they organized for us in 2002, in the aftermath of the Dagbon 
crisis. (August 12, 2011) 
These counter-claims indicate the recycling of practices or a ‘business as usual’ agenda for the 
human security framework that has been established to transform the security and development 
terrain of the region.  This recycling of failed practices confirms the extent to which the 
UNDP’s failure to learn from its historical mistakes.  The rationale behind the possibility of 
solving every locally-identified problem by the UNDP, through the transplantation of best 
practices independent of the context, needs reconsideration.  A necessary logical expectation is 
that the UNDP would avoid these programmatic pitfalls, particularly the misleading rationales 
and assumptions.   An unfolding reality, however, is that, as a major player in the aid industry 
with self-acclaimed infallible status, the UNDP consider themselves to be above the kind of 
reproach that would necessitate changes in their ontological orientation.  Ultimately, these 
ahistorical and depoliticized UN JHSP practices did nothing to address the fundamental factors 
that underpin the alleged insecurity in the metropolis.  In effect, the UN JHSP is a carbon copy 
of the failed conflict resolution practices used in troubled SSA countries such as Somalia, 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone (Willett, 2005, p.573).  The intriguing issue, here, is that the aid 
agencies are fixated on the unchanging logic behind their interventions even in the face of their 
failed outcomes.  I suggest that interrogation of the assumptions and rationales behind aid 
interventions is a viable way to expose the inner flaws of the interventions.  
I insist that the quest to impose an externally-derived and an expected code of 
behavioural conduct on the people in the region necessarily invites non-compliance.  In fact, 
members of a youth group that I interviewed affirm that the JHSP program is alien to their 
time-tested traditional differentiated conflict resolution mechanisms.  They contend that 
significant effort is made by the Tendana to adjudicate their differences and fines, such as 
banishment from participation in their customary practices, have important cultural meaning to 
them to ensure compliance.  This apparent discrepancy in conflict resolution methods expose 
the UN JHSP’s paradoxical harmonious and integrative view of community that has been 
reconstituted through the programmatic tutelage of external values.  Further, Rose argues that 
the third sector is differently spatialized and temporized, which means that community 
members are essentially reassembled by the construction of new identities with indoctrination 
in civic culture (p.172).  Considering the information provided by the youth group, conflict 
prevention groups were not constituted to address the fundamental processes of the current 
predicament.  Instead, an idealized group has been formed that aims to achieve solidarity as a 
panacea to the complex problems of insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment in the area.  
Furthermore, the rhetoric used promises the unrealistic expectations that the intervention was 
supposed to achieve.  Accordingly, both Duffield (2010) and Pupavac (2012) conclude that this 
kind of deception is the hallmark of international development practices.  I will add that a 
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failure to fulfill these empty promises becomes one of the resources the aid industry uses to 
generate new promises in order to stay relevant. 
  From my perspective, the absence of a transformation of orientation in the UN JHSP 
can be attributed to its need to exhibit immediate results in the sectors that have been 
prioritized by the misguided and narrow rationales.  These narrow rationales result in the 
simplification of complex problems of security and development into short-term fixes that 
ultimately fail.  A likely outcome of the emphasis on short-term solutions is the evasion of the 
pertinent broad interplay of socio-economic and historical forces at various scales that impact 
on the study areas and region as a whole.  
Selected participants of the UN JHSP community-based program explained the nature 
and content of how they were handled by the UNDP officials.  One of the participants, who 
chose to remain anonymous, revealed:  
We were treated like ignorant people just as the government treats us as if 
we are backward and in desperate need of training to change our thinking, 
attitude, behaviour and beliefs.  The ‘ all knowing’ officials from the 
UNDP think they can instill in us new values and enlightened thought to 
help us to develop sound attitude and understanding to avoid conflict 
tendencies.  Also the UNDP officers think that this character molding will 
ensure the security of the poor and weak members of our cherished society.   
This statement directly points to the denigration of non-western values as inimical to human 
progress.   The problematization of non-western values becomes a justification for aid agencies 
to intervene and attempt to re-engineer social customs and practices.  Ultimately this social re-
engineering of a particular society is an aspect that mirrors the colonial civilizing mission.  The 
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ineffectuality of this unsolicited civilizing mission is reflected in the abhorrent and non-
compliant attitude emitted by the group.  Certainly, this social engineering practice, in my 
view, is counter-productive as long as the vital goal remains the search for transformational 
means to manage security and development challenges.  
The functional relevance of the training modules presented by the UN JHSP can be 
used in order to concretize my contention that the UN JHSP is essentially an empty 
bureaucratic program not equipped with the resources to engage with complex relational 
issues.  In response to my question in respect to the usefulness of the training program, Mr. A. 
Moro told me that:  
 My group’s members, as well as many of participants, were ashamed that 
we had to be told what to do in order to avoid and prevent conflict as if we 
are crude people with crude values.  In our view, these UN officials just do 
not understand the burning issues of contestation in the localities of the 
region.  Some of us attended the workshop because of the participation 
allowance paid to each participant. (A. Moro. Interviewed on August 11, 
2011) 
Mr. Moro indicates that these group members participated not because of a deep-seated 
intention to apply the training modules that certainly lack credibility, but for the monetary 
incentive attached to it.  It is instructive to note that other participants also informed me that 
their attendance at the workshops was influenced by the monetary enticement offered to them 
in exchanged for their presence.  A logical deduction from this information is the reduction of 
conflict-generated insecurity to behavioural characteristics.  I therefore deem it imperative to 
challenge the rationale behind preventive approaches that claim that conflict is preventable, and 
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that prevention can be achieved by altering the attitudinal persuasion of the community 
members with cosmopolitan values to foster peaceful co-habitation.  I further submit that the 
prevention of conflict is a utopian objective given that the manifestation of the conflict triggers 
and drivers are not easy to accurately anticipate based on short-term interventions.  On the 
basis of the fieldwork information obtained, I suggest that the persistence of insecurity equally 
resides in the assumption that liberal values, like natural laws, are superbly expected to fit well 
in every jurisdiction.  
The quest for behavioural change was quite pervasive within the UN JHSP mandate. 
Mr. A. Moro, outlined the main components of the behavioural change that they are seeking to 
implement: “socializing community members to inculcate sound liberal behavioural norms of 
civility, tolerance for one another and preference for building dialogue society are the workable 
steps to prevent conflict in the region, and create the needed peace and security vital for 
poverty reduction.”   In my perspective, this response reinforces the perpetuation of racial 
hegemonic colonial practice.  The civilizing mission becomes the medium through which the 
post-colonial subject is indoctrinated with cosmopolitan values and expected to begin behaving 
rationally.  This top-down approach has the potential to weaken internal institutional building.  
Because the rules of engagement are not internally-generated through viable contestations, 
struggles, or negotiation they fail to gain the necessary legitimacy of diverse parties.  The 
imposition of externally conceived rules explains, to a large extent, the minimal commitment 
of disparate community members to these projects.  A minimal commitment on the part of 
participants is akin to the failed Inter-NGO Consortium-brokered peace agreements that I 
discussed in chapter four.  I suggest that the imposition of responsibility for conflict prevention 
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on the door step of community groups and individuals who are disconnected from wider 
national institutions is likely to result in futile outcome.  
The elusive outcome is supported by the ongoing clashes between the two main gates of 
Dagbon, in reference to the Andanis and Abudus in Yendi as stated in chapter one.  The most 
recent feud occurred on April 1, 2013, in the aftermath of the installation of Youth Chief of 
Yendi by the Regent of Dagbon.  Indeed, this feud was confirmed by the Yendi Divisional 
Police Commander, Chief Superintendent Cephas Bediako (Joy News, April 1, 2013).  This 
latest clash between the feuding parties is a reflection of the positive achievement outcomes as 
declared by Mr. Moro Awudu of the UN JHSP.  Awudu outlined the following successes of the 
UN JHSP: 
Through the implementation of this community prevention initiative it for 
the first time since 2002, brought the two feuding factions to a negotiation 
table and it is our expectation that this negotiation process will prepare the 
grounds for sustainable peace in the region. As you know Dagbon 
constitutes the largest ethnic group in the region and occupies widest 
territory as well as being the most influential among all the ethnic groups. 
(A. Moro. Interviewed on August 12, 2011) 
The crucial factor is that Yendi is firmly interconnected to wider institutional influences at the 
regional and national levels, especially in national politics.  Therefore, interventions in Yendi 
would require a much more critically-extensive focus. In this case, systemic changes in the 
interlocking sectors of Northern Region will require transformational changes on multiple 
scales from the local to the global.   The human security framework, however, is yet to come to 
terms with this complex interconnectivity between sites of intervention.  
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From the discussions advanced thus far, I suggest that the community oriented conflict 
prevention committee is a pretext to impose responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security on community members.  The enormous focus on the community as the anchor of 
conflict prevention suggests to me that the UN JHSP has no real transformational solution for 
the region.  Indeed, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011) suggest a shift in security 
governance, particularly in light of the recent surge of private security in most urban settings in 
SSA, under the guise of the global-local partnership.  From the context of the Northern Region, 
the community oriented conflict prevention committees appear to be the substitute of private 
security for a predominantly rural spatial setting.  In my view, the critical question to ask in 
this situation is: who is actually being secured?  Judging from the intervention in the Tamale 
metropolis and Yendi municipality, I suggest that the multiple, deprived, heterogeneous poor 
remain inevitably insecure because of their limited sphere of influence within community 
groups.  Community conflict prevention practices present a weak desire to generate the 
necessary stability deemed as a prerequisite for poverty reduction.  The problem is more 
prominent especially in the absence of secure future investments into the life of the poor in 
region. 
In considering the individual focus of security interventions, my assertion is that the 
conflict prevention committee was created as a response to shifts in security governance as 
indicated in the NEPAD framework.  The NEPAD framework is reinforced by the Report on 
UN High Level Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change and 2011 Report, which favor ‘third 
way’ or community involvement approaches as possible bottom-up approaches to conflict 
prevention.  The rationale behind a bottom up approach is that, through the constitution of 
individuals as rational subjects who are empowered through capacity building, conflict 
248 
 
prevention becomes a normal course of practice.  Mr. Erasmus Doe suggested some reasons to 
support the UNDP prioritization of community focused programmes when he suggested that: 
“it is the UNDP’s operational belief that once the community members are adequately 
empowered through the numerous capacity workshops, we will mark the commencement of 
building resilient people.  As a change agency we are optimistic that it will provide a long-
lasting means to prevent conflict and ensure poverty reduction.”  Inherent in his response is the 
technical rendering and de-politicization of the complex problems of conflict prevention.  It is, 
therefore, not surprising that several community members resisted the intervention, as it 
ultimately maintained the problematic social and political relations among multiple ethnic 
groups. 
The polarization of unequal power relations among identified groups in different 
communities has been reported by some residents.  The residents that I interviewed in Yendi 
and Tamale Central are of the view that this unequal relation among participants has 
discredited the legitimacy of the committees.  I therefore suggest that the driving rationale 
behind community-based conflict prevention initiatives of the UN JHSP is the possibility of 
reorienting community members on a clean slate as if they do not have unique worldviews and 
experiences.  With such unproblematic possibility orientations, residents are expected to 
acquire new values they gain through the tutelage of an expert who devised rules of conduct.  
This reorientation practice in itself portrays the people as inferior in similar manners as the 
colonial administrations of the past.  Thus, the characterization of local people as ‘backward’ 
becomes the justification for intervention.   
The emphasis on external tutelage also reinforces the view that the residents of 
communities where aid agencies operate lack the capacity to solve their insecurity challenges.  
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The will to intervene and improve the well-being of the people, as Li (2007) notes, translates 
into an attempt to govern conduct.  Also, the contestations referred to earlier point to the 
inherent shortcomings adhering to an unproblematic possibility of change.  In addition, 
matching contestations should serve as a warning sign to the aid agencies that are still 
practicing this interventionist mindset and force them to acknowledge the chaotic nature of the 
sites of interventions.  
A pertinent issue at play is that there appears to be endless tension between the state 
security agencies and residents of both the minority and majority ethnic groups, 
notwithstanding UN JHSP interventions.  Dr. Shikata of the UNU confirmed the prevailing 
tension that exists between national security actors and most residents, particularly the youth 
groups.  Shikata explained the intractable nature of the tensions in the region when she states: 
“there is so much tension in the region due to high level of mistrust between the state security 
services and the people.  This tension between the distinct parties has been tough challenge to 
our efforts at forging a lasting peace in Dagbon, and the region as a whole”.  The problematic 
nature of this policy is revealed, when Dr. Shikita suggests that “they have organized peace 
soccer matches with the expectation that it will foster smooth interaction first among the 
various ethnic groups on one hand and between the variegated ethnic groups and state security 
actors on the other hand.”  In fact, as we were in the middle of our interview, she received a 
call from a former international footballer who wanted to arrange a prospective match in 
Tamale as part of activities to foster peace and security in the area.   
The unfolding reality of these situations is that an uncritical reliance on external actors 
has the likelihood of stultifying domestically-generated, multileveled mechanisms that could 
accommodate the grievances and priorities of contending factions.  Multi-leveled mechanisms 
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include the development of broad national, regional, and district long-term structures and 
processes to address all facets of ethnic contestations.  In my view, external interventions are 
underpinned by the dominance of simplistic assumptions that render the aid industry ill-
equipped to confront complex problems related to: historically spawned identity contestations, 
traditional autonomy, chieftaincy succession, and justice claims.  Also worth noting here are 
the weak postcolonial state institutions put in place to correct the colonial development policies 
in the Northern Region, as well as the adverse ramifications of the global economy from which 
study sites are not exempt.    
From my critical perspective, an adoption of a celebrity approach in the use of ex-
international soccer players mimics the failed negotiated settlements implemented to resolve 
the 1994 Guinea Fowl War in Northern Region.   In fact, Willett (2005) and Weinstein (2005) 
advocate for the need to create space for domestically generated mechanisms used to address 
conflict and insecurity crises because of the legitimacy deficits that external interventions 
engender.  Weinstein (2005, p. 9) posits that the processes of external mediation usually 
employ methods and practices that are alien to most of the feuding parties.  To mitigate these 
alien processes, efforts must be directed at the development of internally-devised rules and 
processes, while also avoiding the urge to rely on ‘best practice’ formulation.  The critical 
factor, here, remains whether or not the donor community and the aid industry can create the 
space for autonomous recovery in conflict prone areas like the region for this study.   
During my interview with Dr. Awedoba, he expressed a similar concern in relation to 
the futility of externally-imposed, negotiated settlements in the Northern Region.  He argued 
that “there have been numerous half-baked negotiated settlements in many of the protracted 
communities and towns since the 1940’s, however, most collapsed within a short period of 
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time because the ‘hawks’ in the conflicting groups appeared unsatisfied with the terms of 
settlement or partial implementation of the settlement pact undermines the process” (Awedoba, 
July 28, 2011).  The crux of this argument is that these negotiated settlements, as I explained in 
chapter four, rarely address the fundamental critical factors involved in the conflicts.  In my 
view, the violation of agreed terms and conditions with gross impunity invariably exacerbates 
the tension between groups.  The crucial questions related to the abrogation of the peace 
accord, I suggest, should be related to how just, fair and enforceable the terms of the agreement 
are/were.  Furthermore, a vital issue to consider is the diverse processes of engagement among 
groups.  And given the enormous weight of the grievance-related contestations, the dismal 
outcomes of negotiated settlements do not come as a surprise.     
My critical stance in relation to the potency of UN JHSP interventions has been given 
further credence following my interview with a senior program manager of the UNDP in 
relation to the programming of priorities.  This senior program manager ‘cleverly’ eliminated 
the complex historical processes of conflict and poverty from the UN JHSP priorities.  
According to the Senior Program Manager, history cannot be formulated into an expert 
designed programmable toolkit.   Historical factors are inconsistent with the established ‘best 
practices’ of international development assistance.  In fact, disdain for historical processes 
raises enormous concerns regarding the transformational prospects of the UN JHSP.  
Additionally, this transformational impossibility is grounded by the inability of the UN JHSP 
to engage the complex politics and political economy issues that are crucial to secure the 
regional capital of Tamale.  This shortcoming is necessary to signal the impossibility of the 
program to secure the entire region as the administrators of UNJHSP intend.  
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As part of the processes of agenda-setting for committees, the prevailing ethnic 
conflicts, beliefs and power differences and contestations were taken out of the deliberative 
agenda of community-based conflict committees.  According to Mr. Erasmus Doe of the 
UNDP, “the technical and steering committees saw the wisdom in allowing the different 
community groups to address their differences themselves, because our mandate is not to 
dabble in the contestations but provide a rallying framework for them to engage each other.  
Once we break ground for the factions to meet, it is our firm conviction that they will be able to 
find a common ground” (E. Doe. August 21, 2011).  The essence of such an elision of 
controversial issues from the agenda set is to arrive at a rational consensus that betrays the 
touted transformational persuasion of the UN JHSP.  This elision confirms the unwillingness of 
the human security program to address the unequal power structures and institutions that are 
critical to dealing with local contestations.  It is important to note that, in the wake of minimal 
recognition and representation of entrenched differences, and the presence of unresponsive 
institutional processes, the tension and insecurity in the region will endure.  The solution to this 
enduring insecurity is clearly not more of the same interventions, but rather, a serious 
rethinking of rationales, assumptions, ideas and imaginations.   
An attempt to homogenize the problems for practical conveniences has proven to be 
infeasible, and this notion attests to the fact that historically unique contexts are not amendable 
to technical rendering.  The impossibility of an attempted technical rendering of the study areas 
can be explained by the salient, inevitable heterogeneity of socio-cultural systems and values.  
A member of the community- based conflict prevention committee suggested to me, in relation 
to limited space accorded to ethnic groups, that “the non-inclusiveness of diverse ethnic groups 
within the community, and in worst circumstance the restricted and formalized modalities of 
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engagement, are not in harmony with our established practice.”  The consensus orientation of 
the community-enhanced conflict prevention committee ends up silencing the socio-cultural 
differences and structural determinants of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment among the 
people.   
The attempted homogenization of the differentiated community members informs 
bounded interventions.  Such bounded interventions are expected to address a complex 
problem, but instead reduces that problem to problem-solving logic or liberal hypo-deductive 
ethos.  Thus, Long indicates that difference among circumstances is not included in aid plans.  
Rather, difference is erased and populations are included in the liberal project insofar as they 
are, or are made, the same (2006, p. 219).  I further posit that the apparent antipathy toward 
critical differences by aid agencies would rather prolong the insecurity of the study sites.   
Contestations associated with the community-oriented conflict programs also center on 
modalities for identifying threats.  A senior member of the butcher’s association made the 
following remarks to reveal the imposition of ‘alien’ procedures on the community: “we have 
our customary procedures that guide us in engaging other ethnic groups over issues of 
importance to all.  The way issues for deliberation have been designed by these UNDP 
personnel put some of us off, because we do not see our grievances being tabled to see the way 
forward.” Moreover, the assumed homogenous and cohesive community groups proved to be a 
highly politically contestable exercise.   
A leader of one of the youth groups, Samson Abu, informed me of the numerous 
occasions on which many of the youth groups rejected the terms of engagement.  Abu 
described the contestable occurrences in the groups: “there were substantial rejections of the 
composition of the leadership of the community groups on the basis that such groups do not 
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represent their pertinent socio-economic interests.  Ethnic composition of the community 
group’s leadership is one of the main factors which led to the rejection as well as unresolved 
community issues.”  These contestations, in my analytical perspective, point to the absence of 
the transformational persuasions of the UN JHSP, and with its simplistic thinking, it is possible 
for diverse polities to be reduced to artificial homogenous groups.  Evidently, the UN JHSP has 
no mechanism to accommodate different contestations and claims.  The likely result of this 
constructed, homogenous group is the endorsement of existing unequal power relations.  
 
Incorporation of Media Actors in Conflict Prevention  
The focus on individual attitudinal change occasioned the development of an educational and 
awareness training program for media actors to complement community interventions.  Mr. E. 
Doe explained the rationale behind the UN JHSP incorporation of media actors.  He explicates 
that the rationale is part of the innovative programming and declares that:  
It is important to know that, in most cases, conflict arises out of 
misinformation and ignorance of the issues at stake, especially as the 
region has a very high number of illiterate population.  Hence, this 
program is geared towards training journalists of the various media houses 
or networks, who will be given sound training to better understand the 
causes, consequences of, and how to, report incidents in order not to 
exacerbate the prevailing tension.  Hopefully, the rural media networks 
will, in the near future, become our permanent information dissemination 
ambassadors in the remote villages.  We have been training some media 
operators in Tamale and other big towns as well. Our expectation is that 
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with a better appreciation of the untoward effects of conflicts in itself will 
have a preventive effect on the conflict tendencies in the region. (E. Doe. 
Interviewed on August 21, 2011) 
This statement reduces the conflict and insecurity issues to mere misinformation.  It 
is not fully clear the extent to which we can impute misinformation to the historical 
and relational grievances that the various factions, especially the minority groups, are 
contesting.   
The media, as an essential player in the contestations, was brought to focus by another 
research participant.  Dr. Awedoba expressed some concerns in relation to the abuse of media 
platforms and conflict in the three northern regions and postulates that: “the high level of 
ignorance and miscommunication being churned out by the various networks could blamed for 
the insecurity in the Northern and in other parts of the two Upper regions.”  In the wake of the 
pervasive structural underpinnings of the conflict and security challenges in the study region, 
calls for the rethinking of the faith placed in educational outreach through the media to effect 
the requisite behavioural changes.  The use of information dissemination to mitigate the 
complex causes of insecurity and poverty-related conflicts in the region is not a straightforward 
process.  With unresolved contentious claims associated with justice and political autonomy for 
the diverse population, I do not understand the mechanisms through which behavioural change 
will transform a relational problem.  I suggest that it is only in the ideal world, whereby the 
structural and institutional foundations are functionally responsive and the international 
political economy is flawless, that an educational awareness program could possibly help to 
prevent conflict and insecurity.   
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As part of the processes of intervention, there has been a significant reliance on experts 
from academia and the UN to train journalists about reporting on issues of conflict, security 
and peace. According to Mr. E. Doe, “our organization, in conformity with standard practice 
within the UN system, hires relevant consultants to deliver the training and other capacity 
building related activities on our behalf.  Some of the consultants teach in the universities and 
we select them based on their expertise in the areas of conflict and development issues in the 
region and their ability to facilitate the training of these journalists.”  This response indicates 
that this training symbolizes a technical rendering of development and security challenges in 
the region.  The training seeks to problematize misinformed individuals as the cause of 
insecurity and poverty.  Again, the transformational prospect of this human security approach 
becomes significantly questionable, as it fails to interrogate the root causes of problems 
contrary to their normative goals or expectations.  Notable root causes for these problems are 
the contestations for political autonomy, exploitation, and land control and ownership.  I 
suggest that this human security program constitutes the UN’s strategy to burden residents with 
the task of maintaining their personal security through information dissemination.   
The educational program for these journalists seeks to homogenize the communities 
through generic educational training.  My interviews with some senior residents in Tamale 
suggest that there are significant differences in terms of the triggers and impacts of the 
conflicts.  Furthermore, the conflict dynamics that I explained in chapter three also suggest that 
conflict prevention cannot be reduced to mere attitudinal change.  Even more contentious, 
according to the elder of a group of residents in Tamale:   
I think there is a missing target in this training program. In fact, there is no 
evidence so far about the significance of media misinformation as the 
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precursor to the conflicts and tension. Most of the major conflicts cannot 
be attributed to any misinformation by a rural radio station; rather, the past 
failed resolutions of the conflicts should have been the major concern of 
the UNDP if they intend to help create peace, stability for development in 
this region.   
This response aligns with similar sentiments shared by other residents with whom I had 
informal conversations to attest to the tenuous implication of the program.  Specifically, Mr. 
Setor, an electrical engineer in Tamale, suggests that numerous media workshops organized by 
the Catholic Relief Services in Damongo, Tamale and Yendi over the past decade have 
illustrated that past governments have not shown interest in addressing the core issues of 
conflict.  The critical issue, here, is that nothing emerged from those workshops, as evidenced 
by the fact that tensions are still rife.  The implication of Setor’s suggestion is that the media is 
not the cause of this tension; rather, it is the inability of the government to search for serious 
long-term processes to address conflicts and insecurity.   
The training modules used by the UNDP aim to produce rational subjects, a move that 
indirectly pathologises community members as having an irrational mindset.  The assumed 
irrational mindset, therefore, becomes an area of reformation.  This disparaging framing 
affirms the position of both Pupavac (2007) and Duffield (2011) that liberal peace has become 
the blueprint that aid agencies rely on as a preventive intervention in post-conflict societies.  
In summary, the articulation of community-based conflict prevention programs in their 
simplistic forms and content creates an imagined tolerant community.  The correlating 
imaginations elide the complex processes that ensure the attainment of the imagined goal of 
order and stability.  Apparently, the weaknesses with the human security-driven intervention 
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are the linear and short-term practices.  This idea is contrary to the normative view espoused by 
Newman (2010, p.23) and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p.157) that human security brings 
long-term perspectives toward the protection and empowerment of individuals and 
communities.  Significantly missing, therefore, in the intervention components of the UN JHSP 
for conflict prevention, are efforts geared towards institutional change related to the judicial 
and distributive systems and the wider polity that are crucial for peaceful co-existence. 
 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurialism as Panacea to Poverty  
Market competiveness to reduce poverty remains the pivotal element of the human security 
framework to reduce poverty.  The quest to achieve this apolitical, market-induced poverty 
reduction depends on the reinvigoration of the innate capabilities of the imagined rational 
subject through the imposition of the double rationalities of autonomy and responsibilization.  
From this liberal perspective, capacity-building and empowerment become the central conduits 
used to promote the idealistic entrepreneurship by which poverty reduction will be anchored.  
A senior official elucidates the poverty reduction policy orthodoxy of the UN JHSP as follows: 
It is well known that poverty is so rife in this region, which in itself 
accounts for the tensions, conflicts and insecurity.  Low productivity and a 
lack of access to the market have been identified by our team of experts.  
Another big factor is the absence of productive skills on the part of the 
youth to embark on viable self-employment has created a large pool of 
high youth unemployment which is a recipe for future conflict and long-
term poverty.  Therefore, we have targeted the agricultural sector and 
instituted youth skill development programs as part of measures to ensure 
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self-employment generation among the teeming youth entering the labour 
market. 
Implicit in this policy orthodoxy intervention is the prioritization of the agricultural sector, 
which is tailored around existing policy frameworks, notably of GPRS 1&2, and MDGs 
priorities, to mention a few. The adopted policy orientation of the UN JHSP favours market 
competitiveness, which requires the need to shore up productivity and the promotion of 
entrepreneurship through capacity-building.  This suggests that the UN JHSP is a replica of the 
liberal framework that lacks any transformational outlook or capability to emancipate the 
Northern Region, contrary to the normative, imagined, and transformative orientation.     
What I deduce from the statement of the UN JHSP official is the continuous naming of 
local deficiencies as the causes of the poverty challenge.  Noticeably, poverty itself is 
represented as an objective phenomenon of analysis in order to facilitate blueprint solutions.  
Therefore, poverty is understood through the abstraction of people who are independent from 
the micro and macro social system in which they struggle for their daily survival.  I contend 
that this externalization thinking makes poverty an exceptional case in which neutral 
interventions become the preferred solution.  It is important to recognize that such a neutral 
framing significantly negates the social-relational processes that produced poverty conditions.   
Underlying this restrictive understanding of poverty, in my thinking, is the simplistic rationales 
that render a problem visible and homogenized for a wide range of different people.  Such a 
technical rendering of the poverty phenomenon facilitates deductive diagnostics and 
prescriptions that are applicable to diverse sites, regardless of their contextual differences.  It is 
in this sense that the study region, deemed a post-conflict society, will require an urgent move 
to ensure the incorporation of the people into the market system.  
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Poverty conditions, as I explained in chapter four, are not a natural phenomenon, but an 
outcome of the processes of adverse social relations at multiple scalar levels.  This relational 
imperative of poverty causation invalidates any intervention that dwells on a problem-solving 
ethos as undertaken under the UN JHSP.  The human security framework employed by the UN 
JHSP, in my judgment, lacks the potency to search for deep-rooted underlying causes of 
poverty as an important development challenge.  More importantly, the search for deep-rooted 
causes is a difficult task, especially when the triggers and drivers of poverty evolve overtime.  
An imperative strategy, therefore, is to adopt a long-term approach that searches for a complex 
understanding of poverty challenges to address both social-relational processes of 
marginalization and adverse exclusions.  Thus, the wider ramifications of the international 
political economy need to be considered when interrogating poverty conditions in the study 
region.  
Agricultural sector interventions constitute one of the means to reduce poverty under 
the UN JHSP.  The idea of an agricultural sector as a promising sector for poverty reduction 
was touted by Mr. Doe of the UNDP, when he informed me that: 
There has been gross underutilization of the enormous agricultural 
resources of the region.  Output of most farmers is nothing to boast of, a 
sore situation that has impoverished many farmers.  Our core priority is 
therefore to boost the productivity of the farmers.  One of our strategies for 
boosting output is through introduction of new crops or products with 
immense marketing opportunities.  The other plan is to boost the capacity 
of agro-processing, which will create employment for non-farmers.  We 
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have identified promising products to support vigorously and these are: 
mango, chili pepper, cotton, guinea fowl and other vegetables.  
This evaluation of the low agricultural yield of the farmers is imputed to supply side 
constraints identified as capacity inadequacy and absence of market competitive products.  
Interviews with select group of farmers, however, provide a much different perspective.  The 
leader of the vegetable farmers, Mr. Issa Mahamadu, told me of the plight of his colleagues and 
himself:  
Every now and then FAO experts come with training schemes to improve 
the quality of our products, especially with the introduction of new 
varieties that tried on experimental basis.  On some occasion we have seen 
modest increment in yield, but in many cases negative output has been 
observed. The real problems for us vegetable farmers remain with high 
cost of loans, land insecurity, no protection and subsidy by the government 
and high cost of farming implements.  Many years ago the government 
rendered many services to us at very low cost, such as fertilizer supply, 
irrigation facilities and extension services.  Now we have to dig deep into 
pockets to bear the full cost of many services.  The market is actually 
killing most of us.  Look at the high interest rate charged by the banks and 
these microfinance companies.  This high interest rate is just a put off to 
most poor farmers, so most have to rely on friends and family members for 
pittance. (I. Mahamadu. Interviewed on September 30, 2011) 
This narrative basically suggests that there is nothing new or innovative about the human 
security framework in addressing the fundamental challenges of farmers.  Instead, following a 
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private sector policy mantra, integration of farmers into the market is deemed as the ultimate 
solution.   
There is no evidence to support any serious effort to address the adverse effects of the 
liberal oriented SAP agricultural policies that have significantly contributed to the 
pauperization of most peasants.  In fact, during an interview with three farmers in Gurmani, a 
suburb of the Tamale metropolis, Suleiman, I heard about the dire conditions farmers found 
themselves in after the SAP reforms:  
Yaro! [Hausa term for a young man] we are fed up with all these 
organizations that come to us as ‘angels’ to ease our challenges.  Ever 
since the government reduced drastically its support to our agricultural 
vocation since the mid-1980s, life has never been the same for our 
families’ well-being.  How do you expect us to buy inputs from the same 
market that the rich farmers also patronize?  
Suleiman’s testimony points to the enduring adverse effects of liberal agricultural policies 
which began in the early 1980s and are now being consolidated by the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture.  The Agreement on Agriculture, in its present circumstance, limits intensive state 
support or subsidies for the agricultural sector.  From my perspective, the Agreement on 
Agriculture, with its emphasis on further liberalization, will undermine the necessary policy 
space that agrarian regions and economies urgently require to address non-tariff barriers to 
agriculture.   Any intervention worthy of its claim to transform the socio-economic fortunes of 
the people of the Northern Region cannot be oblivious to the ramifications of international 
development policy directives.  
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The transformational claims of the human security approach by the senior officials of 
the UN JHSP are more wishful thinking than actually helpful.  I concur, therefore, with 
McCormack, who suggests that the human security approach is “less than a transformation in 
conceptualizing and doing security and development” (2011, p. 255).  Given the questionable 
transformational prospects of the UN JHSP, I suggest that the organization rather reflects a 
disjuncture between the rhetoric of one tale told, but the correlating programs tell significantly 
different tales.   
The poverty-oriented agricultural intervention as a plan to support peasant farmers 
reveals contradictory targeting in its implementation.  The selectivity of the products to be 
introduced and supported actually do not include crops cultivated by most of the peasant 
farmers.  A research participant from the MOFA attests to this deliberately selective 
exclusionary practice:  
The official records available to us show that most of the peasant farmers 
are into tomato, yam, rice, beans, shea butter and grains such as millet and 
sorghum cultivation.   Our opinions were sought but the recommendation 
from us that the crops of the peasants must dominate the interventions 
virtually fell on deaf ears.  With our hands tied we couldn’t change 
anything.  These donor agencies always come to us with their own plans 
that spell out their priorities.  Frankly, I wonder why these so-called 
development partners pretend to seek our professional advice and insights 
only to dump our views like garbage.  
The response by the MOFA official reflects an imbalance in power relations in favor of the UN 
JHSP’s determination of the crops to be supported.  This exercise of asymmetric power 
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relations certainly ruins the transformational prospects of the UN JHSP.  This asymmetric 
power relation also has a higher likelihood of marginalizing the peasants, rather than 
transforming their lives.  These exclusionary and contradictory processes are core 
manifestations of an over-arching market competition rationale that drives the intervention and 
they ignore principles of equity, justice and fairness.  
Another level of discrimination relates to the criteria for selection.  In respect to crop 
selection, Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP, revealed the reason behind the choice of particular 
crops and beneficiary farmers: “in view of the short-term nature of the project, from 2009-
2013, we have to be selective with which farmers to support, having in mind the crops whose 
market viability, especially for exports have been established by the experts.  Therefore, we 
expect the supported farmers to have the requisite resources to adapt to the training and 
support.”  This response appears to be a rendition of the colonial administration policy to 
support crops of higher export value, as I discus in chapter three.   Also clear from the project 
officer’s response is that the agricultural intervention is basically a short-term project. In the 
wake of chronic poverty in the region, enabling such a limited time frame for intervention is in 
my view not well conditioned to interrogate the long-standing, adverse structural and power 
relation processes that precipitated poverty conditions in the study region.  Moreover, the 
short-term nature of this project is underpinned by non-transformational rationales of 
simplification, which lead to depoliticized solutions that are deemed viable options for 
intervention.  
Further problems have been revealed in the highly adverse, selective nature of the UN 
JHSP agriculture sector, which came to light during an interview with some unemployed 
farmers in Jisonayili, one of the farming villages of Tamale.  A member of a group of 
265 
 
unemployed farmers outlined the following demands as fundamental prerequisites for 
eligibility for agricultural support: sustained progress, secured land and assets to use as 
collateral.  I did encounter farmers eligible for UN JHSP support, but one of these farmers, 
Issaka Razak, explained to me why they refused any support from external agencies: 
This is not the first time we have seen the introduction of new crops to 
increase our yield.  However, with the past failures being our guide, we did 
not find it expedient to avail ourselves for support.  We will continue with 
our food crop production that supports us during the lean season due to the 
little savings we make from it, instead of adopting these vegetables to serve 
an urban market which does not favour us. (I. Razak. Interviewed on 
September 30, 2011) 
This response reiterates the built-in exclusionary and marginalizing nature of the UN JHSP in 
its quest to reduce poverty.  These contradictory circumstances are symptomatic of liberal 
practices that are far from being all-inclusive.  The true reflection of the failure of agricultural 
aid programs is in the promotion of an unbridled, uneven selection process that targets specific 
populations and spaces. The transformational claim of the human security framework, based on 
these findings, cannot be accurate.  The emerging contradictory outcomes instead have a 
potential effect of straining already tensed inter/intra ethnic relations as a result of selective 
market-driven practices.    
The articulated liberal market interventions appear to display a level of insensitivity 
toward a region with a long history of conflicts and insecurity.  This contradictory practice 
suggests the need for the UN JHSP to engage in considerably deeper introspective assessments 
of their interventions.  As to whether program managers are willing to exercise this kind of an 
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internal forensic examination of the ideas, assumptions and rationales behind the interventions, 
is uncertain. 
 
Skills Development: A Magic Bullet for Youth Employment Creation?  
The poverty reduction component of the UN JHSP, as I indicated earlier in this chapter, is 
aimed at market competitiveness with capacity building and empowerment as its driving 
instruments.  In addition, the problematization of youth is necessary for the UNJHSP program 
to meet its objectives.  I previously quoted the program manager of the UNDP, who identified 
the high youth unemployment rate as a major cause of conflict, as well as an obstacle for 
conflict prevention.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the youth skills development project is 
packaged as a mechanism for both poverty reduction and conflict prevention.  An official of 
the UNU, Mr. Raphael Azumah, highlighted some justifications for their focus on the 
promotion of skills development for youths:  
The youth constitute the future of every society.  Therefore it becomes the 
mandate of every government and other stakeholders in the Northern 
Region to address the future well-being of the youth.  With the current high 
youth unemployment, we see it as a national security threat beyond the 
region.  So we cannot wait any longer. By not addressing this youth 
unemployment menace as a means for poverty reduction and conflict 
prevention.  As you remember the timeless adage; the devil finds job for 
idle hands, it is important therefore we equip the youth to direct their 
energies and skills in tapping into the opportunities offered by the global 
market. (R. Azumah. Interviewed on October 12, 2011) 
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Azumah’s response is suggestive of a causal linkage between poverty and violent conflict and 
insecurity.  It also problematizes youth unemployment as the main aetiology of insecurity in 
the entire Northern Region.  This imagined causal linkage is quite problematic because it rests 
on a simplistic assumption that makes economic motivation a key determinant of violent 
conflict and insecurity.  The policy implication of such an assumption is that addressing 
unemployment challenges will translate into poverty reduction and ultimately prevent conflict 
and insecurity.  Moreover, there is a relentless attempt by the UNU official to problematize the 
local terrain, independent of external factors, as responsible for the unemployment situation.  
By focusing on the economic imperative and remaining silent on the grievance claims of 
marginalization, injustice and exclusion, the transformational prospect of the UN JHSP is lost.  
Furthermore, as part of the problematization of youth as a site of intervention, the 
homogenized youth were framed as lacking the skills to enter and endure the competitive 
labour market.  Thus, Mr. Erasmus Doe of the UNDP expressed some remarks in relation to 
the ‘youth’ as a vital demographic category in need of support:  
A larger majority of the youth in both the urban and rural communities of 
the region lack appropriate skills to make a worthy living.  Therefore, the 
UNDP will liaise with the National Board of Small-Scale Industries 
(NBSSI) as well as United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) to develop appropriate skills in ICT, reorient butchers and 
blacksmiths with skills to venture into rewarding vocations.  (E. Doe. 
Interviewed on August 21, 2011) 
The key point in this claim by the UNDP official is the foregrounding of individual 
responsibility as a precondition for a person’s future progress through skill training.  In arguing 
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for the significance of a broader perspective, I posit that the long-term unemployment rate in 
the region is structural in nature, because it is produced and reproduced by the interplay of 
dominant systems and processes pervasive within the core economy and external forces.  Thus, 
a reductive-oriented youth skills development project cannot transform or significantly 
improve unemployment rates among youth or prevent conflict in the Northern Region.  
Further, and consistent with the belief that the market is the solution for unemployment, 
critical factors such as multiple social, economic, and political deprivations have been glossed 
over in order to render short-term and technical-oriented training or input-output analysis.  On 
the basis of this vital omission of relational factors, I object to the transformational claims 
proffered by the human security framework.  It is interesting to take note of the internal 
institutional power wrangling between officials of NBSSI and the UNDP, whose conflicts 
ultimately renders any collaborative work futile.  
The youth training scheme that has been embraced by youth groups contrary to the 
expectations of program managers.  A substantial number of butchers were earmarked for 
training, but most rejected the offer on the grounds that they are satisfied with their current 
vocation, notwithstanding its challenges.  Dauda Yakubu, one of the butchers, expressed the 
following sentiments: “I am prepared to attend to training programs that I know will transform 
my life and impact positively on my family. Bro! The training activities we are being 
encouraged to attend are nothing to guarantee us a secure future.  Sometimes when they want 
to help us, at least they should seek our views and must refrain from thinking of what is best 
for us.”  Yakubu’s remarks depict the empty nature of the youth skills development program, 
which is a replication of colonial practices that provided limited vocational training as a way of 
containing the population.  Inherent in Yakubu’s response is the perpetuation of top-down 
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approaches of poverty-oriented development interventions, in which case the ideas and 
prescriptions of an expert must prevail.  It is obvious that a simplistic approach to job creation 
implies that the official objective is to meet the survival needs of the residents, but not to 
address their long-term socio-economic priorities.  To address the long-term well-being of 
youth would necessitate processes toward structural and institutional changes.  This urgent 
need for structural and institutional changes is largely absent in the human security framework.  
Other interviewees expressed similar remarks to those of Yakubu, suggesting the extent of the 
resentment that youth have for intervention programs. 
The youth training program also reveals the simplistic, short-term rationale of 
attempting to remake individuals into idealized working subjects.  The simplicity lies in the 
thinking that the butchers, for instance, would happily abandon their life-long professions and 
adopt new ones that are shrouded in a cloud of uncertainty.  A possible net effect, here, is that 
the prosaic conundrum of poverty and insecurity become more entrenched as interventionists 
repeatedly fail to understand the complexity of the situation.   In a way, the expert-driven youth 
program resonates with ‘program to fail’ intervention plans, especially the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund (NUSAF), which was financed by the World Bank in conflict-prone 
Northern Uganda.  The structural and social relational factors in Northern Uganda were 
ignored in the articulation of the apolitical NUSAF.  In the end, the NUSAF did not reverse 
chronic poverty conditions in Northern Uganda (Gooloba- Mutebi and Hickey, 2009, p. 31).  
Similarly, the youth skills development program clearly ignores the structural conditions that 
are fundamental to enhancing its success.  The UN JHSP evaluation Report of May 2012 
admits the program’s failure to forge a collaborative alliance with NBSSI.  The Report states: 
“collaborations with local partners such as NBSSI…have to date been superficial; and their 
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potential has not yet been adequately exploited to support key outputs” (UN JHSP, p. 14, 
2012).  The program is structured around a collaborative orientation, but has no recourse to 
think clearly about the driving motivations behind aid interventions.  
A significant aspect of the processes of establishing an employment skills training 
program entail the elision of the structural and historical formations of the locale.  
Continuously silenced from the programming is the adverse incorporation of the locale into the 
wider polity within the political economy of Ghana.  I posit that the chronic nature of poverty 
in the metropolis cannot be reduced to lack of employment for which an expertly informed 
employment strategy becomes the panacea.  From my perspective, the structural nature of 
unemployment within both the metropolis and the region reflects systemic historical and 
contemporary failures within the political, social and economic relations at the regional, 
national and global scales.  The connectivity of the region to both national and global policies 
suggests that programs for employment generation must factor in the effects of global 
development and national policies.  For instance Khor’s (2006) work on the effects of the 
liberalization of agriculture as part of SAP indicates the extent to which most farmers in the 
Northern Region were rendered unemployed.  I suggest that the market approach, imbued with 
short-term and apolitical orientations, cannot address a region that is beset with complex power 
relational and structural challenges.  Therefore, deepening of the reforms after initial failures 
will not suffice because the driving rationales behind the reforms themselves need to be 
reexamined in detail. 
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Concluding remarks 
On the basis of the interventions that I have analyzed in this chapter, I suggest that the practice 
of joint articulation of development and security interventions by the UN JHSP are in full 
conformity with the frameworks developed by the established international development aid 
enterprise.  With the adoption of the dominant international development frameworks by the 
human security framework, I suggest that the DSN, in effect, lacks any potency for conflict 
prevention and poverty reduction.  The UNJHSP in its current form and content, then, cannot 
secure the Northern Region.  From the evidence analyzed, I suggest that the UN JHSP 
interventions also embody colonial community that does not reflect a transformational project.  
An important issue within aid interventions is that they are driven by rationales and 
assumptions that make it impossible to secure the study areas and the region as a whole.  
Specifically, the inability of the human security framework secure the region can be linked to 
the technocratic orientation of rationales that endlessly seek to reduce problems to rely on 
standardized solutions over a short time frame.  The failure on the part of the UNJHSP to 
recognize the relational dynamics that impact the region, creates a disconnect with the macro-
institutional foundations that are vital to secure the region.  It must be added that the 
exclusionary and contradictory processes of aid interventions also minimize any prospect of 
securing the region.  This inability to secure the region lies in the fact that the program does not 
foster a cohesive foundation on which long-term interventions that will be guided by realistic 
assumptions can be pursued to transform the region.    
Securing the study region through the market approach remains an inconceivable 
elusive goal.  The elusiveness associated with the faith placed on the market as the means to 
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revive post-conflict society renders it difficult to achieve.  From my perspective, the market, 
with its economic profit maximization motivation, distorts the broader relational and 
institutional conditions critical for securing the region.  Under the influence of Sen’s 
capabilities notion, this UN JHSP represents an attempt to project post-industrial subjectivities 
fostered by market capitalism onto a traditional economy of a post-colonial region.  This 
attempt to remake or civilize the farmers in order to convince them to respond to market 
signals is an attempt to promote self-reliance, and poverty-reduction programs. This constitutes 
an exercise devoid of the broader structural and relational conditions vital to securing the future 
of the selected farmers. These market empowerment programs endorse conservative practices 
and have the possible effect of consolidating existing asymmetric power relations.   
Market interventions problematically normalize the adverse political representations of 
the needs of the poor.  More specifically, the terms of recognition and political representation 
of the needs and priorities of the poor are crucial issues to consider.  In support of this power-
related political representation, Mosse (2010, p. 1172) points out the vitality of examining the 
relational foundation of poverty.  Such an examination of the relational underpinning of 
poverty, Mosse notes, will foster a better understanding of how groups of people are confined 
to poverty.  Through such relational scrutiny, the diverse institutions and actors that claim to 
represent the interests of the poor will constitute an arena of contestation for change.  Particular 
issues of contestation will include the social classification, needs and priorities of the poor.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
I suggest that addressing the developmental and security challenges of a conflict prone 
region would require long-term dialectical social change processes, as I explained in chapter 
four.  Thus, a critical issue of state formation and search for long-term approaches must be 
underwritten by realistic rationales that should drive interventions aimed at securing the 
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Northern Region.  The reality is that voluntaristic capacity building strategies aimed at farmers 
and other producer groups limits them to a narrow domain of economic vocation.  Furthermore, 
the capacity boosting required must be geared towards effecting transformation in the 
institutional structures that work towards enhancing the political representation of the disparate 
poor in the region.  As I suggested in chapter four, securing of the region is critically dependent 
on the nature of relations within the global political economy, and not in the entrenchment of 
the global power inequalities being endorsed by the current UN JHSP.  
On the whole, the nexus between security and development is not a given and thus this 
imagined DSN may, at best, exist under extreme idealistic conditions.  Analyses of the 
interventions that are influenced by the existing international development frameworks, 
therefore, suggest that there is nothing new with the DSN.  In fact, these interventions, under 
the notion of DSN, are replications of existing and past interventions. Prima facie empirical 
observations do not suggest clear functional relations among the diverse institutions.  The next 
chapter, therefore, will examine in detail the institutional relations between the two sectors and 
discuss at length how the implementation challenges have been framed. 
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Chapter Six 
Post-liberal Interventions: A Solution to the Development and Security Impasse? 
 
Introduction 
Chapters four and five of this dissertation palpably demonstrate the colossal failure of the 
articulation of both development and security interventions put in place to secure the Northern 
Region.  I suggest that these failures provide justifiable grounds from the perspective of aid 
agencies to re-enact ‘new’ solutions to the problems in the Northern Region.   In my view, this 
impasse has proven to be the result of failures associated with colonial interventions in the 
period, and urgently reflects a need for a rethinking of the veracity and potency of the DSN.  
Of utmost significance here is the need to examine the underlying rationales or assumptions 
about peace in the area that are largely ignored in mainstream literature.   This chapter seeks to 
interrogate whether alleged reciprocal relations between development and security exist or if 
the tendentious nexus has other motives.  A possible reason behind the existence of these other 
motives might be to perpetuate liberal and technical solutions by the foreclosure of viable 
alternatives.     
A key argument of this chapter is that to perpetuate liberal and technical interventions 
by the aid agencies, implementation challenges have been scaled down to coordination and 
capacity constraints.  Based on evidence obtained during my fieldwork, I suggest that the 
assumed reciprocal relationship between development and security is an imagined one that is 
deficient of empirical evidence.  This chapter seeks to provide empirical insights into the 
problematic rhetorical nexus touted by the aid industry as a panacea for insecurity and poverty 
phenomena in post-conflict regions.   
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In terms of the impasse emanating from the articulation of the DSN, Duffield (2010) 
suggests that the failure of security and development interventions serves to maintain the 
global life chance divide between developed and developing countries.  From my perspective, 
however, it is absolutely imperative to interrogate the intricate processes through which the 
dire developmental gap is reproduced as it relates to the study region.  The essence of this 
chapter is to provide empirical insights into how the proposed remedial measures invariably 
have the highest likelihood of maintaining the status quo liberal interventionist practices in the 
study region.  
 Another vital argument here is that the quest to aggregate implementation challenges 
around coordination failures and capacity constraints reflects the simplistic framing of a 
complex structural, historical and social challenge.  The consequence of the elision of these 
complex factors is that, when examining the implementation challenges, aid agencies are 
provided with an avenue to adopt technocratic solutions through the perpetuation of ‘business 
as usual’ practices in the area.  In my view, the rationales and assumptions made about the 
region are potent vectors that can expose the flaws in localized and indigenized discrete 
implementation challenges.  The central research question of this thesis is vital in investigating 
how these rationales were articulated in the region.  An integral part of the issues these 
implementation challenges articulated is the unassailable problematization of the local as the 
bearer of responsibility regarding the challenges of implementation.  I posit, however, that 
these deliberate attempts to problematize the local are calculated tactics used to exonerate aid 
agencies from their complicity in failures to implement development and security challenges 
and I reiterate that solutions driven by same rationales are likely to be counterproductive.     
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In order to address the arguments that I have advanced, this chapter proceeds through 
several sections.  The first section will discuss the operational challenges germane to the joint 
articulation of development and security related interventions.  The officially-identified 
challenges to stability in the Northern Region primarily center on weak local capability and 
coordination problems, which tacitly endorse top-down interventions, and thereby instigate 
deepening interventions in the area through what Duffield calls a shift from containment to 
resilience measures.  Pritchett and Woolcock (2004, p. 201) also suggest that the reduction of 
complex problems to technical understandings enable the aid industry to resort to 
intensification, amputation and policy-reform practices.  Associated proposed programmes in 
the area, primarily the DFID program on Making Markets Work and Early Warning System, 
reflect intensification and policy reforms that will be discussed accordingly.  The second 
section deals with the institutional challenges of the supposed joint/fused interventions by 
collaborating UN agencies.  The essence of this section is to provide insight into the non-
seamless nature of the DSN.  This section also reveals the institutional power politics and the 
legitimacy deficits demonstrated by the main local actor – the metropolitan and district 
assemblies (that is, the decentralized agencies through which most of the interventions are 
deployed).   
The third section concludes the chapter, first with a critical discussion of neglected 
factors in the articulation of post-liberal interventions remedial options.  The essence of this 
section is to demonstrate the need to embrace complex political economies, politics and other 
relational factors in order to address the security and development challenges in the area.  More 
particularly, I propose a plausible alternative in calling for a shift in the focus of the aid 
agencies from multilateral and bilateral-based interventions towards an engagement in state 
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formation (political context) processes.  The call for renewed focus on state formation is, as 
argued in chapter three, based on the problematic political and economic incorporation of the 
Northern Region into the nation-state of Ghana.  Specifically, this flawed relational integration 
of the Northern Region has been a neglected factor in both aid interventions, and the proposed 
remedial options to secure the region. The second component of the third section of this 
chapter contains my concluding remarks, and also serves as an introduction to the next, and 
final, chapter.  
This chapter employs data gathered through interviews with key respondents.  Key 
research participants were drawn from the various aid agencies operating in the area, the 
Tamale Municipal Assembly (TAMA), local NGOs, and farmers in several communities in 
Tamale.  In-depth interviews were mainly conducted with key informants from both the aid 
agencies and TAMA.   I adopted more informal conversation methods when interviewing the 
selected farmers.   
 
Articulation of the Development-Security Nexus: A Linear or Non-Linear Practice? 
 A prima facie notion of the aid nexus suggests a mutually compatible conceptual and 
operational relationship between the two autonomous concepts involved in the discussion.  A 
‘nexus,’ as defined by Stern and Ojendal (2010, p. 11), is a “network of connections between 
disparate ideas, processes or objects and alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of 
possible linkages and relationship.  From an empirical viewpoint, however, a nexus does not 
portray a linear relationship.  In substantiating an argument for the non-linear or incompatible 
relations between the security and development interventions, the UN JHSP will be the fulcrum 
of the analysis.   
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The operational mutuality of poverty, conflict and under-development in the area were 
issues that the DSN sought to bring to light.  In order to establish the mutual relations between 
these three conditions, I sought the views of Mr. Awudu Tahiru, a national operations manager 
of the UN JHSP, to clarify the organization’s position on the relationships between all three 
elements.  Mr. Tahiru told me of his conviction that instrumental linkages exist among the 
conditions:   
The underdevelopment and poverty in the 3 Northern Regions have 
persisted for centuries.  In fact, conflict has been the single overriding 
factor responsible for the development crises that have destroyed the 
economic opportunities of the people in this part of the country. It also 
makes the regions unattractive to investors (foreign and domestic) to boost 
the economy of the regions.  Uniquely, the three Northern Regions tend to 
have similar socio-economic characteristics; therefore we expect the three 
regions to grow at the same pace.  However, poverty incidence appears to 
be more prone in the Northern Region than the Upper West and East 
Regions.  Preliminary studies undertaken for and by the UNDP indicate 
that the intractable conflicts in the Northern Region explain the Region’s 
negative development outcomes.  It is our expectation therefore that when 
we target both development and conflict preventions programmes and 
other broad initiatives there will be stability in the region to ensure poverty 
reduction. We deem sustained poverty reduction also a lasting solution to 
the conflict, tension and insecurity in the regions of operation.  That is why 
we developed this integrated Human Security Program comprising the six 
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UN agencies to work in Tamale, Yendi, Bawku and Wa. (A. Tahiru, 
Interviewed on October 4, 2011) 
Flowing from this answer is a suggestion of the inevitable, imagined nexus between security 
and development.  Also explicit in Mr. Tahiru’s response is his reiteration of the orthodox 
dictum of stability being a precondition for poverty reduction and vice versa.  It is imperative 
to question the basis on which those preliminary studies arrived at these compressed causal 
relations.  My investigation into these studies hit a glass ceiling because, according to Mr. 
Tahiru, such studies are classified reports not meant for the general public.  Invoking the nexus 
as an inevitable intervention to secure the region would necessarily require collaborative efforts 
among autonomous organizations.  
On the contrary, the unfounded enthusiasm and high expectations of the human security 
program, in terms of delivering effective programmes to maximize collective security and 
reduce poverty in the region, have been met with bleak outcomes as an unfolding reality. This 
contradictory outcome in the articulation of development and security interventions is well 
rooted in the region’s historical formation, as explained in chapter three.  Evidence of these 
bleak outcomes has been outlined by Dr. K. Shakita of the UNU: “There are high levels of 
tensions, grievances and contestation among feuding parties, whereby there is a tendency of the 
dominant parties to dictate the issues to be discussed; some opinion leaders have hijacked the 
meetings which ultimately led to the withdrawal of aggrieved parties from further negotiation.”  
As I indicated in earlier chapters, such failures should be expected in view of the simplistic 
approach employed by the UN JHSP to address a complex problem.  It is quite strange that Dr. 
Shakita did not anticipate this prior failure, a fact that I attribute to the unrealistic rationales 
behind the interventions. 
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The vital issue here, however, relates to the denial of responsibility for these failed 
initiatives on the part of the collaborating agencies, which blame targeted participants in the 
community-based conflict prevention project for its failure.  An important issue here is the 
silencing of unrealistic assumptions about the possibility of change through pre-programmed 
interventions.  This linear-oriented possibility of change inadvertently provided the 
interventionist space and scope to perpetuate stove-piped development and security 
interventions.  In the light of the perpetuation of this ‘business as usual’ practice, Dr. Shakita 
issued this remedial option: “there is a need to deepen the capacity training we have been 
providing for the people with the hope that over time they will absorb the knowledge and skills 
imparted to them.  With further training I believe the trainees will be able to identify potential 
threats, conscientize their people about peaceful living and improve the dialogue and 
negotiations.” 
The streak of the disappointing outcomes of the UNJHSP projects was brought up by 
Ms. Ramatu Abugri, a Project Officer of UNU. Ramatu attributed weak collaboration between 
the field officers and the program co-ordinating units as responsible for the poor outcomes.  
According to Ramatu, the poor coordination affected the preparation of the timely reporting 
that is vital for program implementations.  In a similar vein, Mr. Erasmus Doe, a Program 
Manager of the UNDP, expressed misgivings about the ‘unexpected failed’ outcomes of the 
UNJHSP. Mr. Doe poured out his frustration with the disappointing outcomes:  
We set out to address this difficult problem of insecurity and poverty in the 
region, however, it seems, the collaborating agencies do not care about the 
success of this program.  Each organization is only interested in the success 
of their individual priorities.  I have emphasized on many occasions to the 
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expected collaborating agencies about the need to work integrate their 
activities, which I think is the only way to ensure the success of this 
laudable programme.  (E. Doe, Interviewed on August 21, 2011) 
Ramatu and Doe’s responses demonstrate the high premiums placed on instrumental and 
technical factors in these aid solutions.  In addition, the essence of the prioritization of these 
technical factors is to provide justification for continuous reliance on expert-designed 
interventions to correct deep-seated, historically adverse social relations within the Northern 
Region.  The point that needs to be forcefully made is the gross ignorance, from an official 
standpoint, of the implementation challenges and the rationales or assumptions that underpin 
their own interventions.  The absolute silencing of these rationales by the aid agencies 
reinforces the central research question for this dissertation: one about the way these rationales 
were articulated.  The subsequent subsidiary questions regarding the examination of 
implementation challenges between development and security practices become vital to an 
understanding of the way implementation challenges have been framed.   
From my critical position, these rationales should be a purposeful guide in interrogating 
the implementation challenges.  I contend that if the rationales for these interventions are 
considered as critical to implementation challenges, a better understanding of the complexity of 
these issues will be gained.  The plausible explanation that comes to mind is that these 
technically-diagnosed failures of intervention strategically become justification for continued 
interventions.  In this regard, Pritchett and Woolcock (2004, p. 201-202) reinforce the 
suggestion that these technical justifications constitute a ruse for the intensification of existing 
programmes and policy reform.  Intensification as a response to interventionist failures, 
according to Pritchett and Woolcock (2004), “point to proximate, logistical, technical causes 
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and attempt to remedy the failures directly, but within the same institutional structure, that is 
with the same patterns of interaction among the agents and hence with the same incentives” (p. 
201).  Therefore, the implementation challenges in the DSN interventions are placed at the 
door-step of technical diagnosis.  Emerging from these technical diagnoses is the imputation of 
failure to the weak capacity of the intended beneficiary.  The failure to implement the assigned 
responsibilities regardless of the operational impossibility of a programme becomes theirs.   
It is important to note that framing targeted beneficiaries as both the source of problems 
in the localities and also the solution to those problems appears, from my observation and study 
of the kind of interventionist practices at work in the Northern Region, to result in an 
intensification of the programming orientation.  This deference for similar intervention, despite 
their inefficacy, is predicated upon an unyielding faith in capacity-building, through which 
domestic actors are expected to develop the requisite skills and knowledge to implement the 
program’s activities.  In particular, DfID sponsored an early warning system project in which 
GHANEP’s failure to meet performance targets set by DFID led to further training of 
GHANEP personnel in the hope that it would translate into program success.  In fact, Mr. A. 
Sakibu, security analyst with GHANEP, revealed to me his experiences with DfID:  
Our organization works for DFID regarding the early warning system to 
mitigate conflicts and insecurity in the region.  DFID set out targets to 
meet; these are targets imposed on us and we are expected to achieve them 
after we have been given some training through seminars and other 
workshops to sharpen our skills. We find the training irrelevant because the 
targets are unrealistic. Because DfID brings foreign experts who we are 
supposed to learn from, our views are not accommodated.  During the 
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Dagbon Crisis in March 2002, against all caution, the UNDP did not listen 
to us, because I, for example, do not have a doctorate degree.  With the 
new early warning system that DFID has initiated in the region, two of my 
colleagues and I have been scheduled for further training as a precondition 
to attain the imposed targets. (A. Sakibu. Interviewed on September 19, 
2011). 
The crucial point here is that DFID did not consider it important to question the working 
rationales or assumptions behind the early warning system, particularly in terms of its 
addressing of the structural causes of insecurity within the Tamale and the region as a whole.  
The early warning system, notwithstanding the much-touted potential to curb insecurity and 
foster the stability that is vital for poverty reduction, remains an over-hyped practice.   
In fact, an assessment of the effectiveness of early warning system as a conflict-
prevention mechanism by Col. R. Adotey (retd), a security expert, shows dismal findings.  Col. 
Adotey (retd) exposes the flaws in the early warning system when he notes that:  
This insecurity in this regional capital and region as a whole goes beyond 
using early warning systems. Even more complicated is the translation of 
the early warning system into development outcomes.  The continuous 
insecurity and conflict propensity should alert these donor agencies to 
pause, reflect, and begin to look for long-term solutions that will penetrate 
deep into the political and social core of the region. (Col.  Adotey (retd), 
September 23, 2011) 
Col. Adotey’s (retd) information supports my position that the results-driven aid industry 
appears to remain stuck in their contagious, failed, quick-fix technical solutions.  Unless there 
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is a systemic change in the rationales, ideas, imagination and structures that condition these 
interventions, I cannot foresee any transformational outcomes.  What is more worrying as I 
indicated in Chapter Five, is that UN JHSP officials are patently aware of the tension and 
insecurity in the region, despite their conglomeration of intervention practices.  None of these 
officials, however, see the crucial need to think critically about the ideological and ontological 
foundations of their aid practices.  The essential issue, here, is that insofar as the interventionist 
rationale and assumptions remain ossified along a simplistic and linear instrumental 
orientation, it is inconceivable that there could be transformational change.  The likely 
consequence of the failure to secure complex aid practices, in my judgment, is the 
intensification of existing practices which could lead to recommendations for deeper reforms 
for the invented recipients.  
 
Institutional Challenges to the articulation of Development-Security Nexus 
From the interviews I conducted with aid officials during my fieldwork, I can surmise that the 
developmental and security interventions in the Northern Region demonstrate adequate 
institutional differences to instigate a questioning of the veracity of the DSN.  By using the six 
expected UN collaborating agencies responsible for both development and security 
interventions, it becomes clear that there is an empirical chasm of nexus at the institutional aid 
level.   Mr. A. Moro, Program Manager of UN JHSP admits to this institutional lacuna, states 
that: “collaboration between the six agencies so far has remained virtually non-existent. 
Communication between the organizations to facilitate a smooth exchange of actionable 
information is also yet to be seen.  These organizations seem to be comfortable with their 
traditional mandate” (A. Moro, Interviewed on August 11, 2011).  The implication of this 
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statement is that it demonstrates the continuous existence of institutional monism, whereby 
various organizations have maintained their traditional area of focus, despite their lack of 
success in the region.   
Mr. Blaise Trarore and Ms. Ayeshetu Suleiman, both senior officers of the WFP, have 
confirmed the overwhelming prioritization of the traditional mandate of these UN agencies in 
this aid situation.  They revealed to me that the main programmes of priority of the WFP are at 
variance with the expectations of the JHSP:  
The WFP has its core goals and priority areas of operation and currently 
we have two main programmes purposely for reduction in the current level 
of malnutrition in the deprived districts and supply food to Government’s 
earmarked districts and communities for the School Feeding Project.  It is 
our belief that in providing the school feeding service primary school 
enrollment will increase. We are worried about conflict and tension in the 
communities; however, they do not matter in terms of our priorities. (B. 
Traore and A. Suleiman, Interviewed on September 17, 2011) 
Consistent with the normative aid practice, the WFP pursues expert driven problem-solution 
approaches or supply-side interventions that eventually exclude the fundamental or real causes 
of poverty and development issues in search of quick-fix solutions.  The WFP’s other 
activities, as disclosed to me by Traore, include expert training capacity training schemes for 
selected women in the shea sector; this program was designed to be a selective training scheme 
for women operating plantations at a medium scale.  The prioritization of medium-scale 
operators technically and practically disqualified the subsistence shea producers within the 
Tamale and Yendi villages as well as other parts of the region from the benefits of aid 
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practices.  The poverty-reducing effect of this intervention ultimately becomes highly 
questionable given that the WFP’s operations give minuscule attention to the pervasive 
domestic, global structural, and institutional processes that have contributed to the quagmire 
state of insecurity and poverty in the region.  
Moreover, it is crucial to note that Mr. E. Doe of the UNDP indicates that rare working 
relations exist between the UNDP and WFP in terms of supporting the community conflict 
preventions programmes rolled up under the auspices of the UN JHSP.  This non-working 
relationship gives credence to the rhetorical orientation being displayed by the DSN as a new 
‘magic bullet’ in the aid industry.  The crucial issue in my mind, however, relates to the 
positivistic rationales that drive the interventions as a whole.  Even granted that there has been 
effective collaboration in the past, I envisage a problem with the content of these interventions, 
as well as the modalities through which beneficiaries are selected.  As stated in chapter five, 
the contentious politics that characterize the selection of potential beneficiaries and the 
unaddressed regional, national and global structural deficiencies betray the poverty reduction 
and security enhancement possibilities in the region.     
 The prevailing institutional monism that most aid agencies practice reinforce the weak 
theoretical understanding on the part of these disparate organizations normatively conceived of 
as instrumental and, more importantly, neutral entities.  The reality, however, is that these 
institutions are driven by internally generated norms, values and administrative procedures, a 
fact which leads to the inability on the part of each organization to shed its main foci of 
operations.  Further interrogation reveals that these organizations have different funding 
schemes tied to different programmes, along with different budget cycles, that are not flexible 
enough to accommodate non-traditional priority activities.  Above all, these organizations have 
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different constituencies that they need to appease, which makes joint collaboration between 
them a pathetically utopian proposition.  To buttress this contention, Mr. Peter Mensah, an 
official of the FAO explained to me that:  
The FAO has limited budgets to even to address the food security problem 
in the region through its capacity building projects to improve the farming 
techniques of farmers, training of government extension officers, local 
NGOs in areas of water conservation, pest control, fertilizer application, 
post-harvest loss prevention and facilitate agro processing schemes.  All 
these activities are to be undertaken to achieve the set goals within a time-
bound limit.  (P. Mensah.  Interviewed on September 27, 2011).   
This limited budget also means that that the FAO, for instance, cannot make extra 
budgetary provisions to support activities in post-conflict areas, especially ones that 
compete with their other priorities. A further implication is that the FAO cannot 
sacrifice its primary organizational responsibilities in the name of working for a 
nexus that seeks to reorient its activities.  This constrained nexus reflects an empty 
promising machine, typical of an aid industry with limited resources to deliver.  In 
the end, the burden falls on individuals as the bearer of responsibility towards their 
own personal security and development.  
Considering the complex challenges in the agricultural sector in study region, I posit 
that the core functions as indicated by FAO officials do not imply that the FAO is producing a 
sustained poverty reducing effect.  Beyond this, it is my contention that the top-down farming 
knowledge that the FAO is disseminating, alongside their top-down training schemes are not in 
tune with the needs of small-scale farmers.  In fact, three local farmers who have experience 
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with FAO interventions relating to soil management, fertilizer application, crop preservation 
and yield increment were interviewed, and one had this to say:  
These big men who have gone to school think they can teach us something 
new to improve our yield.  Actually, they come and introduce different 
varieties of yam, rice, millet and sorghum. Master! The new varieties did 
not improve our yield in any significant way. I and my other fellows in this 
agriculture business have resolved never to listen to their advice again. 
They actually cost us money because the fertilizers they recommended for 
us is expensive. It seems we are working for some people rather but not for 
ourselves. All they ‘sabe’ [know] be book wey dem no get experience [All 
they know is book knowledge but do not have experience]. (Moses, 
Interviewed on October 1, 2011) 
Moses’s comments reveal the considerable extent to which external expert assistance has 
resulted in counter-productive outcomes.  This paradoxical situation has instigated a 
corresponding resentment against external development interventions by some farmers I 
interviewed.  Inherent in this counterproductive outcome is the misleading notion of 
‘knowability,’ a factor that the aid agencies have used to justify their interventions. The 
‘doctrine of knowability’ is a systematic attempt to eliminate all plausible complex factors 
responsible for a problem, and deploy a universal blueprint as a solution to particular. 
 Another small-hold farmer, Hamza Bawa, recounts his bitter experience with external 
technical support aiming to boost his agricultural productivity.  He narrated his dismal story as 
follows: 
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I have a bitter experience with these book long people, who come to 
misinform us about how to increase our harvest.  Over 5 years of support 
from them did not improve my yield, rather it saddled me with debt, 
because in the past we government used to supply us low cost fertilizer, 
now with these FAO officers have introduced us to fertilizers that did not 
improve my economic situation. (H. Bawa, Interviewed on October 1, 
2011) 
The concerns expressed here raise legitimate questions about the moral responsibility of donor 
agencies, whose methods, I suggest, have not improved the conditions of the uninsured small-
scale farmer.  Pertinent to Bawa’s response is that it indicates the extent to which the FAO 
avoided taking responsibility for the failure of their promises to come to fruition.  Through a 
process of self-exculpation, aid agencies see to subject the farmers to further interventionist 
practices.    
 Some farmers that I encountered at the Tamale central market shared their 
disappointing experiences with experts working for both the aid agencies and government.  The 
leader of these small-scale farmers, Ibrahim Gariba reveals that: 
My family members and I do not want to hear anything from the foreign 
and local officers who think they can teach us anything new to improve our 
farm yield. They do not listen to our needs. My son! Do you think I am a 
fool that I do not understand my farming needs? The difference between 
me and these officers are that they have been to school unlike me, but I 
have experience they cannot match with their certificates.  I do not think 
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their knowledge is good for my progress.  I call on the government to listen 
to answer our needs. (I. Gariba. Interviewed on October 1, 2011) 
This statement reveals the despondency with which small hold farmers view expert-driven 
interventions.  It further indicates that the ‘business as usual’ practice of the FAO that poses as 
the vanguard of innovative knowledge regarding the stimulation of agricultural productivity for 
poverty reduction is not effective for small-hold farmers.  In view of the FAO’s acclaimed 
expertise, the concerns, needs and practices of the peasant farmers have been replaced with 
expert-recommended practices.  The inevitable resistance on the part of farmers is expected 
and understandable in the wake of these abysmal outputs.  This poor output leads to questions 
about the reliability of so-called experts, who I argue are mired in regulatory persuasion, rather 
than transformation.   
Contrary to the goal of seeking the productive wellbeing of farmers, the FAO have 
exposed these vulnerable farmers to dependence capitalist oriented agro-processing firms for 
fertilizer supply.  This counter-productive practice used by the FAO undermines the economic 
and social security of the farmers, a practice that could escalate tensions within communities.  
Duffield’s (2010, p. 63) description of these internalized non-transformational interventions as 
being essentially ‘containment’ measures is an under-statement.  The supposed containment 
measures in the wake of institutional weakness invariably generate further insecurity and 
underdevelopment which then leads to conflagrations of the crises over the course of time.     
Reducing the implementation challenges to a lack of institutional coordination, aid 
agencies force us to question their relationship to the rationales and assumptions that underpin 
interventions. I further submit that reduction of a failed nexus to coordination bottlenecks 
smack of a grand agenda to maintain the status quo supply-side and ahistorical interventions.  
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The implication of this preference for a technical solution is that the ‘co-ordination failure’ 
becomes a strategy to institutionalize post-liberal policy regimes.  From the analyses proffered 
thus far, I suggest that there is an attempt on the part of the FAO to continue to force 
responsibility onto local farmers, and to impose responsibility for aid onto itself. This self-
imposed responsibility will be articulated through international tutelage, a practice that is 
similar to colonial practices analyzed in chapter three.   
Another problematic issue which Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP claims undermines the 
supposed collaborating UN agencies is the different evaluation systems that each use, and their 
impact on government agencies.  Moro offered these technical reasons as inhibiting factors for 
reciprocal working relations of the UN JHSP: 
 There is a poor reporting system by the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly in 
cooperating with the laid down reporting standards expected of them. We 
spent a considerable amount of money and time to train their schedule 
officers but nothing significant has come out of it. This poor reporting 
standard is frustrating our planned activities for the coming year. We may 
have to contract experts to retrain these metropolitan officers again with 
the expectation that they will adhere to the standards. (A. Moro. 
Interviewed on August 27, 2011) 
The responsibility for these failures is placed on local actors, who are posited as inhibiting the 
attainment of targets set by transnational actors.  This testimony is also akin to the perpetuation 
of indirect colonial rule and postcolonial regional interventions such as the NRGP project 
discussed in chapters three and four respectively.  An explicit issue here that is prominent in 
Moro’s response is his avowed reliance on technical experts who are as being endowed with 
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potent prescriptive solutions. Whereby the prescription of experts are expected to be easily 
absorbed by domestic actors through training in order to achieve the set targets, the failure to 
secure the region can be corrected through re-enactment of formalized discrete variables that 
will strip the problematic phenomena of its complexity.   Significantly, the strangulated power 
relations that have characterized the metropolis and regional areas of the Northern Region as 
noted in the chapters three and four have regularly been treated as non-functional variables due 
to the apolitical orientation of the interventions.   
The issue of cross-checking information provided by aid actors and obtained by 
domestic actors (be it government agencies or peasants) is crucial to get a better understanding 
of the issues involved in security and development.  I sought a counter-response to the 
submissions by Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP from Mr. G. Nantongmah, a developmental 
planning official in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TAMA).  Interestingly, Mr. 
Nantongmah issued a terse reaction to express his misgivings about the aid agencies: 
Please do not get me wrong because we value the essence of peace, 
stability and development in this metropolis and the entire region. These 
goals are more pertinent to us, especially with this metropolis being the 
regional capital. We are the centre that holds the region. However, you 
should understand that we have our internally developed schemes to 
address these problems as part of our mandate to ensure the security and 
development of the area in tandem with the state security apparatus. 
Therefore, we have our own priorities to follow, therefore, when these 
donor agencies come to partner us they should understand that we must be 
treated as equal partners, in that our own internal processes must be 
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recognized as respected as such. (G. Nantongmah, Interviewed on 
September 23, 2011) 
His comments demonstrate the inevitable realities that domestic officials have their own policy 
priorities and approaches for addressing their own region are identified and specific needs.  The 
assumption, therefore, that externally-derived solutions can be transplanted into any area 
requires rethinking.  Nantongmah’s response also highlights the disdain with which external 
solutions inconsistent with the internal conditions and priorities are viewed.  It is important to 
recognize the farcical abuse of ideas of partnership and participation through the attempted 
imposition of externally derived solutions.  By privileging externally programmed solution 
buttresses, my argument that adoption of the DSN model as a panacea to developmental 
challenges in a conflict prone region is a tactic to perpetuate old illiberal practices.  The 
continuations of these illiberal practices are perpetrated via the notable centripetal 
interventionist approaches of ‘participation’ and ‘partnership’.  Thus, these interventionist 
discrepancies legitimize the relevance of key research questions of a study that investigates the 
how interventionist practices unfold in reality, rather than simply when privileging normative 
viewpoints of the nexus.  
The necessity of rethinking the interventionist strategies is made more compelling 
especially when the same old practices and reforms have not yielded any appreciable 
transformation in the well- being of the population.  Nantongmah revealed past grievances 
against aid agencies whose results-driven interventions are yet to result in positive outcomes:  
We have had many reporting standards to follow in our engagement with 
the UN bodies in the past. Ask yourself this question. Are they also 
accountable to us? How did all those standards we followed in the past 
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impact on our people? Do they know what it takes to implement their 
programmes and they sit in their air-conditioned offices only to imagine 
standards for us to follow? (Nantongmah, Interviewed on September 23, 
2011) 
The despondency illustrated when local actors discuss imposed operational standards raises a 
significant question about whether aid agencies actually take historical notice of their failed 
interventions, which have been guided by the same irrelevant standards.  I further argue that 
such operational standards are part of the scheme to impose responsibility on local actors.  
More significantly, the imposition of decontextualized operation standards is a vain effort to 
reduce the complexity of the developmental and security challenges in order to justify the 
prescribed technical solutions.  This subversion is a replication of the colonial practices of 
indirect rule.   
Further credence to the strong reservations that domestic actors have for aid agencies 
was brought to light.  This time around, Mr. D. Adamu, an official of the Ghana Development 
Communities Association, provided revealing information from the perspective of his fifteen 
years of engagement with UN agencies.  Mr. Adamu revealed this information to me: 
Whenever these UN agencies come to work in this region and city, they 
make the local officers look like their school boys who must report to 
them.  Meanwhile, they do not own up to the outcomes of the projects they 
mobilize the local people to undertake.  It is the local administrators who 
bear the blame when there is a failure and success is taken by the donors.  
The nauseating problem is the useless reporting requirements. We have big 
problems with poverty pervasive all over the region. The poor lack a voice 
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and most important is the plight of our mothers, sisters and daughters in 
our various communities.  How does timely preparation of reports improve 
this vulnerable population? We need genuine human centered long term 
development approaches that will help to reduce the tension in the region. 
But you do not see these agencies focusing on these problems that 
undermine the well-being of the poor women and children in our 
communities. I think these donor agencies have their own agenda, which I 
believe is not to make our country self-sufficient. (D. Adamu, Interviewed 
on September 27, 2011) 
From my perspective, Adamu’s admission raises salient questions regarding the motivations 
behind these interventions against officially-declared goals that are applicable to the donor 
agencies responsible for the imagined fusion of development and security interventions.  In 
fact, Mr. Adamu’s response is ample confirmation of the antipathy that some active local actors 
have developed towards aid industry modalities.  Moving beyond Duffield’s ‘containment’ 
description of DSN, therefore, it is my contention that this acclaimed DSN indirectly 
approximates an institutionalization of underdevelopment and insecurity.  This 
institutionalization stems from the irresponsibility that interventions under the pseudo- DSN 
foster by not seeking long-term, transformational structural change in such a conflict-prone 
region.  It should, however, be noted that this misleading institutionalization gives ample 
reasons for the aid industry to search for more areas to problematize and intervene.  
Mr. Adamus’s testimony exposes the ineffectual and fallacious trumpeting of the 
emphasis placed on reporting requirements as having an instrumental linkage with the material 
improvement of the poor in Northern Region.  The procedural reporting requirement demanded 
296 
 
by the UN JHSP, in my view, obliterates the contentious political nature of the challenges in 
security and development as highlighted in chapters three, four and five.  This unyielding 
obsession with reporting requirements by the aid establishment serves as strategy to provide an 
avenue for aid agencies to exonerate themselves from any responsibility for the outcome of 
failed aid programs.  From a critical perspective, I suggest that the deployment of the DSN is 
an avenue to perpetuate an old managerial-oriented style of program and project 
conditionalities.  In considering information obtained through personal observations and 
interviews with research participants, I postulate that both the content of these interventions, 
and the way they are rolled out, should be of critical concern to international observers.  By 
placing emphasis on procedural accountability through formalized standardized reporting 
practices, aid agencies fail to capture the complexity of the insecurity and poverty challenges in 
the metropolis and especially in the regions. 
This potential instigation of insecurity as a result of a technical rendering of the 
solutions to an abstracted problem undermines the alleged or imagined nexus between security 
and development.  It is from this critical nexus position that I concur to a large extent with 
Oelbaum (2009, p. 4), who articulates a position that there exists a possible relationship 
between Ghana’s economic growth during its SAP era and the high number of conflicts in the 
Northern Region from 1983-2000.  From my perspective, it is crucially important to explore 
the way these conflicts became rife during the adjustment period.  More importantly, we must 
examine the processes that enabled the pervasive conflicts during a period in which the country 
achieved a high, sustained GDP growth of 5% per annum for the first time from 1984-2000 
(Aryeetey and Fosu, 2008, p. 301).  A valid question remains about the nature and quality of 
the growth that possibly predisposed the area to conflict tendencies.   I argue from a critical 
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institutionalist angle that the existing weak state institutional foundations were further over-
burdened by adjustment reforms implemented after year 2000.  With adjustment reforms 
enervating existing capacity-challenged state institutions, the institutional capability to handle 
the emergence of conflict predispositions, especially in a region with numerous deep-seated 
contestations or grievances, became limited. 
In the context of this study’s focus on Ghana, I suggest that structural reforms did not 
open the political space for good or effective contestations to ensure acceptable political 
settlements among the different ethnic groups in the Northern Region.  Pritchett and de Weijer 
(2010, p.16) argue that the ‘wishful thinking’ nature of state reforms foisted on imagined 
fragile states weakens the de facto function of the state, and exposes the possibility of making 
original conditions worse.  Discrepancies in the reform outcomes generate a curiosity to 
interrogate the rationales and assumptions of these interventions, as my study has exhibited.  
Mkandawire (2005, p. 7) argues that the overwhelming focus on economic stability by the SAP 
confined social policy to a marginal role in poverty reduction and further neglected other 
critical areas of social cohesion and equity. The marginal role given to social policy obviated 
any serious development of responsive institutional (formal and informal) structures and 
systems for conflict management and transformation.  The overall effect of this marginality is 
the further weakening of the institutional foundation of SSA economies to mask the downside 
of these adjustments in terms of conflict prevention.  I therefore suggest that the imagined DSN 
does not encapsulate reciprocal relations between the two dominant concepts.   An empirical 
intervention in the study region, supported by the critical literature, leads me to conclude that 
the DSN depicts both an impasse and contradictory relations.  
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Another vital challenge in relation to the operational manifestation of the nexus relates 
to what I call the knowledge deficit among aid officials in both the development and security 
spheres.  The invocation of the DSN presupposes a fair understanding of each sector by aid 
practitioners in the area.  In the course of my fieldwork interviews, however, an interesting 
revelation came to light that suggests that the collaborating institutions have a limited 
understanding of how each other operate.   In a quite frank interview, Mr. Traore of the WFP 
confirmed his very limited understanding of the critical components of the nexus, when he 
declared that:  
As I told you before, conflict and insecurity are not core priority areas to 
factor in our programming.  I personally do not have any professional or deep 
knowledge about the security and conflict issues in this region. You should 
understand that we are already grappling with the core mandate of our 
organization.  Our best bet is to hire a security expert attached to our unit 
though I doubt whether that will make any difference.   
The inflexibility of officials in adapting knowledge to embrace a totally new field in order to 
broaden the scope of programming demonstrates the less seamless nature of the nexus being 
framed as a smooth fusion from mainstream literature and practice.  In fact, the recent World 
Bank’s sponsored 2011 Report on Conflict, Security and Development reiterates the 
conventional dictum about the necessity to “accept the links between security and development 
outcomes” (p.276).  The assumed existence of conceptual links between development and 
security therefore instigated a notion of the smooth fusion of hitherto parallel interventions to 
address the insecurity and poverty challenges in post-conflict societies.  By being cognizant of 
the adumbrated discussions, we discover that there appears to be a minimal, if not a non-
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existent, institutional interest in joint security and development interventions.  The 
unconnected interventions associated with the nexus clearly betray the acclaimed 
developmentalization of security and vice versa.  
In addition to these problems, there is lack of collaboration between UN agencies and 
those outside the UN system. It is instructive to note that the CIDA was engaged in conflict 
resolution initiatives in the region between the early 1990’s and 2009.  A Deputy Director of 
CIDA, Mr. Alfred Anderson, confirms the CIDA’s many years of conflict interventions in the 
Northern Region:  
After over 15 years of undertaking various conflict resolution initiatives in 
the region, and upon detailed impact assessment study that shows that our 
initiatives were off the target in enhancing the security of the people and the 
region.  So based on the expert-panel recommendations, we are now doing 
conflict dynamics analysis that we expect to help us achieve better outcomes 
than the hitherto conflict resolution programs. (A. Anderson. Interviewed on 
October 12, 2011) 
This admission by the CIDA official, in my judgment, is a vivid attestation to the failed 
strategies of conflict resolution used to resolve the security challenges in the region.  
Considering CIDA’s new preference for conflict dynamics as their interventionist framework, 
it is clear that it has institutional memory regarding the failed conflict resolution strategies to 
share with new interveners in the region.  
 However, CIDA was ignored by the UNDP in its programming of the JHSP.  This 
revelation of non-consultation was disclosed to me by Anderson, when he stated that: 
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The UN team leader for the human security project did not consult CIDA 
before operationalizing the human security project. Let me assure you that we 
wouldn’t have hesitated to share our experiences with them, after all we are 
also committed to the promotion of peace, security and development in the 
three northern regions.  However, the onus lies on them to consult us first 
then we can push from there. (A. Anderson. Interviewed on October 12, 
2011) 
This revelation can be linked to the institutional competition that exists between aid agencies 
rather than the convergence of policies, programmes and practices that the nexus is supposed to 
foster.  This kind of contradictory operational outcome, as noted by Bagayoko and Hikler 
(2009, p.16), is inevitable given the different programme and policy goals of the diverse aid 
agencies.  Notwithstanding the fundamental differences in terms of programming priorities, the 
obvious issue here is that their common feature as cartel of good intentions remains intact.  
Certainly, these illusive good intentions pose a great worry to those in the region because they 
invariably cover-up aid agencies underlying rationales and assumptions of intervention. Thus, 
pertinent issues that must be examined in detail regarding the promising conflict dynamics 
mentioned by the CIDA official are the rationales and assumptions that will underwrite 
strategies and practices to be articulated in the very near future. 
 
Myth and Neglected Details of Post-liberal Recommendations 
In the wake of the reduction of the implementation challenges, coordination and capacity 
deficits have stimulated technocratic recommendations.  For example, Dr. K. Shakita of the 
UNU, in her prescription of options in the wake of their implementation challenges states:  
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It is most unfortunate that our desired outcomes were not achieved.  
Management has resolved that we institute inquiries about the causes of the 
undesirable outcomes. Upon receipt of the committee’s report, we will study 
the findings thoroughly and see how best we can implement the associating 
recommendations.  Personally I think our interventions borders on 
behavioural change, and this behavioural focus, we are most likely to 
influence the beliefs, norms and values of the people over a period of time. 
(K. Shakita. Interviewed on September 19, 2011) 
The localization of implementation rigidities is further reduced to a lack of appropriate 
behavioural conduct.  The problematization of behavioural factors will invariably result in 
foisting of the subjectivist modern attitudinal values to targeted groups of people in the study 
region..  This move symbolizes the continuation of the colonial civilizing mission.  Shakita did 
not, however, find her illusory thinking about the mechanical pursuit of dialogue and conflict 
management problematic, nor did she believe they were enough to address a grievance-laden 
insecurity over a short time frame.  Shakita also did not question the embedded rationale 
behind expert recommendations to solve an assumed static spatial problem.   
The intervention challenges further elicited the recommendations of other liberal 
interventions as viable remedial measures.  Awudu Moro of the UN JHSP outlined some 
remedial measures that his organization has considered:  
We will be scaling up the interventions by adding other districts. Notably 
Gushiegu, Bunkuprungu, Yunyoo, and Buipe and thematic expansion to 
cover gender inequality and inequities. Our first point of intervention will be 
to boost the capacity of the district and metropolitan assemblies in order to 
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boost the knowledge in participatory approaches, planning, monitoring & 
evaluation and ownership of the programmes.  (A. Moro. Interviewed on 
August 11, 2011) 
Strategies for capacity enhancement have preoccupied the interventionist agenda of the UN 
JHSP by privileging the intensification of the programmes to enlist gender as a new area of 
intervention.   Remarkably, ownership as an approach to stability is being proposed as a new 
focus of intervention as revealed by Moro’s interview.  I drew his attention to the fact that, 
even at the country level, ownership is only a remote possibility, especially in the wake of the 
immediate past national development strategy that is GPRS was configured to meet World 
Bank and IMF standards and priorities, leaving regional and community ownership is an 
unattainable expectation, and that we can view this as a scheme to hide regulatory 
interventions.  Moro’s response was that: “we need to experiment at the regional level before 
moving to the national level, through gradual progression the people can own their policies, 
programs and the rest”.  Abrahamsen (2004) defines ‘ownership’ as a disciplinary development 
aid practice that aims to perpetuate economic liberalism without fundamentally questioning the 
existing power structures.  Duffield (2010), also writing from a governmental perspective, 
views ‘ownership’ as a means to accelerate the will to govern.  I suggest that the intended 
pursuit of ownership by the aid industry is a means to exonerate failed assumptions and tacitly 
endorse donor priorities, goals, targets and strategies.   
Given my dissatisfaction with Moro’s explanation in relation to the ownership agenda, I 
probed for further clarification.  In particular, I wondered how local people could be trained to 
own a process they did not conceptualize, develop and implement.  Again Moro answered: “it 
is important for the UNDP, with its vast expertise, train the local leaders because of their low 
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capacity to plan and manager their priority needs.”  I need to point out that Moro could not 
give any firm evidence to support the claim for capacity building and transformation for the 
well-being of the poor in the Northern Region.  
The capacity training for local leaders to function as an intervention was reinforced by a 
senior economist in the UNDP, whom I interviewed after Moro.  Dr. D. Sesay suggested to me 
that capacity training is the quintessential function of UNDP by professing that: “capacity 
training is essentially the main work we do in West African sub-region.  We train the 
government officials both at the national, regional and district levels so that they will be 
equipped with knowledge and skills to manage the policies and strategies we counsel them to 
undertake.  In so doing they will be equipped with the capacity to own the programmes.”  The 
striking deduction from Sesay’s response points to the unchanging idea that the donors wish to 
foist responsibility for interventions on the people.  The duty of the intervened-upon people is 
to manage the intervention in line with the accountability demands of the UNDP.  Therefore, in 
consonance with donor interventions in SSA countries for instance, Abrahamsen (2004) 
suggests that the goal of the ownership mantra of the aid industry is to realize the ‘will to 
govern’ under the guise of democratizing interventions.  Thus, the will to govern will require a 
re-categorization and re-classification of governable subjects (the intervened-upon population).  
A new set of categories come with newly-imposed responsibilities on individuals who are 
imbued with cosmopolitan values, ostensibly to alter the faulted traditional identities.  Similar 
to the indirect-rule colonial practice as discussed in chapter three, this proposed ownership 
trope constitutes an effort to alter the traditional polity of poor regions like the Northern 
Region to fulfill the caprices and whims of the donor industry.   
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Whilst emphasizing the need for ownership, we need to understand that this ownership 
agenda is being pushed within the context of an unchanging exploitative global political 
economy.   I contend that the donor push for ownership is a calculated strategy to continuously 
problematize the local areas and retain unequal global power relations.  In the end, the ultimate 
effect is to perpetuate this non-transformational external tutelage and maintain UN bodies as 
the inevitable source of solutions.  Li (2007) suggests that the aid agencies prioritization of 
community-oriented approaches like ownership is ‘unabashedly governmental… as it sets the 
conditions to reform desires and act on actions” (p. 253).  To a large extent I do concur with 
both Abrahamsen and Li, and I further suggest that in light of the strong political contestations 
during both the colonial and the on-going postcolonial period, such apolitically and 
ahistorically informed ownership approaches are most unlikely to succeed in securing the 
region.   
Furthermore, I contend that the push for ownership as a strategy syncs with the nascent 
risk management and resilience approaches of the aid industry.  In my view, this proposed 
ownership agenda, with its consensus-building orientation, cannot engage with the deep socio-
cultural and political contentions and differences in the region.  Again, it is impossible for this 
ownership agenda to effect any transformation of the region and this agenda will most likely 
perpetuate a neo-trusteeship intention through external tutelage. 
The responsibilization of locals in the name of the ownership, I suggest, privileges this 
deceptive instrumental approach, and will foreclose options against the prevailing narrow and 
technical framing and representation of the development and security challenges. The 
consequential implication is the consolidation of the liberal status quo.  This ownership agenda 
of UN JHSP, in my estimation, fails to address negative structural conditions triggered by both 
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the horrendous historical, and current social, relations on the community, district, regional, 
national and global levels.  Furthermore, it is inconceivable that, given the politically charged 
environment within the region, an orthodox ownership approach is being proposed as workable 
solution to ensure security.  Doubts relate to the extent to which the ownership agenda can 
address the adverse effects of colonial and post-colonial economic and political institutions.  
This community ownership agenda is misleading when juxtaposed alongside the prevailing 
situation in which the processes of intervention have remained top-down in approach and there 
is no sign so far to signal any possible change.  What is more disturbing is the proposed shift 
towards private-public partnership, which has the potential to erode the community’s limited 
voice in the water sector, as discussed in chapter four, especially considering that water is 
deemed as a crucial infrastructural investment and service to secure the region.   
The DFID has launched a new blueprint for a poverty-oriented development 
programme in the Northern Region, which is anchored around private sector development.  A 
programme officer at DFID, George Blankson, who reluctantly granted me an interview for 
this study reveals that: “Our research department commissioned studies into the poverty 
situation in Northern Ghana, because in our assessment there is an urgent responsibility on our 
part to direct our activities in the next decade to revive the economic potential of the three 
regions in the north. We have earmarked the private sector as main engine to boost the 
Northern economy” (G. Blankson. Interviewed on October 19, 2011). The yet to be 
implemented programme is titled “Making Market work for the Poor” and has three main 
components.  According to Blankson, the components were identified and assessed by a team 
of experts in finance, agronomy, marketing, economics, commerce and agricultural economics. 
The first of these components is a financial services and agriculture business.  The second 
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component relates to the establishment of a northern savannah enterprise innovation challenge 
fund, which according to the concept note is meant to provide the competitive facility to 
support small and medium enterprise innovation.  The third component relates to private sector 
provision of social services.  Under this component, the problematization of the public sector 
provision of essential services is inefficient and a drain on government budget.   
The essential issue to acknowledge is that, in view of the dismal socio-economic effects 
of the SAP, I am emphatic that the likelihood of the diverse poor residents in the Northern 
Region benefiting from the proposed shift towards private sector driven service delivery 
remains minuscule.  The reason for this possible denial of the diverse poor households’ access 
to safe and reliable water service is that the austere ‘getting the price right’ ideology of 
privatization within a policy regime of constrained social support will inhibit an effective 
distributive system.  Within the broader context of the study region, I contend that the 
unbridled privatization will worsen the informal politics of the existing crisis in water 
entitlement in such a rankled ethnic and adverse social relational space.  
A cardinal factor to be mindful of is the broader and deeper political contestations that, 
in reality, determine accessibility to a controversial common good.  It seems the DfID has not 
learnt any lesson from the operational flaws in the World Bank driven CWSA water 
privatization practice that I discussed in chapter four.  Significantly ignored in the DfID’s 
proposed privatization of water service are the water politics and accessibility problems that 
could be attributed to the instrumental driving rationales.  This creates the impression that 
development and security interventions essentially thrive on ‘business as usual’ terms.  These 
‘business as usual’ terms are fostered through the replication or recycling of misleading 
rationales into new programmes.  It is unthinkable that, in a region of immense multiple 
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deprivations, there is no conscious effort to address salient issues such as redistribution, social 
justice and genuine equity.  Conversely, the institutionalization of full cost-recovery of the 
water service is the pervasive norm and the water subsidy becomes taboo within the circle of 
DfID.  
 Therefore, evoking development as a means to secure a region illustrates the subtle 
maintenance of inclusive neoliberal policy orthodoxy.  The potential threat to social cohesion 
and stability as a result of the likely exclusion of poor residents also portrays the contradictory 
relations or non-linearity of development and security. 
The deliberate avoidance of the colonial and postcolonial rigidities endemic in the 
region by the aid actors in this chapter, and similarly raised in chapter four and five, are geared 
toward full endorsement of the global unequal relations.  As Ferguson (1990, 2006) and Harris 
(2007) note, such technical prescriptions seek to depoliticize the complexity of poverty and 
insecurity conditions by resorting to calculable rational choice interventions.  By undertaking 
to depoliticize the intractable development and security interventions, room is created to 
reconstitute an economic imaginary that ends up reifying interventionist orthodoxy.  A classic 
example refers to the on-going and proposed entrepreneurialism by both the UN JHSP and 
DfID, respectively, in the Northern Region. The inevitable consequence of these failed, rational 
choice driven interventions is that it delimits alternative options to address the security and 
development problems.   
There appears to be a combination of ideological and ontological attachments to 
simplistic problem-solving approaches within the aid industry.  The crux of this issue is that it 
is unimaginable that, notwithstanding the numerous political contestations, resistance and 
contradictions that a significant number of the interventions have engendered, aid agencies still 
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have unquestionable faith in rational choice programmes.  The unquestionable faith in rational-
choice motivated programmes is manifested in the earlier identified intensification of existing 
programmes, the amputation of failed ones and the deepening of policy reforms to correct the 
failed interventions.  Thus, proffered solutions are framed around the expert-identified 
localized problems.  This predisposition to such deductive or abstracted epistemological 
sources by the UN agencies and DFID could be attributed to their insatiable quest for linear, 
legible, technical and managerial diagnoses and correlating solutions.  It is therefore not 
surprising that the UN sees itself as a knowledge-generating agency, a position that equally 
reinforces the messianic thinking that they have the requisite knowledge and capacity to solve 
difficult problems.  Furthermore, the tenuous fusion of development and security interventions 
geared towards localizing problems smacks of a celebration of international development 
assistance problem-solving ethos.  Young (2007) suggests that such a simplistic assumption 
reflects a blatant predisposition towards platitudes.  It is instructive to note, however, that the 
active political forces in sites of intervention will render the linear assumptions otiose.  
The crux of this situation requires us to question why these donor agencies have 
intensified their quick-fix calcified expert knowledge approach, with its positivistic logical 
framework instilled with neatly categorized indicators, goal, output, assumptions to guide it.  
This linear approach leads me to suggest that such a historically long spanning conflict that 
resulted in insecurity and poverty require a dialectical structural approach.  I am advocating for 
an approach that places priority, from the onset, on politics and a political economy (broad 
social relations) of the region as an integral part of a long search for sustained practices not 
modeled on best practices.  From my perspective, the social relational approach must be 
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historically informed because of the convoluted nature of the regional polity and the adverse 
political economy transformations of a historical-relational foundation of the region.   
 
Concluding remarks 
The analyses advanced in this chapter affirm that implementation challenges in the articulation 
of the DSN have been linked to technical, administrative and behavioural factors.  By limiting 
the intervention failures to technical and administrative constraints, the aid agencies essentially 
tend to exonerate their unrealistic assumptions and faulty rationales from interrogation.  The 
essence of these narrow conceptions of implementation challenges is to ensure the aid agencies 
maintain themselves as vanguards of solutions through their acclaimed expertise.  Thus the 
derived prescriptions to ameliorate the poverty and conflict challenges in the study region are 
still driven by the liberal market logic.  Reinforcement of this market logic is proposed at the 
expense of negating the historical, political and political economy considerations that have 
impacted on the Northern Region.  
  Therefore, it needs to be acknowledged that the problems with securing a region with 
exclusionary and conflicting historical past that keep unfolding in the present would require 
long term approaches beyond the narrow spheres of the projectized interventions.  It is 
important also to consider political systems, actors and processes that have conditioned the 
poverty and insecurity among diverse ethnic groups, gender, youth and aged population in the 
region.  
It must be acknowledged that, given the indicated complex processes that underpin the 
Northern Region’s security and development conundrums, aid agencies must lower their 
expectations or optimism.  The reality is that the poverty and insecurity-prone region 
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epitomizes a bigger political challenge that aid actors have bypassed or ignored.  The emerging 
issue is the naturalization of problems and appeals to universal solutions in the name of 
celebrating best practices.  Therefore broader historical context, social relations, and political 
structures of poverty and insecurity in the region should constitute the framing context of aid 
agencies and the epistemic community (locally and internationally) within development 
practice. 
The above analyzed simplified implementation challenges inherent in the articulation of 
expert knowledge-driven development and security interventions in my estimation will rather 
institutionalize an impasse.  Furthermore, the material and symbolic development and security 
of the Northern Region urgently call for a long search towards emancipation in line with the 
suggestions outlined chapter four, which relate to the need to consider broader and complex 
social change option.  It is imperative to appreciate the transitional nature of the social and 
political integration of the Northern Region into modern Ghana.  This would provide the basis 
to understand the political context to assess the current insecurity and poverty challenge.   
While advocating for reforms of the global political economy as suggested in chapter four, it is 
imperative that the nature of state formation also requires serious engagement.  The next 
chapter will summarize the entire dissertation, reiterate the key points, discuss their 
ramifications and suggest plausible areas for future research.  
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Chapter Seven 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This thesis has been a critical examination of the processes of enacting development and 
security practices undertaken by international development aid institutions in Africa and the 
global South.   Specifically, this study focused on an interrogation of interventionist rationales 
and assumptions that underpin multiple and diverse aid development and security practices.  In 
focusing on the rationales and assumptions that underpin aid interventions, my study 
problematizes the interventions of aid industry contradictory subjective processes.  These 
subjective processes are associated with diverse institutional interests, power, ideological and 
knowledge foundations in relation to the targeted population.  Thus the central research 
question of my study interrogates the rationales behind the security and development 
interventions articulated by aid agencies, and how those interventions are received by the local 
population of Northern Region?  The essence of the key question has been posed to fill a 
significant research gap in much of the development-security nexus literature.  This research 
lacuna is in the area of complex interactional encounters between the ‘interveners’ and 
‘intervened upon populations’ in mainstream development studies and international relations.   
The notable rationales at play here are desirability, necessity and the possibility of 
development.   It is important to note that the rationales behind interventions are conditioned 
by positivistic assumptions about society and social change.  Notable positivistic assumptions 
of development are that causal factors of societal problems are knowable through linear 
epistemological frameworks.  The other inherent assumption is the smooth transfer of 
programmes and policies through expert knowledge.   It needs to be established that such a 
deductive approach privileges a quick problem-solving ethos, which further reduces complex 
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problems to material ‘need’ or ‘lack’ mentality.   From the aid agency perspective, there is a 
significant utilization of abstract thinking.  There appears to be an unending reliance on 
abstract thinking by the aid agencies that has led to a formulation of standardized packages as a 
timeless solution to be applied universally.  My study questioned international development aid 
actors’ assumption of complementary relations between security and development 
interventions in the Northern Region.  Furthermore, the overall objective of the study is to 
understand the complexities of aid interventions that will have a promising effect on future 
research and policy practices. This study, for empirical reasons, focused on the development 
and security practices in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Chapter Two focused on the conceptual framework of the study.  In following 
Duffield’s (2001, 2007) work on governmental practices of security and development, I relied 
on a critical development-security nexus as the driving conceptual framework of the study.  
Duffield (2001) explains that through discursive shifts, underdevelopment from the post-cold 
war era onward has been securitized as source of multiple conditions of insecurity, conflict and 
violence.  A noted consequence of this securitization of development is the designation of 
poverty and underdevelopment as a security problem.  Hence, conflict prone regions are 
constituted as urgent spaces of intervention by development aid industry in the name of 
trusteeship.   
 Chapter Two discussed at length the complex processes involved in the production of 
this development trusteeship by aid agencies.  In discussing the complex nature of the 
production of development trusteeship, I drew on Peck’s (2012) work on policy mobility and 
mutations to conceptualize the socially constructed nature of policies and programmes that are 
crucial instruments for interventions.  In addition, I expanded on some insights from Long’s 
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(2002, 2007) interface analysis, which suggests the complex processes of engagement between 
the agents of planned interventions and the targeted beneficiaries of those interventions.  The 
complexity of the field of intervention is conditioned by the underlying social relations and 
diverse polities that are ignored in search of legible programmable factors.  With this insight, I 
deem the study region to be a complex site of interventions and, as such, planned interventions 
are bound to be contested, renegotiated, and result in contradictory outcomes.  
More importantly, the conceptual framework provided me with the requisite grounding 
to theorize how societies of the global south are constituted through the diverse framing and 
labeling processes.  Given the socially constructed nature of these interventions, I problematize 
international aid attempts to conceptualize and solve problems through an objective or neutral 
lens.  An important reality is that the consequence of neoliberal diagnoses of the problems is 
the imposition of illiberal remedial policies.    
Chapter Three focused on the historical interrogation of uneven development policies 
and practices that under-developed the Northern Region.  It is important to know that the 
uneven development practices were pursued ostensibly to maintain perceived pre-colonial 
egalitarian social relations.  This historical chapter drew on the work of Mamdani (1996) who 
writes about the differential and contested colonial practices and policies within the same 
territorial location.  The key argument is that the historical foundations of the problems aid 
agencies seek to address are rarely given any attention.  In order to understand the complexity 
of aid interventions, it is critical to peruse the historical fundamentals of the current 
development and security challenges of the study region.  By situating the contemporary 
practices within the historical formation of the region, the newness tag placed on conflict prone 
regions by the aid industry exposes the contrition of events to justify its intervention.     
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The indirect rule policy was discussed in relation to a reconfiguration of the political 
and administrative authorities in the diverse ethnic groups inhabiting the region in order to 
stabilize the area.  The net political effect of the political configurations was the installation of 
juridical power in the created chiefdoms.  This power realignment significantly 
institutionalized the identity and materially driven conflict particularly between the chiefdoms 
and acephalous groups.  The continuities of uneven development policies and practices by the 
post-colonial government were also discussed.  In addition, the specific state policies that 
contributed to the onset of the conflicts were discussed.  I provided insights into some of the 
pertinent conflicts that remain unresolved, thereby conditioning the insecurity of the region.   
Chapter Four examined how the rationales behind interventions were articulated on a 
regional scale.  I argued that the aid industry with its strident zeal to intervene in a defined 
conflict-prone region ignores the fundamental relational and structural factors.  Thus, the 
pursuit of simplistic diagnoses and their correlating solutions is the driving logic of these 
interventions.  Diverse conceptual perspectives articulated by the aid actors, therefore, were 
largely infused by simplistic, interventionist rationales and assumptions were analyzed.  The 
overriding interventionist orthodoxy for the agricultural sector was the promotion of market 
competitiveness discourse.  The agricultural and water sectors were the main development 
interventions analyzed.   These findings suggest that the agricultural interventions were 
selective and exclusionary in respect to the farmers.  Critically, the agricultural sector 
interventions were undertaken without due regard to the vital, broader structural factors and 
policy regimes that have had a negative impact on agricultural productivity.  Conspicuously, 
missing from aid interventions are the adverse effects of global trade policies that have 
deepened liberalization and contributed to the pauperization of a majority of peasant farmers.   
315 
 
The water sector, which has attracted both bilateral and multilateral institutional 
investment, was analyzed.  The underlying logic behind water intervention was the 
institutionalization of privatization and re-regulation of the service through a framed 
community model.  Thus, water was used to reconstitute disparate individual members of 
heterogeneous communities as governable subjects.  This contentious liberal community-
driven water intervention program exists with the inevitable formal and informal political 
contestations that remain an enduring phenomenon.  The security interventions were anchored 
in conflict resolution strategies like negotiated settlements, peace accords and peace education.  
These consensus- oriented practices sync with the liberal peace orthodoxy and were aimed at 
short-term solutions, which negate the complex long-term relational nature of the problem. 
Chapter Five focused on the UNDP coordinated human security program which, from 
an official standpoint, is the epitome of the DSN.  In this chapter I argued that the UN JHSP is 
a replication of existing development practices in the Northern Region that are contrary to the 
transformational approach of the conflict prevention being claimed.  The chapter examined the 
processes in which the underlying rationales of the programme were articulated to prevent 
conflict and reduce poverty.  A major finding is that the UN JHSP wholly adopted existing 
international frameworks that are essentially are non-transformational, both conceptually and 
practically.  Furthermore, I analyzed various poverty reduction-focused developmental 
interventions, as well as community-oriented conflict prevention practices.  In addition, the 
youth were constituted as an object for intervention because they were framed as a security 
threat.  Another major role of the program was an attempt to modify individuals’ behavioural 
and attitudinal dispositions in order to urge them to embrace entrepreneurialism.  Again, these 
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expert-driven programs prioritized behavioural changes were implemented through 
empowerment and capacity building practices.  
On the basis of the policy documents that I reviewed and information obtained through 
in-depth interviews, I conclude that these ‘novel’ DSN-inspired interventions lack 
transformational capabilities.  The absence of transformational potential is predicated on the 
fact that the programme was modeled on existing international development frameworks.  
These prevailing frameworks, including the MDGs and PRSPs, epitomize the ultra-liberal 
interventionist practices.  And these narrow international development frameworks were 
characterized by ahistorical and apolitical orientations, and maintained power relational 
imbalances between the global north and south.  Remarkably, the conflict prevention element 
within the UN JHSP, I suggest, is a reflection of the anodyne aspirations of the aid industry 
that are averse to the appreciation of complex issues.  Another major finding of the UN JHSP is 
that through the conflict prevention program’s goals, individual resilience has become the new 
interventionist trope.  Specifically, individual’s cognitive and adaptive capacities are 
constituted as solutions to conflict and insecurity challenges.  Through the focus on adaptive 
and cognitive capacities, individuals are reconfigured to embrace risk instead of being 
protected from conflict and insecurity.  Therefore, this human security-induced discursive shift 
towards embracing risk is a testament to the DSN’s inability to secure a region through conflict 
prevention. 
Chapter Six examined the implementation challenges in the DSN, as well as an 
assessment of empirical working relations between security and development at the 
institutional level.  A vital finding of this chapter is that the implementation challenges have 
been reduced to technical and administrative constraints.  This reductive notion of 
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implementation challenges constitutes a strategy to deepen post liberal interventions.  Thus, 
post-liberal interventionism was prescribed as a panacea to the implementation rigidities.  
More importantly, this reduction of the implementation complexity to technical and co-
ordination constraints denotes an explicit endorsement of the interventionist rationales and 
assumptions.  The logical inference is that challenges such as the apparent rejection and 
manipulation of interventions by some residents of these communities were treated as outlier 
issues.  The interveners failed to appreciate the diversity of the expectations of individuals vis a 
vis the programme.  This discrepancy implies that international aid interventions cannot thrive 
on axiomatic or hypo-deductive assumptions any longer.  A major finding is that there is an 
absence of any institutional and operational relations among the six UN agencies that constitute 
the UN JHSP.  I conclude that DSN remains an imagined fiction, which serves ultimately as a 
strategy to institutionalize liberal interventions, notwithstanding the failure to achieve set goals.  
Against the backdrop of the diverse analyses provided in this thesis, I would like to 
emphasize six major conclusions.  First, the development and security interventions deployed 
in the Northern Region depict a complexity reduction exercise.  This reduction is informed by 
the simplification of insecurity and poverty problems into discrete entities such as behavioural 
and attitudinal traits.  The interventions keep neglecting essential structural and relational 
factors in favor of individual and homogenous community-driven approaches.  In effect, the 
structural and relational factors have been treated as extraneous variables that would hinder a 
technical rendering of the problems and solutions.   Based on the findings of this study, this 
complex reduction strategy is pursued through the silencing of adverse colonial practices that 
have, to a large extent, framed the contemporary challenges of security and development in the 
Northern Region.  The reductive elements of the DSN are articulated through the 
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administrative factors of coordination, complementarity and coherence as panacea to complex 
challenges of poverty and conflict.  
Secondly, implementation processes follow formal and linear patterns that I attribute to 
the positivistic rationales aimed to ensure smooth implementation.  More importantly, the 
inflexibility of interventions to accommodate diverse informal processes suggests that the DSN 
is imbued with exclusionary possibilities.  The formalistic patterns of these interventions also 
confirm a lack of recognition of ‘identity’ differences among the diverse populations.  The 
neglect of ‘identity’ differences is a result of the homogenization of problems and prescription 
of universal solutions.  This homogenization logic serves to achieve short-term goals by 
sacrificing long-term implications.  In addition, the saliency of diverse, informal institutional 
arrangements proved unyielding to fixed programmatic interventions.  The enduring nature of 
informal institutions reinforces the vital point that contextual factors are critical when 
intervening in postcolonial settings.  The lack of recognition of these significant differences 
can be attested to by the prescription of standardized solutions with universal reach to solve 
predictable problems.  I suggest that these interventions deny the interlocking nature of 
development and security challenges that cannot be ameliorated by technical solutions. 
The third conclusion relates to the continuous formalistic processes of intervention that 
have depoliticized the conceptualization and implementation of development aid and security 
programs.  The apolitical nature of the interventions remains ingrained in the calcified 
approaches of capacity building, empowerment and participation.  It is critical to note that an 
added impetus for the pursuit of these apolitical interventions is a heavy reliance upon 
technical experts.  These experts are deemed to wield unproblematic solutions to the simplified 
problems of development and security.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the translation of the 
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formalistic practices and processes encounter fierce resistance by both local government 
officials and residents. 
Fourth, the past and prevailing interventions point to the impossibility of securing the 
region, particularly by addressing the daunting systemic and complex challenges of 
development (specifically poverty) as well as security (relative to conflict prevention).  From 
my analytical perspective, the impossibility in securing the region lies with the simplistic 
rationales and assumptions.  The rationales and assumptions that undergird the interventions 
seek to privilege phenomenal wishful thinking.  Furthermore, the input-output logic that has 
underwritten these postcolonial interventions cannot provide theoretical or empirical 
frameworks to transform the region.  Thus, a quest to transform a conflict-prone region 
requires a critical historical contextual analysis and engagement with broader relational factors.  
Particularly relevant is the need to seek an understanding of the region as part of the process of 
state formation.  It is also imperative to consider the extra-territorial connectivity of the region 
and the effects of global policy decisions and practices of the region itself. 
Fifth, the evocation of the DSN, in view of the adumbrated interventions, typifies an 
endless imposition of liberal orthodoxy. This implies that the DSN constitutes a strategy to 
perpetuate liberal interventions.  The nerve center of these liberal interventions is the 
reconstitution of human agency and an imagined community as conduits for human 
transformation.  In addition, the recalibrated agential autonomy is composed through capacity 
building and empowerment to contain the risks associated with insecurity and poverty.  The 
DSN endorses the prevailing, unequal global power relations between the global north and 
south, whereby the Northern Region will remain worse off.  This fate is evidenced in the 
continuous causal linkage in the development and security challenges to weak internal 
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structures.  On the other hand, the imperialist practices in the global economy have been 
normalized.  I contend that the interventions analyzed in my empirical chapters demonstrate 
that the long-term development of the Northern Region is not a primary goal of donor countries 
and institutions.  Strikingly noticeable in the articulation of the DSN is an attempt by 
international aid agencies to maintain a policy hegemonic dominance over a poor region. 
Finally, my review of the various policy frameworks, projects and programmes leads to 
the conclusion that application of the DSN limits the policy space of SSA economies.  This 
limitation of the policy space is actively pushed for by relentless efforts to perpetuate an 
external trusteeship practice.  The external trusteeship is perpetrated by the deepening of 
remedial reforms driven by the same failed rationales.  In effect, I suggest that the DSN does 
not promote recourse to alternative options.  Considering the absence of a space for effective 
alternative aid options makes the push for good governance, rule of law, economic growth and 
democratic reforms ineffective frameworks for the dissolution of the adversarial colonial 
legacy.  Not until the pertinent historical justice, equity, and redistribution deficiencies, as well 
as the imperialist practices have been addressed, the goal of securing a conflict prone region 
will remain a mirage.  Niall Ferguson’s (2003) call for the West to be responsible for the 
development of the global south is, therefore, unacceptable, particularly when the trusteeship 
ideals remain in vogue.  Furthermore, Ferguson’s interventionist responsibilities placed on the 
‘West’ tend to ignore the historical facts of Western involvement in the SSA countries through 
colonialism and imperialism has, and continue to, hinder developmental prospects on the 
African continent.   The appropriate option in my view, therefore, is that attention must be 
directed towards the correction of colonial injustices and the on-going imperialist practices. 
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Implications for Future Research and Policy Direction 
The shortcomings of interventions as outlined in the summary and the six broad conclusions 
inevitably pose vital implications for future research.  The first implication is the need for a 
critical interrogation of the ideas, discourses and imaginations that frame existing and future 
international aid interventions.  A critical interrogation of interventionist practices, from an 
SSA perspective in particular, requires collaboration in notable fields such as African studies, 
sociology, political science and critical human geography.  Such broad interdisciplinary 
collaborations, when well pursued, will provide counter-conceptual and theoretical responses 
to the liberal instrumental discourses and ideas that underpin numerous interventions in various 
sites.   I view the need for a broader engagement in critical perspectives of the noted disciplines 
as crucial in the wake of the complexity of forces that drive the developmental and security 
challenges in the SSA countries and other ‘poor’ economies. 
A critical area in dire demand for collaborative scholarship relates to the thorny issue of 
state formation, which is fundamental in re-politicizing the apolitical and ahistorical 
interventionist practices.  The complex issue of state formation defies an adequate 
understanding of any single discipline.   Additionally, the dearth of comprehensive knowledge 
and processes of state formation make it more imperative of Third World oriented scholars 
from diverse backgrounds to join forces.   In addition, a need for a collaborative approach is 
crucial, given that international development institutions are not trans-ideological, and are 
driven by rational-scientific epistemological and ontological perspective.  
The urgent need for collaborative research is accentuated by significant shortcomings in 
interventionist practices.  In the absence of any counter-hegemonic responses to interventionist 
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failures, the aid industry will perpetuate a prescription of narrow neoliberal remedial measures.  
For example, the concept of ‘resilience’ is now the new development aid lexicon 
conceptualized by the UN and the World Bank as a panacea to the development and security 
challenges in conflict prone regions.  This resilience notion, as my findings in relation to the 
UNJHSP interventions reveal, constitutes a risk management strategy articulated through the 
empowerment of individuals to contain risk.  Thus, it becomes imperative to challenge this risk 
management notion that is creeping onto the development aid landscape. 
Diverse forms of knowledge production and subjectification are still active in shaping 
contemporary relations between the global north and south.  Shilliam (2011) problematizes the 
dominance of western thought in international relations.  He attributes the dominance of 
western thought to the discriminatory nature of the Western academy, colonialism and the rise 
of European power as a universal model (Shilliam, 2011, p.2-3).  The implication is that the 
silencing of non-Western thought has been the normative practice and, when not challenged, 
Western thought will continue to frame the failed interventions.  This perpetuation of Western 
thought is evidenced by the linear and technocratic ideas that structure reform proposals which 
have been proffered to correct failed interventions.  
 In considering the failed Western interventions as reflected in the dismal outcomes of 
aid interventions makes it necessary to recover non-Western thoughts by critical scholars to 
serve as credible alternative framework.  Shilliam (2011) suggests that the recovery of non-
Western thoughts is more crucial because it played a vital part in shaping pro-Western 
modernity of thought.  In the light of Shilliam’s suggestion, it is imperative to examine the 
resistance and challenges associated with the colonial encounter between Western and non-
Western societies.  Through such historical analysis of colonial encounters, the role played by 
323 
 
non-Western thinkers in the shaping of Western thought will be appreciated.  The logical 
implication is that the myth that surrounds Western discourses must be broken.  The aim of the 
recovery of non-Western thoughts according to Shilliam is: “to undermine the security of an 
epistemological cartography that quarantines legitimate knowledge production of modernity to 
one idealized geo-cultural site” (2011, p. 24).  In taking account of my research findings, I 
reiterate the need to engage non-Western thoughts in development studies and other cognate 
social sciences as a way to reorient aid thinking and practices. The crucial issue, then, relates to 
the exploration of the necessary modalities that will ensure a pragmatic collaborative research 
effort among diverse disciplines to promote and sustain non-Western scholarship.   
The first policy implication is that a precondition for securing a conflict-prone region is 
the abandonment of piecemeal approaches.  The problematic politics of representation and 
agenda setting was brought to the forefront in order to understand the processes of 
interventions.  Thus, the distorted politics of representation and agenda setting should instigate 
future research.  Particularly, prospective research should be directed at: ways to open the 
policy and political space to ensure equity and justice in the relations between the donor 
agencies and recipient regions.  Further research is needed in processes of enhancing the 
effective representations of the needs and priorities of diverse citizens of the Northern Region 
and other regions of similar conditions in SSA.  This call for critical policy and socio-political 
analyses in aid interventions make it vital for the international aid agencies to fully appreciate 
the need to embrace the ‘rocky' domestic political landscape.  Thus, it is advisable for 
international aid actors to recognize the adverse political effects of their actions. 
The other policy implication is the need for prospective approaches to embrace the 
complexity of rationales that are devoid of linear, technical and managerial thinking.   The 
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complexity approach, in my view, should gravitate towards an interrogation of wider historical 
contextual and contemporary relational issues, both internally and externally.  From my 
perspective, an adoption of complexity thinking will not foreground an achievement of non-
contextual targets and goals, but will rather seek long-term transformational thinking and 
practices.  I suggest that the quest for transformational possibilities must transcend the 
prevailing restrictive approaches of individual capacity building and empowerment.  Hence, 
the current pro-poor interventions trumpeted by the aid industry as the key to unlocking the 
development and security challenges in conflict prone regions, cannot be accurate.  The overall 
dismal outcomes of most of the interventions that I analyzed strongly imply the need for the aid 
industry to abandon this lofty goal setting practice.  It is from this context that I privilege a 
complexity approach that acknowledges that not all change is possible and predictable.  
Finally, the complexity orientation rejects an absolute faith in planned interventions and 
problematic reductionist designs. 
This study, akin to similar empirical research, was confronted with some challenges 
that need to be reiterated.  It is my expectation that the teething challenges I encountered would 
be of relevant guidance to future studies related to development aid interventions.   Due to time 
and other resource constraints I could not interview a wider diversity of residents, including the 
aged, disabled, orphans or widows as necessary.  Secondly, because of socio-cultural 
restrictions, I was unable to interview as many women as necessary to give my work a more 
nuanced gender perspective.  Given the paucity of gender perspectives in the DSN literature, I 
strongly recommend that future researchers’ consider it as a vital area of research enquiry.  The 
apparent or inevitable complex political nature of the broad dynamics of the interventions 
suggests the need to repoliticize issues.   
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Ultimately, this research has been an exciting aspect of my doctoral studies.  The 
fieldwork exposed me to vital, documented materials and actors that helped interrogate key 
research and subsidiary questions, as well as main arguments.  I found the Northern Region of 
Ghana an immensely relevant research site to obtain a better understanding of the overall 
development and security dynamics in the West African sub-region.  It has broadened my 
horizons, reshaped my preconceived perceptions about historically deprived regions and 
sharpened my critical viewpoints. 
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Appendix 
 
Interview Questions Guide  
International Development Aid Institutions, Agencies, and INGOs 
1. Please provide a brief overview of your organization and your position 
2. Kindly explain the underlying assumptions that frame the security and development 
interventions for poverty reduction in the district by your organization. How relevant 
are such assumptions in explaining and tackling the poverty challenge of the district? 
3. Please provide your organization’s perspective of the nature, aetiology and scale of the 
poverty situation in the district?   
4. How did your organization conceive of the fusion of development and security 
interventions to tackle the poverty crisis in the district? 
5. In what ways did the underlying assumptions for development and security influence 
your programmes/projects/policies for poverty reduction in the district? If not, what 
other considerations informed your programmes/projects and policies? 
6. What specific development and security programmes/ projects/policies did your 
organization initiate to address the poverty challenge in the district?  
7.  Please outline the specific procedures and processes that underpin(ned) implementation 
of the programs?  
8. Please explain the tensions/ complexities involved in the joint implementation of 
development and security interventions in the district? 
9. How have your organization handled or intend to address the implementation 
challenges?  
353 
 
10.  Overall, what impact did your interventions have on the poverty situation and securing 
the people in the district? 
11. What are the future plans and options? 
Domestic Actors: Officials of Government Ministries and Agencies 
1. What development and security plans and policies do you have for the district geared 
towards poverty reduction? 
2. What would you consider as the security and development priorities for poverty 
reduction within the district? 
3. Please describe the nature of working collaboration between your ministry and the 
donor agency in formulating, implementing, evaluating the operational plans, 
programmes and policies for interventions in the district? 
4. To what extent did the donor agency programmes/projects/plans align with that of your 
organization? If yes, kindly explain the similarities; and if no please articulate the 
differences and its implications in addressing the poverty situation in the district. 
5. Kindly explain the specific poverty-focused development intervention in the district?  
6. Please explain the challenges germane to the implementation of donor driven poverty 
focused development interventions in the district? 
7. Who would you say own both the development and security interventions in the district 
in terms of the content and implementation?  If the donors, what would you consider as 
the likely implications for future poverty reduction efforts? 
8. What were the specific donors driven security reforms that your ministry had to 
implement?  What specific support did the donor agencies provide for the security 
sector reform programme?   
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9. How were those security reforms articulated in the district? What would you consider 
as the constraints or problems inherent in the implementation of donor driven security 
reforms?  
10. How did the security interventions impact on poverty reduction in the district? 
11. What alternative strategies would you propose? 
Residents 
1. Please explain your understanding of the poverty situation in the district. 
2. In what ways have the past conflicts affected the security situation of the district?  
3. How has the prevailing security challenge impacted on the poverty situation in your 
district? 
4. Please outline the various donor poverty-focused development initiatives that have been 
implemented in your district? 
5. How has the various development projects/strategies and plans impacted on the peculiar 
poverty situation in your district? 
6. What policing initiatives have you noticed over the years? How has it impacted on the 
security challenge (s) in your locality?   
7. Has there being any noticeable judicial and penal reforms in your district? If yes, what 
kind of judicial and penal reforms can you notice? 
8.  How has the judicial and penal reforms impacted on the security and poverty situation 
in your locality?  
 
